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Abstract
Government efforts to insulate financial systems from criminal and terrorist exploitation
are a centerpiece of 21st century counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. This dissertation
describes this relatively new global economic counterinsurgency regime and analyzes its im-
pact on political security and economy. Despite the growth and expansive scope of these
policies, the academic and policy evaluations of these institutions have been limited, far less
than the scholarship devoted to the military and law enforcement prongs of counterinsur-
gency. I seek to bring these diverse policies under one research agenda. I argue that these
institutions have wide-ranging consequences across a broad spectrum of political phenomena
including security and international political economy. This dissertation will demonstrate
the importance of both targeted and systemic economic counterinsurgency in explaining pat-
terns of political violence and foreign investment. I address the following questions: How
does targeted economic counterinsurgency impact rebel groups use of violence against oppo-
nents and civilians? How do we measure country-level systemic economic counterinsurgency?
How does systemic economic counterinsurgency impact the levels of political violence within
a country and the desirability of a country’s economic market?
Economic Sanctions and Insurgent Violence: How do targeted sanctions affect the bat-
tlefield behaviors of insurgent groups? Policies that seek to restrict rebel group’s access to
resources, such as freezing assets, imposing embargoes, and limiting travel, are increasingly
common forms of third-party intervention aimed at reducing a rebel group’s ability to per-
petrate violence. However, extant literature on battlefield dynamics show that economic
sanctions are rarely effective and that rebels may be most prone to victimize and exploit
xii
civilian populations during periods of relative weakness. I present a theory that explains
heterogeneity in rebel responses to economic sanctions based on the rebel group’s economic
portfolio and founding connections with local communities. I expect groups with diversified
funding streams and sources of income that are difficult to interdict to be relatively resilient
to economic sanctions. However, groups with few sources of income or funding that is vul-
nerability to external interdiction will reduce their overall levels of violence when targeted
by sanctions. I expect rebel groups lacking organizational ties to local populations, such as
those that mobilized around external resources, to increase their violence against civilians
when targeted by sanctions in order to recoup losses and extract resources. In contrast,
groups that have preexisting social connections to non-combatants will reduce civilian vic-
timization when sanctions make them further reliant on maintaining support from civilians.
My theory is tested using data on insurgent groups from 1998-2012 and implementation of
United Nations sanctions. The results show that sanctions reduce violence from economi-
cally vulnerable groups, but groups that lack social ties to civilians will respond to resource
deficiencies by increasing their violence against civilians. This work demonstrates when
policymakers can best expect economic sanctions to succeed and when these policies might
produce a backlash of violence against civilians.
Measuring State Counter-Illicit Financing Systems : Government efforts to insulate fi-
nancial systems from criminal and terrorist exploitation are a centerpiece of 21st century
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. The goal of anti-money laundering and countering
the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) policies is to reduce political violence by cutting off
funding to violent non-state actors. Despite the proliferation of these policies, their preva-
lence, design, and efficacy have largely been neglected in the conflict literature. To fill this
gap, this article introduces a two new concepts, counter-illicit financing structures and effec-
tiveness. AML/CFT structures comprise the institutions and regulatory tools designed to
detect, monitor, and counter illicit financing. AML/CFT effectiveness encompasses a state’s
xiii
willingness and capacity to use their toolbox to effectively secure their financial system. I cre-
ate state-level estimates of structural and the effectiveness of these institutions using expert
reports from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and a Dynamic Item Response Theory
model. I demonstrate the validity of these measures by exploring the model parameters and
correlation with other measures of government institutional quality. The results show that
an aversion to regulating private businesses hinders the strength of structural provisions to
countering illicit financing. I conclude by evaluating the impact of these policies on political
violence. The results show that effective AML/CFT systems are associated with fewer civil
war battle deaths.
Counter-Illicit Financing Measures and Foreign Investment : How do AML/CFT policies
affect foreign direct investment (FDI)? Domestic and international AML/CFT provisions
aimed to disrupt the flow of money fueling violence were developed in the 1980s and became
widespread after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States. These policies are
costly for businesses and require increased transparency over business dealings, customer
due diligence and documentation requirements, and coordination between host markets and
firms. This presents a puzzle for understanding firm investment behavior. Firms prefer host
markets with fewer costs and regulations but are attracted to capable host governments
that can rebuff violent instability. To understand these tensions, I consider two measures
of state counter-illicit financing systems, the laws and regulations that make up a coun-
try’s AML/CFT institutions and the government capacity to use these tools to produce
AML/CFT effectiveness. My theory of firm preferences shows that firms should invest in
markets with fewer AML/CFT institutions but high AML/CFT effectiveness. However,
firm preferences for an effective AML/CFT environment decreases as the regulations they
are subject to increase. Using original data on state robustness to illicit financing and FDI
inflows, I find support for these expectations. Evaluating other measures of the business
environment further support my core expectations. This study contributes a new theory
xiv
explaining variation in FDI and highlights a tension between firm preferences and efforts to





International efforts to disrupt the financing of violent non-state actors first developed in
the late 1980s in response to an era of violence from warring drug cartels. These narco-cartels
amassed substantial fortunes and weapons stockpiles by exploiting trade routes and the
legitimate financial system for drug trafficking and money laundering. The Group of Seven
(G-7) created the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 1989 to coordinate efforts to disrupt
illicit financing and develop international standards on combating money laundering. After
the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center these existing structures were
integrated into the United States’ War on Terror. In a Rose Garden address, on September
24, 2001, President George W. Bush implored of world leaders, “Money is the lifeblood
of terrorist organizations. Today we are asking the world to stop payment” (Bush, 2001).
This dissertation evaluates the tools and policies designed to accomplish this ambitious goal,
presents new country-year measures of counter-illicit financing structures and effectiveness,
and analyzes how well the world has met this challenge.
Under the coordination of FATF, individual governments and intergovernmental orga-
nizations have created a massive interconnected system of regulations, surveillance, and
1
enforcement with purview over every part of the global financial system (Biersteker and
Eckert, 2007). I refer to these individual laws and policies as economic counterinsurgency
and use the term economic counterinsurgency regime to described this broad international ef-
fort.1 Economic counterinsurgency encompasses actions that range from narrowly targeting
a single group to broad structural policies that affect the global financial system. Selec-
tive policies include terrorist designation lists and unilateral or multilateral sanctions such
as the United Nations ISIL and Al-Qa’ida Sanctions Committee. Categorical efforts target
entire countries or specific sectors, for example the Kimberley Process,2 legislation regulat-
ing charitable donations or conflict minerals (Section 1503 of the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act), the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)’s efforts to disrupt the narcotics trade,
and country-level sanctions. Policies can also center on structural changes that impact the
ability of all illicit groups to use or manipulate financial systems to fund violence. These
systemic efforts include intelligence sharing across national financial intelligence units (FIUs)
within the Egmont Group3 and strengthening of anti-money laundering and countering the
financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) provisions under FATF.
This dissertation describes this relatively new global economic counterinsurgency regime
and analyzes its impact on political security and economy. Despite the growth and expansive
scope of these policies, the academic and policy evaluations of these institutions have been
limited, far less than the scholarship devoted to the military and law enforcement prongs of
counterinsurgency. I seek to bring these diverse policies under one research agenda. I argue
that these institutions have wide-ranging consequences across a broad spectrum of political
1Within the policy community, these efforts are commonly labeled some variation of Countering (or Com-
bating) the Financing of Terrorism (CFT). This terminology is used by the United Nations, the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, Financial Action Task Force, and many individual governments. The poli-
cies discussed here are used to target terrorists, insurgent groups, and criminals. For simplicity I use the
term counterinsurgency but this refers to actions against all violent non-state actors.
2The Kimberley Process creates certification standards to ensure rough diamonds are not used to finance
insurgent groups.
3The Egmont Group was founded in 1995 to provide a platform for cooperation between FIUs in sharing
technical expertise and intelligence.
2
phenomena including security and international political economy. This dissertation will
demonstrate the importance of both targeted and systemic economic counterinsurgency in
explaining patterns of political violence and foreign investment. I address the following ques-
tions: How does targeted economic counterinsurgency impact rebel groups’ use of violence
against opponents and civilians? How do we measure country-level systemic economic coun-
terinsurgency? How does systemic economic counterinsurgency impact the levels of political
violence within a country and the desirability of a country’s economic market?
This dissertation takes an intersectional approach to evaluate these questions across three
papers. I expect the impact of economic counterinsurgency to ripple through the global fi-
nancial system, just as military operations have wide-ranging impacts on the broader security
environment. I begin by discussing the ways illicit actors exploit the financial system to fund
their violent operations and analyzing one of the most popular economic counterinsurgency
tools: targeted sanctions. Building on theories of rebel mobilization, tactics, and origins, I
theorize that economic sanctions should have heterogeneous effects across rebel groups based
on characteristics of the rebel groups’ economic portfolios and origins. This study examines
enforcement challenges based on the economic portfolios of individual groups but highlights
state-level compliance and enforcement as unexplored sources of variation that should also
influence the efficacy of targeted policies. To investigate this variation further, I create state-
level yearly measures of counter-illicit financing structures and effectiveness. Then, I evaluate
how systemic economic counterinsurgency affects political violence and the economic market
within a country. In the third paper I move from exploring illicit exploitation of financing
markets to evaluate how these counter-illicit financing policies will impact legal business
using financial markets for trade and routine transactions. Together this dissertation evalu-
ates the impacts of government economic counterinsurgency on three sets of actors: violent
non-state actors, civilians in proximity to insurgencies, and multinational firms navigating
the counters of financial markets redefined by systemic economic counterinsurgency.
3
My approach differs from the existing body of work on economic counterinsurgency in four
primary ways. First, this diverse set of economic counterinsurgency tactics affects a range
of actors through unique mechanisms. In Chapter 2, I evaluate how the same economic
counterinsurgency tools might have different impacts on violent non-state actors depending
on the unique characteristics of the rebel group. My theory describes heterogeneity across
insurgent groups in their responses to economic coercion based on the vulnerability and
diversity of their economic portfolios and organizational origins. The results show that
economic sanctions can reduce net levels of violence by rebel groups with diversified economic
portfolios. My approach proves that not only do the tools of economic counterinsurgency
vary, but within a single tool the impact varies based on attributes of the target.
Second, I move beyond prior studies of economic sanctions that only evaluate rebel
groups’ battlefield violence (Radtke and Jo, 2018; Escribà-Folch, 2010; Hultman and Peksen,
2017) and consider how economic coercion might have unintended consequences on civilian
populations. Building on my approach of evaluating rebel heterogeneity, I show that groups’
foundational connections to pre-existing institutions such as political parties, local govern-
ments, or religious movements can have enduring impacts on their responses to economic
coercion and relationship to civilian populations. Economic sanctions increase these groups’
reliance on civilian populations and incentivize rebel groups to reduce any coercive behaviors
toward noncombatants. Alternatively, rebel groups that originated around external resource
endowments or from splintering off prior violent non-state actors do not have these shared
social connections or tools to persuade civilians to supplement their losses under economic
sanctions. They will instead use increased violence and predation against civilian populations
to shore up resource deficiencies.
Third, this dissertation is the first research to cross-nationally measure and evaluate
systemic economic counterinsurgency. As the following sections will show, academic work
on economic counterinsurgency has mainly focused on economic sanctions or case-specific
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evaluations of categorical economic counterinsurgency. However, these actions take place
under the broader AML/CFT structures that I elucidate. I create two new concepts to
evaluate counter-illicit financing. AML/CFT structures measure a country’s AML/CFT
laws and regulatory tools and AML/CFT effectiveness encompasses the government’s latent
capabilities and willingness to use these tools to produce improved security of financial
markets. Using these original measures, I uncover a correlation between effective systemic
economic counterinsurgency and lower levels of intrastate violence. These measures will
enable other researchers to study these phenomena further, incorporate systemic variation
into analyses of categorical and targeted measures. They can also provide guidance for
policymakers seeking to compare and improve state security against illicit manipulation of
financial markets.
Finally, I look beyond political violence and evaluate how economic counterinsurgency
policies affect the broader political economy of a country. Policymakers and scholars must
consider these downstream effects when evaluating the costs and benefits of economic coun-
terinsurgency. I argue that systemic changes in the financial system meant to rebuff illicit
financing will also impact legitimate actors in the international political economy. Focusing
on primary actors of the international political economy, multinational firms, I show that
firms consider systemic economic counterinsurgency in their investment location choices.
Foreign firms offer employment opportunities, technology spillover, and services that can
bolster social and economic conditions within a country, particularly for developing coun-
tries, and may be associated with less violent conflict (Schneider, 2017; De Soysa and Fjelde,
2010). As such, exploring factors which entice or repel foreign investment is a prominent
research vein in international political economy (Pandya, 2016). My results show that for-
eign firms avoid markets with costly AML/CFT structures but are attracted to countries
that effectively insulate their financial markets from illicit exploitation. These findings point
to a source of tension between governments seeking to attract foreign investment and im-
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prove their compliance with international counter-illicit financing policies. This dissertation
demonstrates the interconnected nature of the actors involved in the international financial
system, both licit and illicit.
This chapter reviews the tools of economic counterinsurgency and our existing knowledge
on them. I classify forms of economic counterinsurgency based on the scope and discrimina-
tion of their targets. At the most narrow, targeted economic counterinsurgency focuses on
a single violent non-state group or individual within a violent group. Categorical economic
counterinsurgency encompasses a collection of targets based on a shared feature, for example
all the groups within a given country or commodity-specific measures such as diamond certi-
fication standards. Systemic economic counterinsurgency involves fundamental shifts to the
financial system and the functioning of the economy to avoid illicit exploitation. These forms
of economic counterinsurgency are not mutually exclusive and a given group may operate
under systemic, categorical, and targeted economic counterinsurgency. I highlight the gaps
that remain within our understanding of each of these areas and where I make my contri-
bution. Then, I briefly review the organization of the dissertation. I conclude this chapter
by discussing implications for public policy and my dissertation’s contribution toward the
literatures on economic counterinsurgency, political violence, and foreign investment.
1.1.1 Targeted Economic Counterinsurgency
Targeted economic counterinsurgency is the oldest form of economic counterinsurgency
and encompasses many different tactics.4 I define targeted economic counterinsurgency as
efforts to block, disrupt, or destroy tangible support to a specific insurgent group, individual
group member, or supporter of the group. The goal of targeted economic counterinsurgency
is to reduce political violence by cutting off violent groups’ access to financing, munitions,
4The first known use of targeted economic counterinsurgency occurred in 432 BC between city-states
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Targeted Sanctions on Violent Non−State Actors
Figure 1.1: Active UN and US Targeted Sanctions Regimes
logistical support, transnational travel, and other supplies. These actions take many forms
including but not limited to military strikes against money reserves, arresting financiers,
raiding and confiscating caches of supplies, terrorist exclusion lists, and freezing assets of
specific leaders on the United Nations ISIL and Al-Qa’ida Sanctions Committee. Since the
end of the Cold War, these tactics have increasingly taken the form of targeted economic
sanction regimes. Figure 1.1 shows the increase in rebel groups targeted by United Nations
and United States economic sanctions from 1990-2020.
The limited literature evaluating specific targeted economic counterinsurgency tools has
found that these can be effective tools for curtailing violent groups. Paul, Clarke and Grill
(2010) reviews 30 resolved insurgency cases from 1978-2008 and finds that reducing tangible
support to insurgents is a highly effective strategy. In the eight successful cases of coun-
terinsurgency in the sample, counterinsurgents disrupted at least three forms of tangible
support, and in the 22 cases where counterinsurgency was deemed a failure, counterinsur-
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gent forces disrupted no more than two sources of support (Paul, Clarke and Grill, 2010).
Sanctions are most successful at curtailing violence and reducing the duration of civil wars
when combined with military or peacekeeping operations (Lektzian and Regan, 2016; Le
Billon, 2012). Escribà-Folch (2010) evaluates 87 civil wars from 1959-1999 and determines
that economic sanctions and arms embargoes can hasten the decline of civil wars. However,
the record on intensity is mixed. Hultman and Peksen (2017) distinguishes the components
that form targeted sanctions, demonstrating that economic sanctions are associated with
increased intensity of violence, but arms embargoes reduce battlefield violence.5 For rebels
lacking diversified funding streams, sanctions can contribute to territorial losses and reduced
levels of violence (Radtke and Jo, 2018). Radtke and Jo (2018) is one of the first studies to
specifically consider sanctions targeting non-state actors, but is limited by only considering
variation in groups’ economic endowments. Phillips (2019) evaluates the United States’ For-
eign Terrorist Designations and shows these measures are associated with reduced terrorist
violence, but only from groups based in countries aligned with the United States. These
results show economic counterinsurgency may effectively reduce rebel capacity for violence
in some cases. Research into targeted economic counterinsurgency is the most developed, yet
our understanding of why targeted economic counterinsurgency works against some groups
but not others is still limited. This literature has only begun to explore the direct impacts of
economic sanctions and not yet examined the broader effects on insurgent group structures
and tactics, rebel groups’ willingness to negotiate, violence against civilians, and impacts on
states and non-state entities that enforce sanctions.
5Most sanctions targeted at rebel groups include arms embargoes. All the sanctions analyzed in this
dissertation are comprised of freezing assets, travel restrictions, and arms embargoes.
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1.1.2 Categorical Economic Counterinsurgency
I use the term categorical economic counterinsurgency to refer to the policies that impact
many different groups based on their locations and economic profiles. These efforts mostly
arose in the 1990s out of academic and policy research that identified the prevalence of nat-
ural resources as associated with conflict, deemed the resource curse. Research and policies
built around this topic sought to break the various mechanisms linking resource-rich coun-
tries to cycles of violence and instability. Prominent examples of these institutions include
the Kimberley Process, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), international
and domestic legislation regulating the use of conflict minerals in technology products, and
United Nations’ resource sanctions targeting entire countries. The Security Council imple-
mented commodity-specific sanctions in approximately one third of resource-based conflicts
from 1989-2006 (Le Billon and Nicholls, 2007) and, in 2009, the United Nations Environ-
ment Programme issued a report that argued “international sanctions should be the primary
instrument dedicated to stopping the trade in conflict resources” (United Nations Environ-
ment Programme (UNEP), 2009). These policies do not target a specific violent non-state
actor but will impact any group in a targeted region that uses the designated resource in-
cluding access to armaments. Figure 1.1 traces the development of key categorical economic
counterinsurgency policies.
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Table 1.1: Timeline of Categorical Economic Counterinsurgency
1990• UNSC imposes sanctions on all goods and
arms in Iraq and Kuwait (resolution 661).
2000• Kimberley Process Established.
2002• Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
established.
2002• Kimberley Process enters into force.
2010• United States passes Dodd-Frank Act.
2021• EU Conflict Minerals Regulations enters into
force.
The academic and policy research into categorical economic counterinsurgency shows
mixed results. Beevers (2015) analyzes the efficacy of natural resource management strategies
in Liberia and Sierra Leone and argues that the Kimberley Process has improved monitoring
and reduced smuggling, resultantly strengthening government control over mining areas. In a
systematic review of the process, Grant (2012) argues that the Kimberley Process is effective
at reducing the trade in diamonds and this has contributed to successful peacebuilding
efforts in Angola and Sierra Leone. Evidence from several recent studies also suggests EITI
improves regulatory behavior. Rustad, Le Billon and Lujala (2017) provide a comprehensive
evaluation of EITI goals, organizing them into three categories: institutional, operational,
and developmental. Institutional goals include building the EITI organization, increasing
membership, and promoting EITI norms. Operational goals focus on implementation of EITI
standards and improving state compliance with guidelines. Developmental goals are long-
term outcomes such as reducing corruption, increasing investments, and improving living
conditions. In Rustad, Le Billon and Lujala (2017)’s review of 45 studies, 72% find evidence
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of institutional success, 44% for operational success and 23% for development success.6
However, research into policies to disrupt the conflict-mineral link offer a less hopeful
outlook (Bloem, 2018; Stoop, Verpoorten and Van der Windt, 2018). Section 1503 of the
Dodd-Frank Act was created to break the link between natural minerals and conflict in
Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, but has been associated with increased violence
and looting in affected areas (Bloem, 2018; Stoop, Verpoorten and Van der Windt, 2018).
Bloem (2018) shows that the Dodd-Frank Act doubled the probability that administrative
areas within DRC would experience a range of violent unrest including violence against
civilians, battles between rebel groups, riots, and protests. The results suggest there is
more work to be done to link the mechanisms undergirding policies to case-specific and
broader knowledge on how rebel groups extract, manage, and use resources. Understanding
the components of these resource-generating tactics, their supply chain features, and rebel
groups’ organizational structures can help policymakers anticipate and safeguard against
side effects.
1.1.3 Systemic Economic Counterinsurgency
In the late 1980s and 1990s, states began developing domestic legislation and forming
international agreements to disrupt the booming illicit trade in narcotics and money laun-
dering systems that allowed criminals to obscure the origins of their fortunes. In 1999, the
United Nations General Assembly adopted the International Convention on the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism, which only four states had ratified prior to September 2001
(Biersteker and Eckert, 2007). The September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Cen-
ter produced a sea change in domestic and international efforts to counter the financing of
terrorism and, led by the U.S. Treasury Department, galvanized states, intergovernmental
6Several studies were unable to fully evaluate EITI’s developmental success because it was too early in
the process.
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organizations, and civil society actors to identify and disrupt sources of funding to violent
non-state actors (Biersteker and Eckert, 2007; Zarate, 2013). These efforts were paired with
targeted and categorical tools of economic coercion that have been frequently applied against
states to construct an international regime of economic counterinsurgency. Figure 1.2 pro-
vides a timeline of the development of key systemic economic counterinsurgency policies.
Despite its omnipresence, systemic economic counterinsurgency has been the most neglected
in the literature, in part due to measurement challenges, and is the focus of two chapters of
this dissertation.
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Table 1.2: Timeline of Systemic Economic Counterinsurgency
1989• Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
established by the G7.
1995• Egmont Group convened.
1996• FATF updated.
1999• October: UNSC first introduces Resolution
1267.
•
December: UNGA adopts International
Convention on the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism.
2000• Wolfsberg Group formed.
2001• UNSC Resolutions 1368, 1373.
2001• FATF issues eight special recommendations on
terrorist financing.
• G8 Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG)
established.
2004•
UNSC creates Counter-Terrorism Committee
Executive Directorate (CTED) (Resolution
1535).
2006• UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy
adopted by UNGA.
2012• FATF rules updated to current standards.
2017• United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism
(UNOCT) established.
In surveying the literature on targeted, categorical, and systemic economic counterinsur-
gency, I identify two areas where new research could be most impactful. First, the literature
on targeted and categorical sanctions is relatively disconnected from broad theories in the
conflict literature on rebel origins, mobilization strategies, and treatment of civilian popu-
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lations. Access to resources and relative abundance of endowments feature prominently in
these theories, but far less attention has been paid to economic deprivation and changes
in rebel behavior as they lose resources. Prior work on economic counterinsurgency has
produced qualitative case-studies that contribute important knowledge of the mechanisms
of economic counterinsurgency and their application in specific environments, and broad
analyses of civil wars that do not measure group-level effects and behavioral changes. This
dissertation connects theories of rebel organization and tactics from the conflict literature to
the mechanisms of targeted economic sanctions to elucidate rebel behavior under resource
constraints.
Second, this literature provides no unified measure or analysis of cross-national systemic
economic counterinsurgency. Chapters 3 and 4 of the dissertation center on filling this gap.
The lack of a measure of systemic economic counterinsurgency or state counter-illicit fi-
nancing policies poses a challenge for understanding the entire economic counterinsurgency
regime. Economic counterinsurgency policies overlap and the enforcement and success of one
measure is inextricably linked to the quality of other economic counterinsurgency institu-
tions. For example, Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) operates in Mali and across
the African Sahel region. AQIM has been subject to sanctions under the ISIL (Da’esh)
and Al-Qa’ida Sanctions Committee since 20017 and subject to numerous targeted economic
counterinsurgency operations to confiscate, destroy, and block their supply chains and re-
source stockpiles. The group also is subject to the country-wide sanctions and arms embargo
imposed on Mali (pursuant to UNSC resolution 2374). To evaluate the impact of these poli-
cies, scholars must also consider the wider tools and capabilities that national governments
have available to monitor and enforce economic counterinsurgency provisions. My mea-
sures show that Mali has relatively strong AML/CFT effectiveness compared to Mauritania
7The group was initial listed under its original alias, the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, on the
original UNSC Al-Qa’ida sanctions list.
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and this variation may shine light on differences in the efficacy of categorical and targeted
economic counterinsurgency measures in the region. I create measures of counter-illicit fi-
nancing structures and effectiveness to evaluate systemic economic counterinsurgency, but
expect these measures to also be integrated into the evaluation of targeted and categorical
economic counterinsurgency.
1.2 Organization of the Dissertation
In Chapter 2, Economic Sanctions and Insurgent Violence, I begin my study of the global
economic counterinsurgency regime by evaluating economic sanctions that target insurgent
groups. This paper fills the gap I have identified in the literature by connecting our knowl-
edge of the mechanisms of economic counterinsurgency with theories of rebel mobilization
and origins. This expands the literature by evaluating not just violence between warring
parties, but also a targeted insurgent groups’ propensity to attack civilians. I expect the im-
pacts of sanctions to vary across rebel characteristics. My theory centers on the vulnerability
and diversity of a rebel group’s economic portfolio and how its founding origins shapes its
relationship with civilian populations. Economic sanctions are designed to create economic
costs for the target by restricting its access to foreign markets for imports and exports. I
expect rebel groups with economic portfolios that are comprised of resource-generating tac-
tics with long supply chains and cross-boarder transactions to be especially vulnerable to
economic sanctions as these revenue streams rely on access to the wider world economy. Al-
ternatively some rebel groups’ resource-generating tactics are relatively difficult to interdict
and I expect these groups to be more resilient in the face of economic coercion.
Next I move beyond extant research that only evaluates battlefield violence (Radtke and
Jo, 2018; Escribà-Folch, 2010; Hultman and Peksen, 2017) and analyze how economic co-
ercion might affect violence against civilians. I consider two primary tactics groups use to
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elicit civilian support: persuasion and coercion. I build my theory of rebel violence against
civilians based on theories of rebel origins and the impact of origins on rebel institutions.
The pre-existing institutions from which rebels drew their initial membership have enduring
impacts on rebel groups’ organizational structures and subsequent treatment of civilian pop-
ulations. I show that groups founded in pre-existing institutions with connections to local
communities will maintain their ties to civilians and use persuasion to acquire more resources
from civilians. The implementation of economic sanctions are accompanied by international
condemnation meant to name and shame the deleterious behaviors of the target. Attacks
on the reputation of a rebel group can be particularly harmful to groups with social ori-
gins, as they rely on civilians favorable perceptions to maintain their support. These rebels
groups will face economic constraints produced by and in order to extract additional re-
sources from civilians they will need to counter the UN’s narrative. This incentivizes groups
that occasionally were coercive to civilians to improve their behavior and cease any violence
that could provide evidence in support of a harmful narrative. Groups with social origins
are more likely to extract additional resources from civilian populations without reliance on
coercion. Economic counterinsurgency efforts that are viewed as unfair or repressive may
actually galvanize civilian networks to provide additional support.
Facing economic sanctions, groups lacking institutional ties to civilians will have few
strategies available to recoup their potential losses. Relationships with local communities
require trust and shared interests which develop over time through iterated reciprocal in-
teractions. Predatory groups facing economic constraints cannot use persuasion or shared
social networks to seek resources from civilian populations. These groups may attempt to
strategically offload their economic losses onto civilian populations, violently extracting more
resources to supplement losses in other income steams. In periods of economic decline, rebels
are particularly vulnerable to other forms of counterinsurgency and may increase coercive
measures to dissuade or punish civilian cooperation with government forces.
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I evaluate my theory using data on insurgent groups from 1998-2012 and implementation
of United Nations sanctions. The results show that sanctions reduce violence from economi-
cally vulnerable groups, but groups lacking institutional connections to civilians will respond
to resource deficiencies by increasing violence against civilians. Sanctions are most effective
at reducing violence from groups with few sources of income. Economically diversified insur-
gents can avoid the costs of sanctions or rely on alternative sources of funding to continue
their violent operations. These findings highlight the risk of implementing sanctions without
careful consideration of rebel characteristics. Policymakers targeting rebels without ties to
local communities may need to pair economic counterinsurgency with programs to protect
civilians from potential backlash.
This chapter does not find support for my expectations on the vulnerability of rebel
resource-generating tactics. If there is not variation in enforcement of sanctions based on
funding streams, where else might we be able to observe differences in the enforcement of
economic sanctions? An important and missing source of variation in Chapter 2 is differences
across governments in their ability to implement sanctions, secure borders from the smuggling
of goods, and the resilience of their financial systems from illicit exploitation. These systemic
forms of economic counterinsurgency are an important layer of the broader counterinsurgency
efforts that rebel groups face. However, there exists no cross-national measure of systemic
economic counterinsurgency, so I create these measures in Chapter 3.
In Chapter 3, Measuring State Counter-Illicit Financing Systems, I evaluate the broadest
level of economic counterinsurgency, system-wide laws, policies, and tools that governments
use to insulate their financial systems from exploitation from illicit actors. This chapter in-
troduces two new concepts to measure a state’s counter-illicit financing systems. AML/CFT
structures comprises the legal framework and regulatory tools established to oversee, inves-
tigate, and block illicit financing. AML/CFT effectiveness is derived from a government’s
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capacity and willingness to use its toolbox to disrupt illicit activities.8 AML/CFT effective-
ness captures how well a government is able to achieve the goals of AML/CFT and ability
to identify, disrupt, and prevent efforts to use financial systems for illicit purposes. I create
county-level estimates of AML/CFT structures and AML/CFT effectiveness using expert
country assessments from FATF and dynamic ordinal item response theory models.
I demonstrate the validity of these measures by exploring the model parameters and
correlation with other measures of government institutional quality. I conclude by evaluating
the impact of these policies on political violence. The results show that financial robustness
has no clear impact on levels of terrorism but is associated with fewer civil war battle deaths.
Exploring the latent variable model parameters highlights the challenges governments face
in regulating private entities which serve as the day-to-day regulators over transactions.
Governments are adverse to regulating private businesses and this hinders the strength of
structural provisions to AML/CFT. I explore this tension further in Chapter 4 by evaluating
firm preferences over host markets with different counter-illicit financing systems.
Chapter 4, Foreign Investment and State Robustness to Illicit Financing, delves deeper
into the behaviors of legitimate firms operating in financial markets that have been recon-
figured by systemic economic counterinsurgency. Chapter 3 showed that an aversion to
regulating private businesses hinders the strength of structural provisions to countering il-
licit financing. I investigate this further with a firm-centric approach by considering a firm’s
preferences over host markets with varying levels of AML/CFT structures and AML/CFT
effectiveness. The policies of systemic economic counterinsurgency are costly for businesses
and require increased transparency over business dealings, customer due diligence and doc-
umentation requirements, and coordination between host markets and firms. This presents
8I use the terms structural AML/CFT and AML/CFT technical compliance interchangeably. Both terms
refer to the first measure of counter-illicit financing systems which captures the underlying laws and tools in a
country. I use the terms AML/CFT capacity and willingness interchangeably with AML/CFT effectiveness.
This second dimension captures a government’s ability to identify, enforce, and disrupt money laundering
and terrorist financing.
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a puzzle for understanding firm investment behavior. Firms prefer host markets with fewer
costs and regulations but are attracted to capable host governments that can rebuff violent
instability.
I argue that firms seek out host markets where they can minimize the costs of invasive
AML/CFT regulations but reap the benefits of a government with a strong capacity to
counter illicit financing and environment free of well-financed violent actors. Firms most
prefer host markets characterized by weak AML/CFT structures but high AML/CFT effec-
tiveness. However, as AML/CFT regulations and restrictions on business dealings become
more onerous, firms prefer governments less adept at implementing them. To evaluate my
theory, I use the original measures of state AML/CFT structures and AML/CFT effective-
ness developed in Chapter 3 and data on FDI inflows. The results support my theoretical
expectations. Firms prefer host markets characterized by weak AML/CFT structures but
high AML/CFT effectiveness and investment into strong host markets decreases with in-
creasing AML/CFT structures. This chapter contributes a new theory explaining variation
in FDI and highlights a tension between firm preferences and efforts to protect financial
systems from illicit exploitation. These findings provide additional context for the trade
off identified in Chapter 3 between a government’s goal to insulate financial markets from
exploitation by violent non-state actors and their desire to attract foreign investment to
stimulate economic growth.
In Chapter 5 I conclude with a summary of the dissertation, policy and academic contri-
butions, and future research that follows from this work.
1.3 Contribution and Policy Implications
This dissertation makes several contributions to the study of economic counterinsur-
gency as a unified area of research. First, I contribute new knowledge on the scope and
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occurrence of economic counterinsurgency. The policies of economic counterinsurgency have
been largely studied in isolation, but I connect these policies under the framework of the
global economic counterinsurgency regime. Although my contributions center on targeted
and systemic economic counterinsurgency, I believe the wider context of the global economic
counterinsurgency regime is helpful to understanding its individual components.
Second, I create the first cross-national measure of systemic economic counterinsurgency.
Systemic economic counterinsurgency is important to several areas of study in political sci-
ence and public policy, including political violence, international political economy, and
international interactions. Future work can use these measures to evaluate variation in ro-
bustness across state features, variation in economic markets, state behavior in international
bargaining, and political violence. These estimates are also useful to policymakers to evalu-
ate counterparts’ robustness to illicit financing and separate false signals of compliance from
strong AML/CFT systems. The results show that several countries that have the highest
structural robustness fail to effectively block the illicit exploitation of their financial systems.
Information is a key aspect of international cooperation and bargaining. The information
provided by these measures can help regulators understand compliance and reduce enforce-
ment noise for efforts to enhance international institutions.
My focus on the downstream effects of economic counterinsurgency is a significant depar-
ture from prior approaches and a key contribution of this dissertation. I pursue this line of
inquiry down two paths. In Chapter 2, I evaluate how targeted economic counterinsurgency
will impact the civilians living in proximity to insurgency groups. The results show that
rebel groups lacking social ties to local communities may attempt to recoup their economic
losses by attacking civilians and extracting resources via coercion. Policymakers should
carefully consider when to implement economic counterinsurgency and when to pair these
interventions with policies to protect civilian populations from a potential backlash.
Chapter 4 evaluates the impact of systemic economic counterinsurgency on the legitimate
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firms that form the backbone of the international financial system. Changes to the financial
system meant to repel illicit actors flow through international markets and can impact a
broad range of actors. This work shows that foreign investors are repelled by AML/CFT
structures that impose onerous regulations on them but are attracted to markets that have
demonstrated an ability to keep illicit actors from exploiting the financial system. This find-
ing has direct relevance for policymakers as foreign direct investment represents a significant
share of many countries economies and firm preferences for less regulated markets may be an
impediment to international efforts on AML/CFT. AML/CFT efforts are costly for domestic
governments, and this study has identified additional opportunity costs of repulsing foreign
investors that seek out less regulated environments.
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CHAPTER II
Economic Sanctions and Insurgent Violence
2.1 Introduction
Targeted sanctions and other forms of economic counterinsurgency are increasingly com-
mon policy tools for disrupting violent non-state actors’ access to financing, munition, and
transnational travel.1 Yet, our understanding of the processes and efficacy of economic coer-
cion are based on policies targeting states and theories of state behavior in the international
system. There lacks scholarship linking the mechanisms of economic sanctions to theories of
insurgent behavior. The logic undergirding economic counterinsurgency is straightforward;
rebels require resources to mobilize and sustain insurgencies, so limiting the availability of re-
sources should reduce rebel capacity to perpetrate violence. However, there has been limited
evaluation of the assumptions underlying these policies or their potential side effects. Draw-
ing on theories of rebel origins and mobilization, I evaluate these assumptions and analyze
the impact of targeted United Nations (UN) sanctions on rebel violence against combatants
and civilians.
Access to resources and relative abundance of endowments feature prominently in theories
1I use the terms rebel, insurgent, terrorist, and violent non-state actors interchangeably throughout this
dissertation. This chapter’s scope encompasses all violent groups contesting governments and is operational-
ized as a group that has engaged in conflict with a government producing more than 25 battle deaths in a
given year.
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of rebel mobilization (Olson, 1965; Lichbach, 1998; Weinstein, 2006) and strategic behavior
(Lei and Michaels, 2014; Buhaug, Gates and Lujala, 2009; Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore,
2005; Fearon, 2004; Lujala, 2009; Maystadt et al., 2013) but are understudied sources of het-
erogeneity in explanations of rebel evolution, including their demise (Jones and Libicki, 2008;
Toft, Duero and Bieliauskas, 2010; Cronin, 2009; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2014). If resources
are vital to the onset and sustainment of violent insurrection, how are groups affected when
resources become more costly to procure or run out entirely? Inherent to the termination
of any insurgent group is a period of decline, characterized by a combination of battlefield
losses, resource deprivation, and erosion of local or external support. Recent work in this
vein has found that rebels facing battlefield or resource losses may be more abusive toward
civilian populations (Hultman, 2007; Wood, 2014) and this increase in civilian victimization
can further undermine opportunities for peace (Pearlman, 2009; Fortna, 2015; Findley and
Young, 2015). Given that the goal of economic counterinsurgency is to downgrade the ca-
pabilities of insurgents, scholars and policymakers must explicitly study rebel behavior in
periods of relative weakness.
To fill this gap, I present a theory of rebel behavior which explains when sanctions are
likely to succeed in curtailing the violence of rebel groups and when sanctions may result
in rebel groups increasing violence against civilians. My theory centers on heterogeneity
across insurgent groups based on their economic portfolio’s diversity and vulnerability and
their foundational connections to local populations. An economic portfolio comprises all of
a rebel groups’ resource-generating tactics. Resource-generating tactics refer to the methods
rebel groups use to acquire the money, personnel, weapons, shelter, logistical supplies, food,
and other goods necessary for their violent and non-violent activities.2 Economic sanctions
2I use the term resource-generating tactics instead of financing to denote the full range of resources
that insurgents procure which goes beyond financial resources. Common tactics include soliciting donations,
extortion, trafficking in commodities, kidnapping for ransom, legal business activities, exploitation of natural
resources, smuggling, state sponsorship, and non-state sponsorship.
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are designed to isolate targets from the global economy, and this impacts some resource-
generating tactics more than others. I expect rebel groups with resource-generating tactics
that require long transnational supply chains and groups with few sources of income to be
especially vulnerable to economic sanctions, resulting in a reduction of net violence when
targeted.
I move beyond prior studies of economic sanctions that only evaluate battlefield violence
(Radtke and Jo, 2018; Escribà-Folch, 2010; Hultman and Peksen, 2017) and consider how
economic coercion might affect violence against civilians. My theory builds on a growing lit-
erature that traces rebel group origins to variation in rebel groups’ organizational structures
and tactics (Staniland, 2012, 2014; Larson and Lewis, 2018; Braithwaite and Cunningham,
2020; Parkinson, 2013). This approach has two advantages. First, the pre-existing institu-
tions that rebels emerge from have an enduring impact on a rebel group’s organizational
structures and connections to civilian populations (Staniland, 2012; Braithwaite and Cun-
ningham, 2020). Understanding the origins of groups can elucidate their connections with
local civilians that stem from shared experience in pre-existing institutions and flow along
cultural, religious, political, or ethnic lines. Second, rebel group origins are relatively easy
to observe and are not dynamic like other measures of organizational characteristics such
as structure, leadership, and tactics (Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2020). Once a group’s
origins have been ascertained this information can help predict subsequent behavior. This
should be particularly useful to policymakers, as other rebel features vary over time and
require additional resources to continually track.
Civilians can provide valuable resources to insurgent groups including personnel, ar-
maments, intelligence on government forces, abstaining from providing intelligence on the
rebels to opposition forces, money, and access the supply networks beyond the rebels’ ter-
ritory. Groups formed from societal institutions have pre-existing connections with civilian
populations that they can use to foster collaboration and persuade civilians to provide re-
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sources to sustain the insurgency. Alternatively, rebel groups that were founded from prior
violent non-state actors or from external economic endowments lack these ties and it will
be difficult to build bridges with civilian populations. Instead, these groups tend to rely
on coercion to maintain control over and extract resources from civilians (Weinstein, 2006;
Wood, 2010; Salehyan, Siroky and Wood, 2014). When targeted by economic sanctions, I
expect groups that formed from pre-existing societal institutions to maintain resource sup-
port by improving their behavior toward civilians and persuading civilians to supplement
their resource losses. For groups lacking these connections, I expect they will seek to redress
their losses by violently extracting resources from civilians.
I evaluate my theories using a dataset of insurgent group net violence and civilian vic-
timization from 1998-2012 and the imposition of United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
sanctions. This fine-grained data allows me to precisely test how sanction regimes impact
specific rebel groups and measure the distinct violent behaviors of groups. Using a Bayesian
multi-level model, I find support for several components of my theory. The results show that
sanctions often work. Groups with few revenue streams reduce their levels of violence when
targeted by economic sanctions, but groups with diverse funding sources are unaffected by
sanctions. The empirical evaluation supports my hypotheses on group origins and violence
against civilians. This finding should caution policymakers to carefully consider rebel group
features when enacting sanctions as these policies are associated with increased violence
against civilians from rebel groups whose foundations were not derived from pre-existing
institutions in local communities.
This chapter makes several contributions to the study of targeted sanctions and rebel
behavior. The existing body of knowledge on sanctions is dominated by state-centric theories
and datasets (Peksen, 2019) and most studies conclude that sanctions are usually ineffective
despite their popularity as a policy tool. I argue that these existing theories do not adequately
explain the sanctioning process against insurgents and instead I offer a theory centered
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around rebel groups. This theory highlights heterogeneity across rebel responses to financial
constraints based on the diversity of their resource generating strategies and relationship
with civilian populations. This approach is complimented with an appropriate measurement
strategy. Existing studies of sanctions in the context of violent conflicts tend to focus on
conflict-level sanctions and aggregated measures of violence at the country-level (Escribà-
Folch, 2010; Hultman and Peksen, 2017).3 This chapter focuses on sanctions targeting rebel
groups and disaggregates rebel violence to understand how economic constraints force choices
between violent tactics.
The results demonstrate that economic sanctions can be effective policy tools for reducing
rebel violence, but the impact varies importantly across rebel features. Sanctions are most
effective at reducing violence from groups with few sources of income. Economically robust
insurgents can avoid the costs of sanctions or rely on alternative sources of funding to con-
tinue their violent operations. Sanctions curtail the battlefield violence of rebel groups, but
predatory rebels will respond to economic constraints by violently extracting resources from
civilian populations. Policymakers targeting rebels without ties to local communities may
need to pair economic counterinsurgency with programs to protect civilians from potential
backlash.
The next section describes the efficacy of sanctions broadly and their application to
conflict reduction. Then I discuss where the process of sanctioning non-state actors diverges
from the mechanisms of sanctions against states. The following section describes mobilization
strategies of insurgent groups and their tactics for garnering resources and support from
civilian populations. Building on this literature, I present my theory of insurgent tactics
under targeted sanctions and heterogeneity across insurgent groups. The empirical section
uses data on economic sanctions implemented by the United Nations and insurgent violence,
3A prominent exception is Radtke and Jo (2018) which analyzes rebel-specific economic sanctions and
will be discussed more thoroughly in a later section.
26
finding support for my expectations. I conclude with a discussion of this study’s limitations,
avenues for further research, and the policy implications of the results.
2.2 Economic Sanctions and Civil Conflict
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), regional economic bodies, and individual
countries implement sanctions as a coercive tool to alter the target’s behavior and restrict
weaponry, economic activity, specific commodities, and travel by targeted entities and asso-
ciated individuals. Most research into sanctions focuses on sanctions targeting states, and
this research concludes that sanctions are often ineffective or counterproductive in changing
states’ behaviors (Mack and Khan, 2000; Peksen, 2009a; Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott, 1990;
Peksen, 2019). Part of this poor track record can be attributed to a selection effect; states
most likely to acquiesce to the demands do so before sanctions are implemented (Noorud-
din, 2002). The sanctioning process can also be disrupted by incomplete implementation
due to sanctions-busting (Early, 2015) and faces a targeting challenge, as those most im-
pacted by the sanctions are not empowered to create political change (Mack and Khan,
2000). Sanctions targeting governments have produced negative side effects for civilian pop-
ulations, including repression and physical integrity violations (Wood, 2008b; Peksen, 2009b;
Peksen and Drury, 2009), worsening outcomes of public health, economic conditions and
educational opportunities (Cortright et al., 1997; Weiss, 1999; Lopez and Cortright, 1995),
and increased political violence and instability (Marinov, 2005; Choi and Luo, 2013). While
individual states impose sanctions to further a range strategic goals, sanctions implemented
by the UNSC have been largely focused on conflict reduction.
The United Nations Charter Chapter VII vests the Security Council with the authority to
impose sanctions for the specific purpose to “maintain or restore international peace and se-
curity”(UN, 1945). The formal announcement of sanctions are complemented with strategies
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for monitoring, identification of violations, and enforcement mechanisms. These monitoring
and enforcement strategies are a primary reason why the United Nations and international
institutions generally tend to produce more effective sanctions regimes than other multilat-
eral actions or bilateral sanctions (Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott, 1990; Drezner, 2000; Miers
and Morgan, 2002; Drury, 1998). Sanctions work by isolating targets from economic mar-
kets vital to their economy, so monitoring and punishing sanctions-busters is key element
of enforcement. The Security Council implemented sanctions in approximately one third
of resource-based conflicts from 1989-2006 (Le Billon and Nicholls, 2007) and, in 2009, the
United Nations Environment Programme issued a report that argued “international sanc-
tions should be the primary instrument dedicated to stopping the trade in conflict resources”
(United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2009). In the wake of the Cold War, the
United Nations increasingly enacted sanctions regimes to quell violence in civil wars. The
September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center ushered in a new era of sanctions
and financial controls to counter the threat of transnational terrorist attacks. The United
Nations, regional economic unions, and most individual states maintain some form of a ter-
rorist exclusion list which includes provisions to freeze assets, block weaponry, and restrict
travel for included entities and individuals.4 The current UNSC consolidated sanctions list
contains 305 entities and 708 individuals that are associated with ongoing sanctions regimes.5
UNSC sanctions regimes target rebel groups and individuals with diverse ideologies, or-
ganizational structures, sizes, and goals. Most sanctions regimes are associated with specific
countries or conflicts. For example, the sanctions regime in the Democratic Republic of
Congo6 initially applied an arms embargo to all “foreign and Congolese armed groups and
militias operating in North and South Kivu and Ituri, and to groups not party to the Global
4The UN maintains a sanctions regime concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or
Da’esh), Al-Qa’ida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities. Violent non-state actors
may be added to this sanctions regime or regimes covering specific conflicts.
5The full list is available at https://scsanctions.un.org/consolidated/
6Pursuant to UNSC resolutions 1493, 1533, 1596, 1649, 1698, 1807, 1857, 2078, 2136
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and All-inclusive agreement” (UNSC, 2003). This affected relatively large, well-financed eth-
nic rebel groups such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and
lesser known small religious groups such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) which only
conducted occasional violent attacks. The mandate behind the ISIL (Da’esh) & Al-Qa’ida
Sanctions Committee7 is far broader, applying to any individual or entities associated with
Al-Qa’ida or ISIL (Da’esh). Member states can petition to add any individual or entity to
this list if they provide evidence of an association with these groups.8 Within a sample of
all 135 insurgent groups from the Big Allied and Dangerous (BAAD) II dataset, I found
that 45 groups were subject to UNSC sanctions from 1998-2012. Table 2.6 in the appendix
provides a comparison of the groups that have been sanctioned to those that have not. Rebel
groups that were sanctioned in the sample tended to be far more violent overall, on average
resulting in three times more battle fatalities and six times the civilian deaths compared to
groups that were not sanctioned. This suggests that the UNSC might face pressure to act
when violence flares and particularly if it targets civilians. These groups also tend to be
younger, slightly larger in size, and exist in countries with lower GDP per capita and less
democratic governments.
Although economic sanctions are often unsuccessful at changing state behavior, recent
work on the UN’s central goal of reducing violence and promoting peaceful resolutions to
civil wars has found areas of limited success. The multilateral nature of UN sanctions and
the monitoring and enforcement capabilities that an international institution provides may
also enhance their likelihood of success as UN member states are expected to comply with
sanctions regime and contribute to enforcement.9 Sanctions are most successful at curtailing
7Pursuant to UNSC resolutions 1267, 1989, and 2253
8UNSC Resolution 2368 specifies acts and activities that quality as associations. These include: “Par-
ticipating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in
conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of; Supplying, selling or transferring arms
and related materiel to; Recruiting for; or otherwise supporting acts or activities of, ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qa’ida
or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof.” (UNSC, 2017)
9The empirical support for the relative efficacy of multilateral sanctions compared to unilateral sanctions
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violence and reducing the duration of civil wars when combined with military or peacekeep-
ing operations (Lektzian and Regan, 2016; Le Billon, 2012). Escribà-Folch (2010) evaluates
87 civil wars from 1959-1999 and determines that economic sanctions and arms embargoes
can hasten the decline of civil wars. Sanctions regimes implemented by international organi-
zations such at the UNSC or EU are also positively associated with negotiated settlements
(Escribà-Folch, 2010). Sanctions bundled with other policy interventions, such as arms em-
bargoes and military intervention, are the most likely to reduce battlefield violence (Hultman
and Peksen, 2017). However, the record on intensity is mixed, Hultman and Peksen (2017)
distinguishes the components that form targeted sanctions, demonstrating that economic
sanctions are associated with increased intensity of violence, but arms embargoes reduce
battlefield violence.10
Radtke and Jo (2018) analyzes UN economic sanctions that specifically target rebel
groups, and finds evidence that sanctions can indirectly reduce rebel violence conditional on
the rebel group’s resource adaptability. Radtke and Jo (2018) defines resource adaptabil-
ity as a rebel group’s robustness to the severing of one of their financial strategies.11 For
example, in response to a 2012 UN embargo on charcoal exports, Al-Shabaab shifted their
financial revenues to criminal activities such as extortion and piracy (Radtke and Jo, 2018;
Levy and Yusuf, 2019). Adaptability is operationalized based on whether or not a group
has external state-sponsorship, non-state sponsors (donations from diaspora communities),
is mixed. Despite the expectation that more compliance should ease enforcement challenges, most com-
parisons of regimes find that unilateral sanctions are more likely to be successful than ad hoc multilateral
sanctions (Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott, 1990; Drezner, 2000; Miers and Morgan, 2002; Drury, 1998). How-
ever, international institutions, such as the United Nations, can enhance compliance and create monitoring
mechanisms to oversee implementation of sanctions, leading to more successful regimes (Drezner, 2000; Bapat
and Morgan, 2009).
10Most sanctions targeted at rebel groups include arms embargoes. All the sanctions analyzed in this
paper are comprised of freezing assets, travel restrictions, and arms embargoes.
11This is operationalized as an additive scale indicating the number of income opportunities a group uses
from external state sponsorship, non-state sponsors, territorial control, and access to natural resources. This
concept is further measured through micro-analyses of National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) and Al-Shabaab.
30
territorial control, and access to natural resources (Radtke and Jo, 2018). For rebels without
diversified funding portfolios, the implementation of sanctions can contribute to territorial
losses and reduced levels of violence. However, sanctions do not reduce the violence of highly
adaptable rebel groups that can divert financing to other strategies (Radtke and Jo, 2018).
Together, these studies present mixed expectations over the impact of sanctions on violent
conflict.
2.3 Sanctioning Non-State Actors
Economic sanctions and other forms of economic counterinsurgency against rebels are fun-
damentally different from economic coercion targeting states. A sanctions episode against a
state actor generally begins with a negotiation phase in which the initiating actor threatens
to sanction the target if a specific policy concession is not granted. Some literature suggests
this phase is where potential sanctions are most likely to succeed in extracting policy con-
cessions (Nooruddin, 2002). If the sanction is successful in this phase, the threat is sufficient
and the sanction is never implemented. Alternatively, states can impose sanctions and create
reputation and material costs for the target. Financial controls or embargoes are intended to
raise economic costs for the target by isolating the target from important export and import
markets and straining political and economic systems. Sanctions are also a form of “nam-
ing and shaming,” tarnishing the target’s reputation on the international stage and making
the business of international relations more difficult. Imposed sanctions succeed when they
create high enough costs that targets will agree to policy concessions in exchange for lifting
the sanction.
The steps involved in sanctions against non-state actors follow a distinct process from
sanctions against state actors. While some sanctions regimes against non-state actors are
tied to specific policy-goals, the goal of economic counterinsurgency is generally to downgrade
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and eliminate the group rather than a coercive tool to alter the behavior of an actor that will
remain in the international system. For example, most entities and individuals targeted by
the UNSC are added through the Al-Qa’ida or ISIL (Da’esh) sanctions list which includes
groups based on their associated with Al-Qa’ida or ISIL. These sanctions are rarely tied to
specific policy concessions that insurgent groups can grant in order to regain access to legit-
imate financial markets. Some sanctioning actors, for example the United States, publicly
refuse to even engage with a group that has been listed under their terrorist designation list.
This difference in objective changes the stages in the sanctioning process. Sanctions against
violent non-state actors contain no threat stage, as this would undermine their efficacy in
freezing the assets of insurgents and their financiers. Designating groups and individuals to
the UNSC ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qa’ida Sanction regime is a confidential process, and once
a listing request has been approved, member states are expected to implement sanctioning
measures without delay, although this is not always achieved.12
Sanctions specifically targeting violent non-state groups are rarely lifted, thus eliminating
the potential rewards for compliance.13 Once listed, some states explicitly refuse to negotiate
with designated groups, further diminishing a rebel group’s incentives to change its behavior.
As with state sanctions, the financial controls can be costly for insurgent groups, forcing them
to seek out alternative sources of income or armaments as supply chains are targeted and
assets frozen. However, the naming and shaming associated with publicly listing groups could
have the opposite effect for terrorist and rebel groups. Adding groups to terrorist exclusion
lists and sanctions regimes creates additional publicity for the group and opportunities for
it to extend their propaganda to a wider audience, which is a key goal of many terrorist
groups. The infamy associated with these lists might signal the prowess of listed groups,
12According to a recent report from the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the
Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, most governments interpret “without delay” as within
24 hours or less. The full report is available at http://undocs.org/S/2020/493
13There are important exceptions, for example Mujaheddin-e Khalq (MEK) campaigned for decades to be
removed from the United States Foreign Terrorist Organizations and the request was finally granted in 2012.
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leading to increased donations or drawing support away from rival groups and undermining
the original intention of financial blockades.
The literature on state sanctions does guide this evaluation in two areas. First, theories
of state sanctions evaluate how regime characteristics shape responses to economic coercion
(Brooks, 2002; Peksen, 2019). Expectations of sanctions against non-state actors must also
be grounded in understandings of rebel organization and governance. A key component of
my theory of rebel behavior centers on differences how rebel groups exert control over civilian
populations. Second, the literature on state sanctions has identified important unintended
consequences of state sanctions such as deterioration of human rights (Wood, 2008b; Peksen,
2009b; Peksen and Drury, 2009) and worse social outcomes (Cortright et al., 1997; Weiss,
1999; Lopez and Cortright, 1995). This chapter also considers the side effects of sanctions
and how they might impact insurgent groups incentives for targeting civilians. Specifically, I
evaluate whether rebels attempt to supplement resource losses by violently targeting civilian
populations and coercively extracting resources.
Measuring the impact of sanctions on rebels poses a unique challenge compared to states.
Unlike policy concessions which can be observable, sanctions targeting rebels are only suc-
cessful if they are able to effectively block the material resources of the group. Insurgent
groups are covert organizations, carefully guarding their funding sources and holding pri-
vate knowledge of their relative economic, political, and military strength. It is difficult
to analyze whether a specific sanction can effectively block an insurgent leader’s access to
financial resources or weapons. Many rebel behaviors, for example their violent acts, are
observable, but their underlying capabilities and strategies are latent. An observable change
in rebel production of violence may reflect a resource deficiency, a shift in underlying strate-
gies and associated tactics, a change in the government’s counterinsurgency and intelligence
capabilities or some interaction of all the above.
Due to these challenges, the goal of this research is to measure changes in rebel production
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of violence associated with the implementation of a sanction rather than attempt to measure
the amount of resources that have been blocked by a given sanction. I evaluate rebel groups
net violence as the best representation of their ability to produce violence. Then I consider
potential side effects produced by rebels operating under economic deprivation, such as
victimizing civilian populations to acquire resources. I argue that an insurgent group’s
economic portfolio and origins, will affect its violent tactics against governments and civilians
in response to economic counterinsurgency.
2.4 Rebel Groups Resources and Tactics
This section reviews rebel groups’ resource-generating tactics and the literature on civilian
victimization in contexts of civil conflict. Asymmetric power is a central theme in intrastate
conflict, with governments controlling a relative abundance of the country’s wealth, security
sector, infrastructure, and legitimacy. To overcome the imbalance in raw capabilities, rebel
entrepreneurs innovate. They mobilize their labor force from untrained civilians and employ
unconventional tactics that require cheaper inputs–improvised explosive devises (IEDs) and
explosive-laden vehicles substitute for tanks and aircraft. Financing a sustained insurgency
is expensive; according to the Global Terrorism Index. the annual revenues for the four most
prolific insurgent groups range from $2 billion to $25 million (The Institute for Economics &
Peace, 2017).14 Funding is absorbed into recruiting, training, feeding, housing, and paying an
often novice army of fighters; acquiring arms, ammunition, vehicles, and technology; financ-
ing individual attacks, and supporting any parallel non-violent activities such as political
participation or social service provision.
Insurgents engage in a range of legal and illicit activities to procure funding for their
14In 2017, the Islamic State topped the list with $2 billion, the Taliban earned $400 million, Al-Qa’ida’s
revenues were $250 million and Boko Haram had an income of $25 million (The Institute for Economics &
Peace, 2017).
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violent endeavors. Rebel entrepreneurs capitalize on religious principles of tithes and zakat
to illicit donations from supporters close and abroad. For decades, the Provisional Irish Re-
publican Army relied on donations from Catholic Americans to fund their violent campaign
in Northern Ireland (Horgan and Taylor, 1999) and Al-Qa’ida’s funding prior to 9/11 was
derived in large part from donations (Kean, Hamilton et al., 2004). Civilians can also be
forced into footing the bill of their oppressors through extortion–under threat of violence or
promise of protection–robbery, and seizure of property or goods. Extortion encompasses a
range of coercive or bureaucratic taxation activities. For example, extortion is the Taliban’s
second most lucrative source of income and consists of a 2.5% tax on wealth (zakat), taxes
on goods, and fees for services such as electricity and water–this final fee regardless of the
Taliban’s role in actually providing the service (The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2017).
Other funding strategies include the exploitation of natural resources, trafficking in com-
modities, abduction and ransom, extortion of businesses and state sponsorship (Freeman,
2011; Raphaeli, 2003).
Rebel groups rely on local civilian populations for many resources including personnel,
intelligence, and financing and their strategies for extracting resources from civilian popu-
lations has been the focus of much scholarship (Weinstein, 2006). Rebel entrepreneurs con-
testing a government must overcome a classic collective action problem to mobilize a labor
force for rebellion. Civilians supportive of the rebel cause can gain the benefits of successful
rebellion–ousting the government–without shouldering the costs of insurgency. Successful
rebel entrepreneurs overcome this problem by using their underlying economic and social
endowments to provide a bundle of selective incentives to recruits (Olson, 1965; Lichbach,
1998; Weinstein, 2006). The opportunity cost model suggests that rebels with an abundance
of economic goods, for example from exploiting natural resources or foreign patronage, more
easily resolve their collective action problems by offering wages and opportunities for looting
and predation that exceed expected earnings through economic activity in society (Collier
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and Hoeffler, 2004; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006). Under this logic, a potential recruit
weighs the risks, benefits, and wages in society versus those available through rebellion and
will choose rebellion if it maximizes the economic return to their labor. Leaders lacking
these endowments face a daunting mobilization process, but those who overcome it do so
by leveraging their social capital, pulling on religious or ethnic ties that imbue trust and
interdependence between leaders, recruits, and their communities.
Resource-rich rebels tend to attract opportunistic soldiers seeking consistent economic
payoffs, while rebels defined by non-monetary commonalities share a disciplined commitment
to victory and the bounty of political and economic power that would accompany it (We-
instein, 2006). Access to natural resources, particularly those that are easily lootable–such
as diamonds, minerals, and drugs–are an opportunity to provide wages, purchase weaponry,
and sustain insurgency that might not otherwise be possible for groups lacking in social
capital. To sustain a supply of labor, rebel leaders must maintain payments to combatants
while continually recruiting new members to replace those soldiers who perish in violent
operations. Groups with recruitment and retainment packages skewed toward social capital
will more successfully maintain their labor supply in the face of economic downturn because
their payoffs are not purely wage-based. These movements tend to attract and select a
higher caliber of soldier who is more devoted to long term victory than short term wages
(Weinstein, 2006).
In contrast to theories of resource endowments driving organizational structure, Staniland
(2012, 2014) argues that social bases form the organizational structures of rebel groups which
create discipline and cohesion. Rebel groups can draw membership, organizing strategies,
and leadership from pre-existing organizations such as political parties, student movements,
religious organizations, government military and non-military structures and ethnic orga-
nizations. The vertical and horizontal organizational structures of these institutions are
reflected in the rebel groups that come after them (Staniland, 2012, 2014). These underly-
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ing organizational structures influence the cohesion and discipline of insurgent groups, and
connections with civilians determine how resource wealth impacts a rebel group (Staniland,
2012; Larson and Lewis, 2018; Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2020; Parkinson, 2013). In-
stitutions such as kinship networks can help emerging rebel groups bolster their reputation
with civilian populations and persuade civilians to support the insurgent group by forgoing
intelligence sharing with government or other opposition forces (Larson and Lewis, 2018).
These two theoretical views converge in agreement that insurgent groups’ organizational
characteristics affect the tactics they employ to maintain their relationships with and exert
control over civilian populations. Civilian populations provide resources vital to sustaining
rebellion. Civilians make up the labor and financial supply for groups and provide informa-
tion such as local knowledge of terrain or intelligence on government activities. Maintaining
the support of civilian populations and reducing civilian coordination with the government
can sustain an insurgency and reduce the success of government counterinsurgency opera-
tions. Economically-endowed rebel groups are more prone to coercive measures of maintain-
ing civilian compliance (Weinstein, 2006; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006). These groups
lack the hard-earned social ties with local communities, so they are unable to persuade
civilians to support them without the fear-evoking threat of violence. Rebel groups funded
by foreign sponsors and through the exploitation of natural resources often fail to develop
mutually beneficial ties with local civilians and are more likely use violence against civilian
populations (Weinstein, 2006; Wood, 2010; Salehyan, Siroky and Wood, 2014).
Alternatively, some explanations of rebel violence against civilians are not derived from
inherent organizational characteristics, but instead focus on the dynamics of war and re-
sources available in the current environment (Azam and Hoeffler, 2002; Bueno de Mesquita,
2013; Hultman, 2007; Faulkner, 2016). Conventional violence against a military force is
far more capital and labor intensive than irregular tactics, such as terrorism, that can be
launched against a range of targets–military, police, civilians, foreign dignitaries, businesses–
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with influence over government policies (Bueno de Mesquita, 2013). The use of terrorism and
civilian predation in particular are thought to signal a group’s inability to engage traditional
military targets, a sign of weakness and earning terrorism the moniker “weapon of the weak”
(Crenshaw, 1981).15 Hultman (2007) argues that insurgents attack civilians not to extract
compliance or punish coordination with the government, but as a way of inflicting costs on
the government when their battlefield operations are unsuccessful. These battlefield or ma-
terial losses from engagement with government forces has been shown to increase subsequent
civilian targeting by the weakened challenger (Hultman, 2007; Wood, 2014) 16 The logic of
substitution in periods of weakness can extend to other proxies for government forces, such
as peacekeeping forces (Fjelde, Hultman and Lindberg Bromley, 2016).
External actors can also affect the balance of capabilities between a challenger and gov-
ernment, leading to shifts in each belligerents’ strategy. Military, diplomatic, and economic
interventions in favor of one belligerent tend to increase that actor’s likelihood of winning al-
beit at the risk of prolonging the duration of conflict or reducing the chances for negotiated
settlements (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce, 2008; Regan and Aydin, 2006; Lektzian
and Regan, 2016; Sawyer, Cunningham and Reed, 2017). Asymmetric military interventions
decrease civilian targeted by the bolstered side, but increase the use of civilian victimization
by their opponent, demonstrating both government and rebel propensity to rely on these
tactics as the balance of power shift unfavorably (Wood, Kathman and Gent, 2012).
My research question sits at the nexus of these theoretical arguments. I evaluate a third-
15Although elements of the weapon of the weak argument are well disputed, there is evidence for the
central notion of this label: terrorism is a relatively cheap and easy form of violence. According to a report
from the Wilson Center, it costs $6,000-$12,000 USD annually to supply, feed, and house a single combatant
in the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (Otis, 2014). A North Atlantic Treat Organization
(NATO) report estimates the average cost of a suicide attack, a particularly lethal form of terrorism, is
approximately $150 USD. Report available at https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2008/04/EN/index.htm.
Note: this estimate excludes the cost of replacing the combatant and any martyrdom benefit that the group
pays to the attackers beneficiaries.
16The definition of material losses in Wood (2014) includes solider fatalities and capture, loss of territory,
and destruction of camps or supply stores.
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party intervention that I expect will alter the conflict environment in which rebel groups
operate. However, unlike dynamic arguments that predict uniform responses to changes in
conflict dynamics, I expect a rebel groups’ behaviors in response to shifting resources to
be derived from its inherent organizational characteristics which I argue can be predicted
based on the conditions of its founding. As such, I draw on both organizational and dynamic
theories of rebel violence to evaluate rebel heterogeneity in response to economic sanctions.
2.5 Theory of Rebel Violence under Economic Sanctions
My theory integrates dynamic perspectives of rebel violence into Staniland (2012)’s social-
institutional theory of rebel organizations. In line with Staniland (2012) and in contrast to
Weinstein (2006), I seek to separate a group’s economic portfolio from its organizational
structure. First, I evaluate how the impact of economic sanctions on a rebel group’s avail-
ability of resources may be intensified or attenuated by the diversity and vulnerability of
its economic portfolios. A group’s economic portfolio comprises all the strategies it uses to
obtain the resources necessary for insurgency. Economic portfolios vary based on the char-
acteristics of individual funding streams and the diversity of the overall portfolio. Then I
evaluate how the group’s foundational origins will shape its response to economic sanctions,
focusing on its ability to violently or non-violently extract resources from civilian popula-
tions. I create three indicators of a group’s origins. One builds on prior work on resource
endowments (Weinstein, 2006; Wood, 2010; Salehyan, Siroky and Wood, 2014) using nat-
ural resources and state sponsorship as a sign of groups that are unlikely to have strong
institutional ties with civilian populations. A benefit of this measure is its wide use in the
conflict literature, but a limitation is the reintegration of economic measures as a proxy for
organizational characteristics. To complement this measurement strategy, I use the FORGE
data source for my other two variables. This data directly measures the pre-existing social
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organizations that rebel groups were built upon (Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2020).
Economic sanctions against violent non-state actors work by isolating the target from
the legitimate economy. This isolation is achieved through the cooperation of states, inter-
government organizations, financial entities (such as banks and informal money transfer
systems), and other private businesses dealing in resources relevant to the sanctions. I call
this collection of actors enforcers. Economic sanctions generally comprise asset freezes of all
economic resources owned by the target, travel bans that prohibit entry or transit through
all enforcer states, and arms embargoes that require states prevent the direct or indirect sale,
shipment, or transfer of armament and related materials (for example spare parts that could
be used for military purposes) within their state or by their nationals transportation vehicles.
Some sanctions regimes include additional provisions tailored to the funding strategies known
to be employed by the target. For example, the Somalia Sanctions Committee (pursuant
to UNSC resolution 751) added a provision banning the import of charcoal originating from
Somalia due to Al-Shabaab’s exploitation of the charcoal exports as a revenue source (UNSC,
2012).
Every country and non-state enforcer involved in the relevant sector of the economy must
agree to implement these provisions for the regime to succeed. Adhering to sanctions provi-
sions can be costly, as enforcers must forgo the benefits of transacting with the target and
establish robust monitoring and enforcement capabilities to conduct the oversight required.
The refusal of one government to uphold sanctions on a violent non-state actor can pose a sig-
nificant challenge for enforcement, as this provides access to resources in the non-compliant
market and an opportunity to traffic embargoed goods through the non-sanctioned economy
and reach global markets (Early, 2015). However, enforcers exist within the larger network of
the global economy, and refusal to enforce sanctions could result in cascading economic isola-
tion or other punitive measures. For example, the European Union maintains a “black-list”
of high-risk countries that are deemed insufficient in their efforts to counter the financing
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of terrorism and implement international sanctions.17 Companies and countries within the
EU must conduct enhanced vigilance requirements when transacting with designated coun-
tries. Sanctions work best when intermediary actors along a rebel group’s supply chain are
vulnerable to financial exclusion, reputation costs, or punitive measures and decide to sever
economic ties with the rebel group as the least costly option.
These features of economic sanctions make them more tailored to disrupt some types of
resource-generating tactics than others. The global anti-money laundering and countering
the financing of terrorism regime was constructed specifically to target terrorist and criminal
exploitation of global supply chains and resource-generating tactics that involve transactions
across borders. Economic sanctions are a component of these wider efforts and should be
most effective at targeted resource-generating tactics that rely on global supply chains and
the cross boarder transfer of goods or funds. This includes the common financing methods
of drug trafficking, smuggling, state sponsorship, and donations. Each of these funding
mechanisms has some unique characteristics that requires further elaboration.
Drug Trafficking : Drug trafficking involves the cultivation, manufacturing, transporta-
tion, and sale of drugs and plants from which drugs are derived including opiates,
cocaine, amphetamine-type stimulants, and cannabis. Insurgent organizations may be
involved at any level of the supply chain, including taxation and protection services
for farmers, maintaining farms themselves, smuggling drugs, and selling to customers.
Drug trafficking involves sprawling global networks for the transit of goods, traversing
both the black market and legitimate trade routes. According to the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime, opiates cultivated in Afghanistan which have long been a
revenue stream of the Taliban, flow through established routes by land, sea, and plane
to Russia, Europe, China, Africa, Australia, Canada and the United States. These




lengthy routes provide multiple opportunities for customs and border enforcement to
intercept the drugs. From cultivation to end users there are many opportunities for
law enforcement to disrupt these revenue streams and disrupting the drug trade has
been a top priority of governments. For example, in 2009 law enforcement bodies were
able to confiscate 76 tons of heroin representing 2-16% of global heroin flows (UNOCD,
2010).
Smuggling : Smuggling refers to the illegal transportation and sale of any good (exclud-
ing drugs). Rebel groups have funded their operations by smuggling diamonds (ex:
Hezbollah, Al-Qa’ida), artifacts (ex: Islamic State), lumber (ex: Revolutionary United
Front, Rally for Congolese Democracy;), human trafficking (ex: Boko Haram, Islamic
State, Haqqani Network, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia),18 cigarettes (ex:
Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb), matériel, and other goods. Smuggling involves the
transfer of legal or illicit goods or persons across international borders by land, sea,
and air, in violation of customs and trade regulations. This funding strategy requires
confronting or circumventing the front-line enforcers of sanctions, border police and
customs inspectors. Smugglers may try to disguise goods and transport them through
authorized border crossings or attempt to cross borders at unmonitored points of en-
try. Either strategy provides opportunities for interdiction. For example, in December
2020 Interpol and UNOCD conducted a seven-day joint operation covering airports,
seaports, and land borders in West Africa (UNODC, 2020). Law enforcement officials
arrested smugglers and confiscated 50 firearms, 40,593 sticks of dynamite, 28 detona-
tor cords, 6,162 rounds of ammunition, 1,473 kilos of drugs, 2,263 boxes of contraband
drugs, and 60,000 liters of contraband fuel (UNODC, 2020).
State-Sponsorship: The state-sponsorship of rebel groups has received ample attention
18For further information on human trafficking, see Avdan and Omelicheva (2021)
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in the terrorism literature and was a particularly common financial strategy during
the Cold War (Carter and Pant, 2019; Salehyan, Siroky and Wood, 2014; Salehyan,
Gleditsch and Cunningham, 2011; Carter, 2012; Byman, 2005). In these cases, states
provide funding, sanctuary, armaments, intelligence, and logistics to support an in-
surgent group that can further the geo-political goals of the sponsor-state. These
relationships tend to be relatively weak and undependable (Carter and Pant, 2019)
allowing governments to deny the relationship exits or sever it if the rebel groups are
difficult to control or their interests diverge (Byman, 2005; Carter, 2012). Economic
sanctions increase the costs of sponsoring a rebel group. Sponsor states will have to
violate international sanctions to continue providing support for the rebel group and
risk financial exclusion or punitive measures for their non-compliance. For example,
the Libyan government under Muammar Gaddafi began sponsoring terrorist groups
in the 1980s including financing prominent attacks on flights UTA 772 and Pan Am
103 (also known as the Lockerbie bombing) (Collins, 2004). In response, the UNSC
applied economic sanctions on Libya in 1992 (pursuant to resolutions 731, 748, and
883) and this sanctions regime was sufficiently costly that Gaddafi offered concessions
and abandoned his policy of supporting terrorism (Collins, 2004). State-sponsorship
is vulnerable as the sponsors interests do not perfectly align with the rebels and states
can succumb to international pressure.
Donations : Donations from domestic and international supporters and adherents is
a common financing strategy. Donations often travel through diaspora communities,
charities, and religious networks. After 9/11, donations and charity networks became
a significant target of law enforcement efforts and this focus has integrated into the
subsequent infrastructure for economic sanctions and other forms of economic coun-
terinsurgency. For example, the UNSC sanctions regime in the Democratic Republic
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of Congo (pursuant to resolution 1533) requires all states to “ensure that no funds,
financial assets or economic resources are made available by their nationals or by any
persons within their territories, to or for the benefit of such persons or entities” (UNSC,
2008). The United States overzealous enforcement of provisions aimed to disrupt do-
nation networks led to the Treasury Department using sanctions, office raids, asset
freezes, and judicial procedures to dismantle Al-Barakaat, an informal value transfer
system based in the United Arab Emirates (Passas and Maimbo, 2007). Al-Barakaat
was the primary avenue facilitating remittance flows and United Nations relief funds
to embattled Somalia, and the broad overreach of the United States authorities in dis-
mantling the network further imperiled Somalians already dealing with a humanitarian
crisis and had wide ranging negative consequences for diaspora communities around
the globe (Passas and Maimbo, 2007).
The ability of sanctions enforcers to disrupt these resource-generating tactics are imper-
fect and suffer from many enforcement challenges including sanctions-busting and difficulties
maintaining compliance, lack of resources, and inability to monitor transactions. However,
these resource-generating tactics have supply chain features that make them vulnerable to
potential disruption, and there are numerous cases of enforcement authorities successfully
attenuating or blocking these revenue streams.
Alternatively, there are some funding streams that should be particularly difficult for
international economic counterinsurgency bodies and enforcers to monitor and interdict.
These funding streams can flourish completely within regions under the control of the in-
surgent group or within the broader domestic context. The first is petty crime and robbery,
which is difficult to systemically block and relies more on local law enforcement. The second
strategy is abduction for ransom. Although some groups specialize in abducting foreign
nations, most abductions are local. For international abductions, there exits a whole in-
44
dustry around paying ransoms and recovering abducted nationals. Some countries such as
the United States and United Kingdom abstain from these transactions and threaten to
prosecute ransom payments under terrorism provision. However, most have continued to
pay ransoms despite involvement in the international economic counterinsurgency regime.
Private companies that operate in dangerous areas purchase kidnap and ransom insurance
(K&R) to cover ransoms because these incidents have become so routine. Finally, I expect
extortion strategies to be relativity difficult to disrupt even if extortion sometimes includes
taxation on goods with longer supply chains. Extortion involves taxation under threat of
punishment or in exchange for protection services generally over certain areas of economic
activity. These funding schemes are most prevalent in areas under control by the insurgent
group where extortion operations often parallel the taxation policies of a government.
In many cases these revenue streams flow directly from the victim to the insurgent group.
With petty-crime, robbery, and extortion, the payoff is immediate and there is no reliance
on the financial system or need to traverse regional or national borders. Kidnap and ransom
efforts often target locals and in those cases has the same characteristics. International
kidnap and ransom efforts do require more intricate transfers of funds and intermediary actors
(for example K&R insurance companies or governments), but for most target nationalities
these schemes have successfully continued unabated by government participation in economic
sanctions regimes.
I expect economic portfolios that are comprised of resource-generating tactics with long
supply chains and cross-boarder transactions to be especially vulnerable to economic sanc-
tions as these revenue streams rely on access to the wider world economy. These connections
are exactly what economic sanctions were created to sever. Alternatively, economic portfo-
lios with a higher ratio of domestic-based funding tactics will be relatively more resilient to
economic sanctions
The depth of a group’s overall economic portfolio should also impact its resilience to eco-
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nomic sanctions. Diversification of revenue is a common risk management strategy employed
by individuals, businesses, and investors to minimize the risk of any set of assets. I expect
this principle to apply to insurgent groups as well. Trinkunas (2019) argues that diversifica-
tion has always been a strategy of insurgent groups because “overreliance on any one source
made them vulnerable to external pressure” (Trinkunas, 2019). There is some trade-off in
the cost of maintaining multiple financing streams, but these efforts will be rewarded when
economic counterinsurgency successfully disrupts one or more of the group’s funding streams.
Groups with multiple funding streams will have alternative sources of income should they
loss access to one of their sources of revenue. Radtke and Jo (2018) describes these groups
as more adaptable, as they are able to secure alternative sources of funding if sanctions do
effectively cut off access to one financial strategy.
For example, Al-Shabaab has multiple funding streams including the trafficking of com-
modities, petty crime, extortion, and state sponsorship and operates in areas with poor
government capacity and financial controls. Al-Shabaab was financially diversified enough
to withstand sanctions implemented in 2010 and strengthened in 2012, resulting in no ob-
servable changes to their violent activities (Radtke and Jo, 2018). Ceteris paribus, a group
with diversified sources of income will be more robust to sanctions compared to one without
multiple funding streams.
Hypothesis 1: Targeted sanctions will reduce violence from groups that are not
economically diversified.
Hypothesis 2: Targeted sanctions will have no effect on the violence of eco-
nomically diversified rebel groups.
Hypothesis 3: Targeted sanctions will reduce violence for groups with a high
proportion of cross-national funding streams.
Hypothesis 4: Targeted sanctions will have no effect on the violence of groups
46
with a high proportion of domestic funding streams.
Insurgent groups have a toolbox of violent and non-violent tactics to choose from in
furtherance of their goals. My theory moves beyond prior studies of economic sanctions
which only evaluate battlefield violence (Radtke and Jo, 2018; Escribà-Folch, 2010; Hult-
man and Peksen, 2017), to consider how sanctions might also impact rebel groups use of
violence against civilians. The literature on civil wars and civilian victimization provides
many explanations for violence against civilians.19 Insurgent groups may strategically tar-
get civilians to exert control and extract resources (Weinstein, 2006; Wood, 2010; Salehyan,
Siroky and Wood, 2014), raise costs and create leverage over their government opponents
(Kydd and Walter, 2006), spoil peace processes (Pearlman, 2009; Fortna, 2015; Findley and
Young, 2015), or demonstrate their dedication to a cause compared to rival groups (Bloom,
2005; Chenoweth, 2010; Nemeth, 2014; Kydd and Walter, 2006). My theory builds upon the
strategic framework in which violence is one strategy that insurgents can employ to control
and extract resources from local populations.
Local civilians can provide a range of resources for insurgent groups, including person-
nel, funding and smuggling routes, food, shelter, intelligence on local terrain, allegiances of
community members, and knowledge of the government or other opponents. Civilians also
collect intelligence on the insurgent group’s actions and whereabouts, which can be valuable
to opposition forces, so their secrecy is another important resource (Berman and Matanock,
2015; Larson and Lewis, 2018). Rebel leaders have two broad strategies for gaining the com-
pliance of local civilian populations: coercion and persuasion. Coercion involves the use or
threat of violence, retaliation, or punitive measure to create control by fear. Persuasion re-
quires rebel groups build or maintain ties with local communities in order to align objectives
and provide protection, services, or other benefits in exchange for civilian resources.
19For a recent review articles see Balcells and Stanton (2021); Nord̊as and Cohen (2021)
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Recent work has highlighted the importance of rebel groups’ origins in determining their
organizational structures and tactics they use to acquire resources from local populations
(Staniland, 2012, 2014; Larson and Lewis, 2018; Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2020; Parkin-
son, 2013). Most rebel organizations are created out of some formal or informal pre-existing
organizations that provide structures and intragroup connections that can help leaders over-
coming mobilization challenges (Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2020). While these social
networks may be transformed over the course of the conflict Wood (2008a) they provide
a foundation of shared values, interests, or simply acquaintance that rebel entrepreneurs
can use to build trust and exercise persuasion (Parkinson, 2013). Common founding or-
ganizations include political parties or movements, religious groups, trade unions, student
organizations, military, and regional governments. These pre-existing institutions provide
a foundation of shared interests, avenues of communication, and interpersonal relationships
between insurgent group leaders and members of civil society. Groups that have connections
to broader civilian networks tend to rely more on persuasion to elicit support and resources
from civilians rather than violence.
Alternatively, rebel groups may have formed outside of local institutions. Groups that
were not founded from pre-existing organizations that have connections to local civilians may
have splintered from a prior violent non-state actor (Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2020) or
formed around the exploitation of a unique resource opportunity such as natural resources
or at the behest of a foreign government (Weinstein, 2006). These rebel groups tend to be
disconnected from local communities, viewing them antagonistically rather than creating a
shared vision of success against the government. When these rebel groups require resources
from civilian populations the only strategy available to them is coercion, using violence to
create fear and demand compliance with rebel group demands (Weinstein, 2006; Wood, 2010;
Salehyan, Siroky and Wood, 2014).
Economic sanctions pose a challenge for organizations that rely on persuasion to elicit
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support and resources from civilian populations. A secondary goal of economic sanctions
is to damage the reputation of the target, and the United Nations announces economic
sanctions regimes while naming and shaming the negative behavior of the target. Although
these effects are strongest against states, groups that rely on persuasion to attract support
from local civilians are particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in civilian attitudes. Civil-
ians who turn against rebels can provide valuable information to government forces (Larson
and Lewis, 2018) and this information will be particularly costly when the rebel is facing
economic constraints brought on by sanctions. Thus, economic sanctions impact a groups’
resource-generating tactics and may undermine the positive image they have cultivated with
civilian populations. To maintain support and convincingly dispel the negative narrative
that accompanies the United Nations’ international condemnation, rebel groups must im-
prove any behaviors that civilians could view as supporting the United Nations narrative. If
successful, the reputational costs of economic sanctions may even backfire on counterinsur-
gents. These naming and shaming aspects of terrorist designations or targeted sanctions may
raise the profile of the organization, signaling their ideological integrity or physical prowess,
and encouraging supporters to “rally around the flag.” This can galvanize civilian networks
to provide additional support and enhance the rebel group’s available resources.
Facing economic sanctions, groups lacking institutional ties to civilians will have few
strategies available to recoup their potential losses. Relationships with local communities
require trust and shared interests which develop over time through iterated reciprocal in-
teractions. Predatory groups facing economic constraints cannot use persuasion or shared
social networks to seek resources from civilian populations. These groups may attempt to
strategically offload their economic losses onto civilian populations, violently extracting more
resources to supplement losses in other income steams. In periods of economic decline rebels
are particularly vulnerable to other forms of counterinsurgency and may increase coercive
measures to dissuade or punish civilian cooperation with government forces. The imposition
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of sanctions may also be viewed as a signal of civilian populations coordination with govern-
ment forces. I expect economic sanctions against groups originating from local institutions to
further in-debts rebels to their peaceful compatriots, whereas economic losses will reinforce
a disconnected rebel groups coercive strategy.
Hypothesis 5: Targeted sanctions imposed on rebels originating from local
societal institutions will decrease rebel attacks on civilians.
Hypothesis 6: Targeted sanctions imposed on rebels without foundational ties
to local communities will increase violence against civilians.
2.6 Empirical Strategy
To evaluate my hypotheses, I use fine-grained data at the rebel-month unit of analysis.
This provides a far more precise measure of my theory compared to studies that evaluate
economic sanctions at the conflict or country level. To construct my sample, I use the Big
Allied and Dangerous (BAAD)II Insurgency dataset from 1998-2012 (Asal, Rethemeyer and
Schoon, 2019). BAAD Insurgency II is an actor-level dataset covering all insurgent groups
active in Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) battles from 1998-2012.20 This sample is
advantageous because it is limited to insurgent groups (violent non-state actors contesting
governments), but is not restricted to civil war periods so BAAD II contains group-level
information in all years the group is active. Few insurgent groups fully demobilize after
civil war termination and they continue to maintain capacity to conduct violent operations
against civilians and government forces. The sample contains 135 groups across 49 countries
resulting in 16,640 rebel-month observations. Groups are included in the sample beginning
the year of their official founding, if known, or the first year they perpetrate violence and are
20The inclusion criteria is based on greater than 25 battle deaths in the
UCDP battle-deaths dataset. For more information about the dataset see the
hrefhttps://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/BAADCodebook.pdfcodeook
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removed from the sample once they formally disband, transition to a non-violent political
entity, no longer perpetrate violence, or no information can be found to confirm the group’s
existence. Groups that persist before or beyond the time period are included for the full
period.21
Rebel violence is disaggregated into two outcome variables to better understand how
sanctions affect the full conflict theater. The UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED)
provides fine-grained incident-level data on violence perpetrated by insurgent groups and
governments. I aggregate individual incidents to the month-rebel level to create a monthly
count of each outcome variable. All Violence measures the net fatalities associated with
that group-month. This includes violence perpetrated against civilians, governments, and
other rebel groups. This measure best captures the group’s aggregate capacity to perpetrate
violence in a given month. The primary limitation of this data is the lack of directionality
in determining which actor initiated conflict.22 A decrease in violence against governments
or clashes with rebel groups could represent a shift in rebel tactics or capacity or might
indicate a change in government counterinsurgency strategy. Despite these challenges, the
UCDP data is the standard for measuring conflict intensity and the dyadic measure is an
improvement over analyses that rely on country-level intensity measures.
The second outcome variable measures the fatalities from intentional attacks against
civilians.23 The GED dataset provides data on rebel-initiated one-sided violence against
civilians. Civilian Fatalities measures the fatalities resulting from the specific rebel’s attacks
against civilians in a given month. Unlike the data on rebel clashes or battlefield violence, this
21Three groups only exist in the data for one year and 56 exist for the full time period. The average
number of months a group is included is 120 (approximately 10 year) and the median is 138 months.
22To the author’s knowledge there is no comprehensive dataset that disaggregates battles or clashes based
on the initiating side. There are significant information challenges in creating such data as news sources
in conflict settings are scarce and coverage may reflect the interests of governments or rebel groups that
allow news organizations and journalists to safely operate. This commonly leads to conflicting reporting and
completing claims over the perpetrator of a given attack
23This measure is distinct from civilian casualties that may be the result of collateral damage during
battles between government and rebel forces.
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data is directional. This measure allows me to isolate the intensity of violence perpetrated
by the rebel group and highlights their strategy toward civilians. Not all groups engage in
civilian victimization, and the sample contains 74 groups (54%) that have no documented
one sided attacks resulting in civilian fatalities for the full time period. The Islamic State,
formerly known as Al-Qa’ida in Iraq, has killed the most civilians in one-sided attacks from
1998-2012, resulting in 6,212 fatalities. Both outcome variables are highly over-dispersed
count variables.
The primary independent variable is the imposition of UN targeted sanctions. I consid-
ered all UN sanctions regimes in creating this variable. First, I matched groups on the UN
ISIL (Da’esh) & Al-Qa’ida Sanctions Committee entity list to groups in the dataset. There
are 12 groups in the dataset that are sanctioned under this regime. Then I drew information
on other sanctions regimes from the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC) (Biersteker et al.,
2018). This data contains information on 63 sanctions episodes from 1991 to 2013 across
23 countries and is a rich dataset comprised of quantitative and qualitative accounts of the
underlying intention, targets, implementing actors, and effectiveness of each episode. Other
datasets of sanctions, such as the commonly used Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanc-
tions (TIES) (Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi, 2014) focus on states and do not cover more
recent time periods during which there has been a growth of sanctions against non-state
actors.
Some groups are explicitly named in these sanctions regimes, such as the National Union
for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), while others are war-parties that fall under
the geographic scope and targeted definition of the sanctions regime. For each sanctions
regime, I used the TSC qualitative dataset and independent research to determine if the
sanctions would affect a given group operating in the targeted territory. These sanctions
regimes targeted 38 insurgent groups, including some which were also added to the Al-
Qa’ida sanctions list. In the full sample, 45 rebel groups faced UN sanctions during the time
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period. Table 3 in the Appendix lists all the groups targeted by sanctions in the sample. The
Rebel Sanction variable is an indicator for every month that a sanction is in place against
the group. Table 2.6 provides a comparison of groups in the sample that have been subject
to sanctions and those that have not. Within this sample, the United Nations has targeted
rebel groups that are more violent toward government forces and civilians. Targeted groups
tend to be younger, equally likely to be predatory and slightly less likely to have social
origins. These groups are slightly larger, have more sources of funding, and are more likely
to control territories. On average, they reside in countries with lower economic growth,
smaller populations, and less democratic than the countries with insurgents that were not
sanctioned.
I use the BAAD II data to construct the measures of a group’s economic portfolio. This
dataset contain yearly information on whether a group used one of six funding measures: drug
trafficking, state sponsorship, smuggling, extortion, kidnapping for ransom, and robbery. I
create two measures of economic portfolio based on this data. The first, Economic Diversity,
is the number of funding strategies that a group uses in a given year. Figure 2.3 in the
appendix shows the distribution of this variable across rebel-months. I create two measures
of the vulnerability of a group’s economic portfolio based on the supply chain features of
each financing type. Drug trafficking and smuggling commonly rely on long supply chains
linking cultivators of the good to the sale of the good to end users often located in other
countries. These cross-national supply chains rely on many actors and crossing borders
which introduces further oversight. Cross-National Financing represents the proportion of
a group’s overall economic portfolio that is drug trafficking or smuggling. For example, in
2008 the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army was financed by smuggling and drug
trafficking. For this year their economic diversity would be 2, their cross-national financing
ratio would be 1 and their domestic financing ratio would be 0. These variables are only
available for groups with at least one known source of financing in the BAAD data, so the
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scope is limited to 76 groups.
To construct the data on group origins I use Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence
(FORGE) Dataset which provides information on the preexisting organizations from which
rebel groups emerge (Braithwaite and Cunningham, 2020). This data includes a range of
parent organizations which founded or provided membership for the rebel groups. I create a
binary variable, Social Origins, to represent groups that were formed from the following pre-
existing organizations: political parties, political movements, religious groups, trade unions,
student organizations, military of a former regime, current military, nonmilitary government
factions or nonmilitary factions from a former regime, religious communities or ethnic com-
munities. Groups originating from pre-existing social organizations are more likely to have
lasting social ties within the community and be reliant on support from civilian populations
for their mobilization. These groups drew their initial membership from organizations that
may still persist and members may share ideological, political, ethnic, religious, or other
connections with civilians from these organizations. These pre-existing organizations often
provide channels for rebel groups to communicate with civilian leaders that were involved
in these parent organizations but never joined the rebel group. Groups built upon social
networks maintain ties with local communities and are less like to predate on civilian popu-
lations for resources (Weinstein, 2006; Beardsley and McQuinn, 2009; Salehyan, Siroky and
Wood, 2014). In the sample, 36% of groups originated from at least one of these pre-existing
organizations.
I create two measures of groups without foundational ties to local communities. Based on
the FORGE data, Rebel Origins is a binary variable representing a rebel group that created
from splintering from another violent non-state actor. These variables provide the most
direct measure of rebel origins that is separate from any aspects of the group’s economic
portfolio. I exclude any rebel groups that originated from a prior violent non-state actor and
one of the social institutions mentioned above, so these variables are mutually exclusive. In
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the sample, 61% of groups have origins based in other pre-existing rebel groups
Other scholars argue that group structures and subsequent strategies are derived from
the resource endowments that rebel leaders can leverage to overcome their collective action
challenges(Weinstein, 2006). Rebel groups that are rich in economic resources that are not
derived from local communities often fail to develop constructive ties with local populations
and instead rely on coercion when they need to extract resources from civilians. Building
on these theories, I create a second measure to capture groups that are disconnected from
local communities. I use the Rebel Contraband Dataset to identify groups that fund their
operations through the exploitation of natural resources (Walsh et al., 2018).24 This dataset
contains information on the funding strategies–extortion, smuggling, theft or booty futures–
and commodities exploited by rebels in each UCDP dyad-year from 1990-2012. The coding
criteria includes a funding strategy when there is evidence that the groups earn “a significant
fraction of funding in this manner” (Walsh et al., 2018). I do not distinguish between different
commodities and include all the variables included in the model. Given the covert nature of
rebel funding, it may be difficult to find annual evidence of the existence of a given funding
steam. I consider a rebel group to be funded by natural resources for the full time period
if the Rebel Contraband Dataset provides definitive evidence that the rebel group received
a significant portion of their income from natural resources in any year in the time period.
This reflects the central notion that funding strategies are an observable representation of a
rebel’s latent mobilization strategy. In line with the literature, I also include a measure from
BAAD II on whether the group receives support from a foreign sponsor. Economic Origins
is a binary indicator of whether a rebel group receives financing through exploitation of
natural resources or foreign sponsorship. This variable reflects the evidence in the literature
and is the most common way of distinguishing rebel groups that are disconnected from local
populations and more prone to predatory behavior (Weinstein, 2006; Wood, 2010; Salehyan,
24Data available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/COQ65B
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Siroky and Wood, 2014). In the sample, 58% of groups have economic origins.
I expect other rebel characteristics to moderate the impact of economic sanctions and
affect rebel responses to economic constraints. Using the BAAD II data, I include three
group features that vary yearly for each insurgent group. This data contains five funding
measures: drug trafficking, extortion, abduction, robbery, and smuggling. Following the
adaptability technique used by Radtke and Jo (2018), I collapse these funding strategies
into a rudimentary categorical variable, Economic Diversity, reflecting the number of known
revenue streams available to the group. I expect rebels with multiple funding streams to
have more robust financial strategies (including savings), and be less likely to shift their
violent tactics in response sanctions. These measures may also reflect the group’s capabilities
broadly and be associated with more conventional targeting and less civilian victimization.
Size is a ordinal measure of the group’s number of members based on the following criteria:
1 = 0 − 99, 2 = 100 − 999, 3 = 1, 000 − 9, 999 and 4 >= 10, 000. I also include a binary
measure of whether the group controls territory in a given year.
The log of gross domestic product per capita and population from the World Bank
are included to account for country-wide features and the government’s counterinsurgency
capabilities. 25 Strong democracies and autocracies are less likely to experience civil wars,
but regimes that are transitioning and anocracies are beset by instability and violence.
International actors may also be more likely to support democratic governments, targeted
their sanctions instead at rebel challengers. Varieties of Democracy (VDEM v9) provides an
electoral democracy index with a range of 0 to 1. Values close to 1 reflect highly democratic
regimes that encompass widespread suffrage, clean elections, and freedoms of association
and expression (Coppedge and Ziblatt., 2019). The mean and median values of this measure
for the sample are 0.4, reflecting anocratic regime types. Sanctions are frequently enacted
in concert with other economic, military and political counterinsurgency tactics. Kathman
25The World Bank Data can be accessed here: https://data.worldbank.org/
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(2013) provides monthly data on the number of peacekeeping troops and military or police
observers deployed in a country. Following Hultman and Peksen (2017), I include the total
number of peacekeeping forces to the mission for each month. Table 2.5 in the appendix
summarizes the descriptive statistic for each variable.
To evaluate my hypotheses, I estimate a Bayesian multi-level negative binomial model
with random effects. This method is the best strategy based on several characteristics
of the data. First, the outcome variables All Violence and Civilian Fatalities are over-
dispersed count variables. Second, there are dependencies across several clusters in the data
and I expect there to be significant heterogeneity in rebel use of tactics. This model also
includes several specifications to mitigate concerns of reverse causality, i.e. that high levels of
civilian victimization or battlefield violence influence the United Nations’ decision to impose
sanctions. All battlefield dynamics and intervention variables are lagged by one month, (m-
1), so that they precede the dependent variable by one period. Random effects are included
to account for unobserved or omitted group and temporal variables that may influence the
effect of sanctions on battlefield dynamics. This approach is also flexible to the unbalanced







γy = θy + εy
εg ∼ N (0, σ2g) εy ∼ N (0, σ2y) ψ ∼ Exp(1)
The model is set up to include random effects for clustered temporal and geographic
components of the data. ygm is the response variable, All Violence or Civilian Fatalities, for
group g in month m. Xgm is a matrix of the interventions that vary at the group-month
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level, αg is the intercept for group g, and γ is the intercept for month m. αg is a random
variable that contains a matrix of group characteristics, ZTg . The error terms for group and
year are drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ2 based on the
cluster samples. The dispersion parameter, ψ, is drawn from the exponential distribution
with rate 1.
2.7 Results
Table 2.1 presents the β coefficient for the first and second models evaluating the impact
of economic sanctions on rebel groups, net violent output. The results show that UN sanc-
tions are associated with decreased violence from targeted insurgent groups. This supports
hypothesis 1: imposed sanctions decrease a rebel’s ability to perpetrate violence. In contrast
to the literature on the ineffectiveness of sanctions, this result shows that sanctions can
succeed against violent non-state actors. The second model includes the interaction term
between rebel economic diversity and sanctions. The results support hypothesis 2: sanctions
only reduce the violent capabilities of groups that do not have robust financing strategies.
This result supports findings in the literature that groups that are more financially adapt-
able can find new funding streams when sanctions target their resource generating strategies
(Radtke and Jo, 2018). Economically diversified groups are resilient to the extra costs and
severed funding streams brought on by sanctions. Their financial underpinnings suggest
these groups are adapt at forming and maintaining sophisticated financial strategies. The
results also support expectations that larger groups with control of territory are more violent.
Figure 2.1 shows the marginal effects of groups’ economic diversity under sanctions and
not under sanctions. For groups with few known sources of financing, sanctions effectively re-
duce their violent output. Economically robust rebels may have sufficient savings or weapons
stockpiles to offset the costs of sanctions as they acquire alternative sources of income. These
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Table 2.1: Summary of β Posterior Distributions for Models 1 and 2
Variable Model 1 Model 2
DV:All Violencem
Rebel Sanctionsm−1 −0.72* −1.00*
(−1.02, −0.42) ( −1.32, −0.67)
Economic Diversity 0.39* 0.31*
(0.31, 0.48) (0.23, 0.40)
Rebel Sanctionsm−1× Economic Diversity - 0.27*
(0.14, 0.40)
Rebel Size 0.13 0.15
(−0.04, 0.29) ( −0.01, 0.31)
Territorial Control 1.36* 1.30*
(1.16, 1.55) (1.10, 1.49)
Peacekeeping Personnelm−1 0.00 0.00
(0.00, 0.00) (0.00, 0.00)
Civil Warm−1 2.35* 2.37*
(2.15, 2.54) (2.16, 2.58)
GDP per capita (log) −0.40* −0.39*
(−0.60, −0.18) ( −0.59, −0.17)
Population (log) −0.18 −0.19*
(−0.37, 0.01) ( −0.36, −0.02)
Democracy −0.43 −0.63
(−1.33, 0.44) ( −1.53, 0.23)
Constant 4.51* 4.77*
(0.70, 8.16 ) (1.26, 8.34)
Observations 14,495 14,495
Rebel-Month RE Yes Yes
Note: Parenthesis show 95% credible interval. GDP = Gross Domestic Product. RE
= Random Effects.
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Figure 2.1: Marginal Effects of Economic Diversity and Sanctions
results also show that groups with more financial resources use that financing to engage in
greater violence. Both rebel groups targeted with sanctions and those not currently under
a sanctions regime are more violent as they obtain more sources of financing. This finding
demonstrates the importance of economic sanctions and other efforts to curtain insurgent
financing. Effectively blocking even one source of insurgent income can reduce their capacity
to perpetrate violence.
Table 2.2 presents Models 3 and 4, evaluating hypotheses 3 and 4. These results offer
mixed support for these hypotheses. I expected rebel groups with economic portfolios con-
sisting of a high ratio of cross-national financing to be particularly vulnerable to economic
sanctions. Groups most vulnerable to economic sanctions would have fewer resources to
allocate toward violence and this would be observable in a decline in overall violent output.
The interaction term in Model 3 is negative, as expected, but the posterior distribution
is centered near zero suggesting there may be no effect of these mechanisms on violence.
Within this sample, the β coefficient for Rebel Sanctions is positive with more than 90 per-
60
centage of the distribution greater than 0. This can be interpreted as the impact of sanctions
when Cross-national financing takes its lowest value, indicating economic portfolios that do
not rely on any vulnerable resource-generating strategies. Sanctions against these groups
are associated with more violence. Cross-national financing without sanctions is negatively
associated with net violence, suggesting that these supply-chain characteristics might result
in more overall instability of financing.
Model 4 evaluated the opposite hypothesis, groups with a high ratio of domestic financing,
which I theorize is relatively insulated from the reach of economic sanctions, should not be
impacted by economic sanctions. The results show no effective of the interaction, as expected,
but the coefficient for Domestic Financing is positive. This shows that groups with economic
portfolios skewed toward domestic sources generally produce more violence when not under
sanctions. Together, these results show that a rebel group’s economic portfolio has important
implications for its levels of violence.
These results suggest that economic sanctions can still raise the costs on groups with
relatively difficult to interdict sources of income. Asset freezes, travel bans, and arms em-
bargoes all make the day-to-day logistics of insurgency more costly. For a rebel group that
relies entirely on relatively difficult to target financing, such as robbery and extortion, the
business operations of insurgency under economic sanctions become more costly as they at-
tempt to procure additional armaments or maintain their supply networks. Rebel groups
must reallocate resources dedicated to fighting toward building new sources of revenue and
re-configuring their armament supply chains to evade the reach of sanctions.
Table 2.3 presents the β coefficient estimates for models evaluating hypotheses 5 and
6. Model 5 evaluates hypothesis 5: groups originating from local institutions will reduce
their violence against civilians when sanctions are imposed. The results offer support for
this hypothesis. The posterior distribution for the interaction coefficient falls completely
below zero. There is no relationship between groups that have social origins and do not face
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Table 2.2: Summary of β Posterior Distributions for Models 3 and 4
Variable Model 3 Model 4
DV:All Violencem
Rebel Sanctionsm−1 0.41 0.21
(−0.07, 0.89) (−0.37, 0.79)
Cross-National Financing −0.61* -
(−0.95, −0.26 )
Rebel Sanctionsm−1× Cross-National Financing −0.19 -
(−0.92, 0.52 )
Domestic Financing - 0.60*
(0.25, 0.95 )
Rebel Sanctionsm−1× Domestic Financing - 0.21
(−0.51, 0.94)
Economic Diversity −0.06 −0.07
(−0.16, 0.04) (−0.17, 0.03)
Rebel Size 0.44 0.43
(0.24, 0.64) (0.24, 0.62)
Territorial Control 0.75* 0.75*
(0.53 0.98) (0.53, 0.97)
Peacekeeping Personnelm−1 0.00 0.00
(0.00, 0.00) (0.00,0.00)
Civil Warm−1 1.09* 1.09*
(0.76, 1.41) (0.74, 1.42)
GDP per capita (log) 0.07 0.07
(−0.21, 0.36) (−0.22, 0.37)
Population (log) −0.40* −0.40*
(−0.65, −0.17) (−0.65, −0.17)
Democracy 0.91 0.93
(−0.33, 2.18) (−0.32, 2.19)
Constant 6.09 5.48
(1.10, 11.02) (0.58, 10.54)
Observations 5,240 5,240
Rebel-Month RE Yes Yes
Note: Parenthesis show 95% credible interval. GDP = Gross Domestic Product. RE =
Random Effects
* indicates 0 falls outside the 95% credible interval
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sanctions and their use of civilian victimization. This suggests that these groups might use
both coercive and predatory tactics. However, the unique challenges of economic sanctions
cause rebel groups to increase their reliance on their civilian counterparts and their violent
behaviors toward civilians decline as a reflection of this. Instead, these groups are able to
use persuasion to extract additional resources.
Models 6 and 7 evaluate my expectations that groups lacking institutional ties to local
communities and the relationships that these institutions facilitate will turn to coercion to
recoup their economic losses from civilian losses. I create two different measures to evaluate
this hypothesis. Model 6 presents the results for the analysis on groups that have access to
resource wealth in the forms of natural resources and state sponsorship. Groups with access
to these economic endowments can attract recruits by offering wages, rather than relying on
social connections that can persuade adherents to take up arms based on shared political,
religious, social, or ethnic ties. As a consequence of the lack of connections, it is difficult
for rebel groups the persuade local civilians to support the rebels and provide resources in
furtherance of their goals. The results show that when these groups face economic sanctions,
they will attempt to make up for losses by violently extracting more resources from civilians.
The β coefficient for Rebel Sanctionsm−1 is negative, supporting the findings in Model 5 that
groups that have institutional ties reduce their violence against civilian populations when
targeted by sanctions. However, the interaction term is positive demonstrating that groups
with economic origins targeted by sanctions turn their violence toward civilian populations.
Model 7 evaluates an alternative measure of this concept based on whether the group orig-
inated from a prior violent non-state actor. These results broadly support the findings in
Model 6, however the 95% credible intervals for the key variables of interest include zero at
the margins. Figure 2.4 in the appendix presents the distribution of these variables.
Figure 2 shows the posterior distributions of the key variables of interest from Model 3
and Model 6 with means plotted as circles and the thick line indicating the 95% credible
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interval for each variable. This figure highlights the starkly divergent impact of economic
sanctions against groups with social origins and those with economic origins. Economic
sanctions targeting rebel groups with institutional connections from local communities are
likely to reduce rebel use of violence against those communities. However, policymakers must
be cautious that economic sanctions targeting groups lacking these community connections
might predate on civilians to offset the costs of sanctions.
Rebel Sanction x Social Origins
Social Origins
Rebel Sanction
−6 −3 0 3 6
Posterior distributions with means and 95% intervals
Social Origins (Model 5)
Rebel Sanction x Economic Origins
Economic Origins
Rebel Sanction
−5.0 −2.5 0.0 2.5 5.0
Posterior distributions with means and 95% intervals
Economic Origins (Model 6)
Figure 2.2: Interaction Terms and Violence Against Civilians
As the discussion and table 2.6 show, there are differences between the types of insurgen-
cies that are sanctioned by the United Nations and those that are not. There is no evidence
to suggest that the UNSC selects easy cases where success is likely. The opposite appears
true, in the sample, groups that have been sanctioned perpetrate more than three times the
amount of monthly violence as groups that avoid these forms of counterinsurgency. This is
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Table 2.3: Summary of β Posterior Distributions
Variable Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
DV:Civilian Fatalitiesm
Rebel Sanctionsm−1 0.34 −2.28* −0.96*
(−0.14, 0.80) (−3.32, −1.66) (−1.92, -0.03)
Social Origins 0.94 - -
(−0.80, 2.75)
Rebel Sanctionsm−1× Social Origins −3.01* - -
(−4.07, −1.96)
Economic Origins - −0.46 -
(−0.96, 0.06 )
Rebel Sanctionsm−1× Economic Origins - 2.84* -
(1.98, 3.74)
Rebel Origins - - 0.10
(−1.99, 2.02)
Rebel Sanctionsm−1× Rebel Origins - - 0.80
(−0.19, 1.85)
Economic Diversity 0.22* 0.17* 0.21*
(0.11, 0.34) (0.06, 0.28) (0.11, 0.32)
Rebel Size −0.05 0.20 −0.03
(−0.29, 0.20) (−0.05, 0.45) (−0.27, 0.22)
Territorial Control 0.96* 1.04* 1.02*
(0.65, 1.27) (0.74, 1.32) (0.71, 1.33)
Peacekeeping Personnelm−1 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00, 0.00) (0, 0) (0.00, 0.00)
Civil Warm−1 0.39* 0.35* 0.38*
(0.35, 0.44) (0.30, 0.39) (0.33, 0.43 )
GDP per capita (log) −1.10* −1.04* −1.13*
(−1.44, −0.74) (−1.35, −0.70) (−1.46, −0.77)
Population (log) −0.41* −0.39 −0.46*
(−0.74, −0.06) (−0.73, −0.08) (−0.77, −0.15)
Democracy 0.09 0.33 −0.04
(−1.38, 1.52) (−1.73, 1.05) (−1.50, 1.37)
Constant 7.72* 7.37* 9.23*
(0.72, 14.76 ) (1.14, 14.15) (2.68, 15.49)
Observations 13,489 14,495 13,489
Rebel-Month RE Yes Yes Yes
Note: Parenthesis show 95% credible interval. GDP = Gross Domestic Product. RE = Random
Effects
* indicates 0 falls outside the 95% credible interval
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particularly stark for their use of violence against civilians, sanctioned groups on average
kill seven times more civilians than groups that are never sanctioned. This intensity and
targeting of violence prompts actions from the international community. Despite taking on
the most challenging insurgencies, these results show that sanctions can effectively curtail
violence by these violent groups. Sanctions are particularly effective against rebel groups
with few sources of income. However, policymakers must carefully consider rebel groups ori-
gins and enduring connections to civilian populations. Rebel groups lacking these ties may
attempt to recoup the costs of sanctions by violently extracting resources from civilians.
2.8 Conclusion
In the past three decades, international organizations and states have increasingly im-
posed sanctions and developed financial counterinsurgency strategies to quell intrastate con-
flict and combat transnational terrorist groups. Sanctions are an attractive policy because
implementation is generally low cost politically and low risk to the enacting party, but sat-
isfies demands for action in international crises. By building a theory of economic sanctions
centered on rebel groups and their violent activities, this chapter shows that sanctions can
effectively reduce the violence of non-state actors. These results also suggest policymakers
should reconsidered broad-based application of these tactics. Sanctions are particularly ef-
fective at reducing violence from economically vulnerable rebels and those with social ties to
local communities. However, rebel groups that lack institutional connections to local civil-
ians will increase their violence toward civilians when operating under a sanctions regime.
Policymakers should carefully consider when to implement economic counterinsurgency and
when to pair these interventions with policies to protect civilian populations from a potential
backlash.
The approach taken in this paper overcomes some challenges associated with measuring
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the impact of sanctions on rebel behaviors, but limitations persist. First, the results demon-
strate changes in levels of violence associated with targeted sanctions, which I have argued is
an observable implication of a change in the group’s latent capabilities. However, this does
not directly measure the effect of targeted sanctions on a group’s access to financial and mil-
itary resources. It is reasonable to assume that insurgent organizational characteristics and
financial strategies will condition not only their behaviors under resource deprivation, but
the magnitude with which sanctions create that deprivation. I have considered one source
of resilience, economic diversity, but others may also affect rebel robustness to sanctions.
This study does not account for rebel reserves of funding and armaments or country char-
acteristics that might enhance or undermine the efficacy of sanctions such as sizable black
markets and porous borders. Second, concerns of endogeneity and reverse causation caution
the interpretation of these results. The Security Council may be most likely to find consen-
sus among members and target sanctions against insurgents when these groups engage in
particularly egregious forms of violence, such as civilian victimization. The empirical strat-
egy undertaken should mitigate these concerns, but it may be fruitful to test these theories
further by focusing on financial restrictions implemented through more routine bureaucratic
and apolitical processes such as at banks and financial institutions.
My expectations regarding enforcement and the vulnerability of funding sources were
not supported by the evidence. While this has been a micro-level approach, it is worth
considering other layers of economic counterinsurgency or country-level variation that might
impact the enforcement and efficacy of sanctions regimes. This study and other evaluations
of economic sanctions in civil wars are missing country-level variation in financial resilience
and enforcement capabilities. This chapter includes country GDP per capita as a rough proxy
for government capacity broadly, but a more precise measure would be beneficial. Country-
level counter-illicit financing systems should influence the enforcement of sanctions and may
interact with rebels economic portfolios in interesting ways. Future work should incorporate
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these systemic economic counterinsurgency measures into analyses of more targeted measures
to isolate the variation of interest.
This chapter suggests several avenues for further research. Rebel production of violence is
one observable implication of targeted sanctions, but these policies are likely to have broader
impacts on the internal cohesion and strategic calculus of violent non-state actors and the
governments opposing them. Given the interaction between rebel organizational structures
and external interventions identified here, it is reasonable to evaluate the presence of this
heterogeneity on other outcomes. Future work could consider the impact of sanctions on
insurgent splintering, willingness to negotiate, and longevity. Economic sanctions targeting
rebels best reflect the growing toolbox of financial counterinsurgency, but in the context of
intrastate conflicts it is worth analyzing symmetric sanctions that impact the capabilities of
all belligerents and sanctions that only target the government. This theory has focused on
rebel groups, civilian populations, and domestic governments, but further analyses into the
broader networks of violent non-state actors could identify if these policies cascade across
rebel alliances or are disrupted by sanctions-busting foreign sponsors.
2.9 Appendix
Table 2.4: Economic Sanctions Targeting Insurgent Groups
Insurgent Group Sanctions Regime Enacted
Kosovo Liberation Army FRY 2 EP1 Mar 1998
National Liberation Army of Macedonia FRY 2 EP1 Mar 1998
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council Sierra Leone EP2 Mar 1998
Revolutionary United Front Sierra Leone EP2 Mar 1998
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola Angola EP3 June 1998
West Side Boys Sierra Leone EP3 Oct 1999
Continued on next page
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Table 2.4 – Continued from previous page
Insurgent Group Sanctions Regime Enacted
Taliban AQT EP1 Oct 1999
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy Liberia EP2 Mar 2001
Abu Sayyaf Group ISIL & Al-Qa’ida Oct 2001
Al-Ittihaad Al-Islami Somalia EP1 Oct 2001
Al-Qa’ida AQT EP1 Dec 2000
Armed Islamic Group ISIL & Al-Qa’ida Oct 2001
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan ISIL & Al-Qa’ida Oct 2001
Islamic Courts Union Somalia EP2 May 2002
Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council Somalia EP2 May 2002
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement ISIL & Al-Qa’ida Sep 2002
Ansar Al-Islam Iraq EP1 Feb 2003
Mahdi Army Iraq EP1 May 2003
Mujahedin-e Khalq Iraq EP1 May 2003
Movement for Democracy in Liberia Liberia EP3 May 2003
Islamic Army in Iraq Iraq EP1 May 2003
Allied Democratic Forces DRC EP1 July 2003
Bunda Dia Kongo DRC EP1 July 2003
Congolese Rally for Democracy DRC EP1 July 2003
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda DRC EP1 July 2003
Movement for the Liberation of Congo DRC EP1 July 2003
Ntsiloulous DRC EP1 July 2003
Kurdistan Free Life Party Iraq EP2 June 2004
Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement Sudan 2 EP1 July 2004
Justice and Equality Movement Sudan 2 EP1 July 2004
Sudan Liberation Movement Sudan 2 EP1 July 2004
Sudan People’s Liberation Army Sudan 2 EP1 July 2004
Islamic State† Iraq EP2 Oct 2004
Forces Nouvelles Côte d’Ivoire EP1 Nov 2004
Ivorian Movement for the Greater West Côte d’Ivoire EP1 Nov 2004
Continued on next page
69
Table 2.4 – Continued from previous page
Insurgent Group Sanctions Regime Enacted
Sudan Liberation Movement/Amy -MM Sudan 2 EP2 Mar 2005
Lord’s Resistance Army DRC EP2 April 2005
Islamic Jihad Group ISIL & Al-Qa’ida June 2005
National Congress for the Defense of the People DRC EP3 Mar 2008
Al-Shabaab Somalia EP3 Nov 2008
Hizbul Al Islam Somalia EP4 Dec 2009
Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula ISIL & Al-Qa’ida Jan 2010
Caucasus Emirate ISIL & Al-Qa’ida July 2011
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan ISIL & Al-Qa’ida July 2011
M23 DRC EP4 Dec 2012
Notes: EP refers to the first sanctions episode the group was party to according to the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC).
Some rebels are listed under country regimes and the ISIL & Al-Qa’ida list, the table includes the first regime were they were
listed.
† Originally listed as Al-Qa’ida in Iraq
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Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Data Source Min. Max. Mean Median
Interventions
(group-month)
Rebel Sanctions UN, TSC 0 1 0.2 0
Peacekeeping Personnel Kathman 2013 0 198,236 22,266 0
Battlefield Dynamics
(group-month)
All Violence UCDP 0 3,043 22.65 0
Battle Deaths UCDP 0 3,005 19.2 0
Civilian Attack UCDP 0 2753 2.7 0
Rebel Characteristics
(group-year)
Social Origins FORGE 0 1 0.4 0
Economic Origins RCD, BAAD II 0 1 0.6 1
Rebel Origins FORGE 0 1 0.6 1
Size BAAD II 1 4 2.7 3
Diversified Funding BAAD II 0 5 0.6 0
Territorial Control BAAD II 0 1 0.2 0
Country Characteristics
(country-year)
GDP per capita (log) World Bank 4.6 10.8 7.0 6.9
Population (log) World Bank 13.4 20.9 17.7 17.7
Polyarchy VDEM 0.1 0.9 0.4 0.4
Civil War UCDP 0 1 0.8 1
Note: BAAD II = Big Allied and Dangerous iteration II. GDP = Gross Domestic
Product. RCD = Rebel Contraband Dataset. FORGE=Foundations of Rebel Group
Emergence TSC = Targeted Sanctions Consortium. VDEM = Varieties of Democracy
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Table 2.6: Comparison Sanctions and Unsanctioned Groups in the Sample
Variable Not Sanctioned (Mean) Sanctioned (Mean)
Battlefield Dynamics (group-month)
Peacekeeping Personnel 18,056.7 30,689.7
All Violence 13.3 41.3
Battle Deaths 11.9 33.7
Civilian Attack 0.9 6.3
Rebel Characteristics (group-year)
Age (years) 20.7 11.2
Social Origins 0.5 0.3
Economic Origins 0.6 0.6
Rebel Origins 0.6 0.7
Size 2.6 2.9
Diversified Funding 0.6 0.7
Territorial Control 0.2 0.3
Country Characteristics (country-year)
GDP per capita (log) 7.2 6.7
Population (log) 17.9 17.2
Polyarchy 0.5 0.3
Civil War Battle Deaths 90.9 182.9
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Figure 2.4: Posterior Distributions of Rebel Group Characteristics from Model 7
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CHAPTER III
Measuring State Counter-Illicit Financing Systems
3.1 Introduction
The September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center produced a sea change in
global counterterrorism efforts. In President George W. Bush’s Rose Garden address on
September 24, 2001, he laid out the contours of the United States’ War on Terrorism, which
centered on military engagements, expansive surveillance and law enforcement operations,
and a new focus on countering the financing of terrorism. He concluded with a global
appeal, “Money is the lifeblood of terrorist operations. Today, we’re asking the world to
stop payment” (Bush, 2001). There has been much journalistic, academic, and government
evaluation of the military and law enforcement prongs of this strategy. However, the financial
front of this war has been largely neglected in the literature, despite growing into an immense
international system with purview over most transactions in the global financial system.
International efforts to counter the financing of violence from non-state actors have been
sprawling and multifaceted (Biersteker and Eckert, 2007). I refer to these laws and policies
as economic counterinsurgency and broadly refer these interconnected international efforts as
the economic counterinsurgency regime.1 Economic counterinsurgency encompasses actions
1Within the policy community, these efforts are commonly labeled some variation of Countering (or Com-
bating) the Financing of Terrorism (CFT). This terminology is used by the United Nations, the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, Financial Action Task Force, and many individual governments. The poli-
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that range from narrowly targeting a single group to broad structural policies that affect the
global financial system. Selective policies include terrorist designation lists and individual
or multilateral sanctions such as the United Nations’ ISIL and Al-Qa’ida Sanctions Com-
mittee. Other efforts target entire countries or specific sectors, for example the Kimberley
Process,2 legislation regulating charitable donations or conflict minerals (Section 1503 of the
U.S. Dodd-Frank Act), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s efforts to disrupt the
narcotics trade, and country-level sanctions. Policies can also center on structural changes
that impact the ability of all illicit groups to use or manipulate financial systems to fund
violence. These efforts include intelligence sharing across national financial intelligence units
(FIUs) within the Egmont Group3 and strengthening of anti-money laundering and coun-
tering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) provisions under the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF).
The international economic counterinsurgency regime is important to several areas of
study in political science and public policy. The goal of these policies is to curtail the re-
sources and activities of violent non-state actors. In a review of counterinsurgency from
1978-2008, Paul, Clarke and Grill (2010) finds that reducing tangible support to insurgents
is one of the most effective counterinsurgency strategies. Yet, the few studies that evaluate
economic counterinsurgency have produced mixed results. Targeted sanctions and terrorist
designations can reduce violence from economically vulnerable groups (Radtke and Jo, 2018;
Simonelli, 2021a) or those operating in countries allied with the United States (Phillips,
2019). However, policies to disrupt the conflict-mineral link have backfired, producing in-
creased violence (Bloem, 2018; Stoop, Verpoorten and Van der Windt, 2018) and sanctions
cies discussed here are used to target terrorists, insurgent groups, and criminals. For simplicity I use the
term counterinsurgency but this refers to actions against all violent non-state actors.
2The Kimberley Process creates certification standards to ensure rough diamonds are not used to finance
insurgent groups.
3The Egmont Group was founded in 1995 to provide a platform for cooperation between FIUs in sharing
technical expertise and intelligence.
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against groups that are disconnected from local civil society can lead to civilian victimization
(Simonelli, 2021a).
Economic counterinsurgency can also have unintended economic consequences on busi-
nesses and foreign investors. Foreign investors seek out host markets where they can maxi-
mize the returns on their investments while minimizing political risks. These duel concerns
lead to interesting patterns of investment; foreign investors exploit environments with lax
regulations but with strong protections from expropriation and political instability (Busse
and Hefeker, 2007; Jensen, 2008; Johns and Wellhausen, 2016; Vernon, 1971). Onerous
AML/CFT financial regulations and oversight can reduce the profitability of investments
by adding burdensome documentation and reporting standards and increasing transparency
over business practices. These provisions might dissuade foreign investors or alternatively
could attract risk-adverse companies that are concerned with running afoul of home country
regulations.
Finally, economic counterinsurgency is relevant to the study of international institutions
and state behavior. Governments have a shared interest in reducing the capabilities of do-
mestic or transnational groups that might target them. However, the rewards of increased
financial regulations are, by and large, a public good and it is difficult to quantify or inter-
nally justify any one state’s benefits from these institutions. States bear a heavy political
and economic cost for compliance with the international institutions of economic counterin-
surgency. Governments must spend precious resources and political capital on enhancing
their intelligence gathering capacity, regulating formal and informal financial transactions,
instituting anti-money laundering controls, and sacrificing sovereignty through pressure to
share intelligence and by allowing intergovernmental monitoring agencies access to govern-
ment records (Biersteker and Eckert, 2007). There is an additional opportunity cost of
potentially repelling wealthy investors that seek a lax regulatory environment and angering
civilians who face additional regulations and restrictions on donating to charities or send-
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ing money through informal value transfer systems, such as hawalas (Clunan, 2006). This
poses an intriguing coordination and bargaining problem that could be compared to the
challenges states face in garnering support and compliance with regimes on human rights,
labor standards, and the environment.
This chapter adds to the nascent literature on economic counterinsurgency by evaluating
systemic efforts to improve robustness to illicit financing. I create two measures to eval-
uate the quality of a state’s counter-illicit financing institutions and overall security from
illicit financing. AML/CFT structures comprise the legal framework and regulatory tools
established to oversee, investigate, and block illicit financing. However, the existence of laws
and regulatory tools on the books does not necessarily imply a lower risk of illicit exploita-
tion. I create a second measure to capture the efficacy of the overall system in rebuffing
illicit exploitation. AML/CFT effectiveness is derived from a government’s capacity and
willingness to use their toolbox to disrupt illicit activities.4 I create county-level estimates of
AML/CFT structures and AML/CFT effectiveness using expert country assessments from
FATF and dynamic ordinal item response theory models. Exploring the model parame-
ters highlights the challenges governments face in regulating private entities which serve as
the day-to-day monitors and enforcers over transactions. The results show that AML/CFT
structures and effectiveness are highly correlated, but high quality AML/CFT institutions
are not a necessary condition for an effective AML/CFT system. As I expected, strong
AML/CFT structures do not always result in higher levels of AML/CFT effectiveness. The
results demonstrate the importance of measuring both dimensions of counter-illicit financing
systems. I validate these measures by demonstrating their positive correlation with five other
common measures of government institutional quality.
4I use the terms AML/CFT structures and AML/CFT technical compliance interchangeably. Both terms
refer to the first dimension of illicit financing robustness which captures the underlying laws and tools in a
country. I use the terms AML/CFT capacity and willingness interchangeably with AML/CFT effectiveness.
This second dimension captures a governments ability to identify, enforce, and disrupt money laundering
and terrorist financing.
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I explore the underlying goal of AML/CFT regimes by evaluating the relationship be-
tween these measures and political violence. I consider three measures of political violence,
intensity of civil war violence, one-sided violence against civilians, and terrorism. The results
show that AML/CFT structures and effectiveness have no conclusive relationship to violence
against civilians and terrorism. However, AML/CFT effectiveness is associated with a lower
intensity of civil wars.5 This result suggests that governments that can effectively block
insurgent groups from exploiting financial markets to transfer funds and launder money may
curtail groups’ violent capabilities. Due to temporal limitations and model features, these
results cannot distinguish the direction of causality in this relationship. This work cannot
yet conclude that AML/CFT efforts succeed in reducing violence or that they have been
an ineffective policy tool that should be reconsidered. However, the results presented in
this chapter highlight the importance of counter-illicit financing measures as a key aspect of
economic counterinsurgency that is relevant for a broad array of political phenomena. This
paper contributes the first measurement model of counter-illicit financing structures and
effectiveness with the hope that others use these measures to explore these patterns further.
3.2 Counter-Illicit Financing Structures and Effectiveness
Counter-illicit financing systems constitute a state’s ability to identify, disrupt, and pre-
vent efforts to use financial systems for illicit purposes such as money laundering and financ-
ing terrorism. Money laundering is an illegal series of financial maneuvers meant obscure
the origins of criminally obtained money so that it appears legitimate. The crime, for ex-
ample drug trafficking, proceeds the exploitation of the financial system. In contrast, the
financing of terrorism often originates with legal sources of income. For example, a supporter
donates a portion of their salary or terrorists exploit a legitimate business. The financial
5AML/CFT structures is negatively associated with battle deaths and terror attacks, but the results
cannot prove this relationship may not also be zero.
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system is then used to transfer licit funds for illegal and terrorist purposes. The definition
of counter-illicit financing systems reflects the interwoven nature of criminal and terrorism
financing.6 The primary tools available to regulators, for example tracking suspicious finan-
cial transactions and customer due diligence, can identify suspicious financial behaviors but
do not distinguish between transactions meant for terrorist or criminal purposes. Improv-
ing counter-illicit financing systems should improve a government’s ability to identify, track,
disrupt, and prevent both money laundering and terrorist financing.
Counter-illicit financing systems comprise the institutions and resources used to safe-
guard financial systems from illicit exploitation and the security produced from these efforts.
States can employ a range of strategies to improve the resilience of their financial systems.
Rather than creating a unified measure of counter-illicit financing systems, I separate state
institutions and de jure regulatory environment from the outcomes that reflect the latent
effectiveness of the overall system. AML/CFT structures include the legal framework and
regulatory tools that have been established to identify, understand, and target illicit financ-
ing. For example, governments can pass laws criminalizing the financing of terrorism and
implement financial regulations requiring banks and other financial entities to conduct cus-
tomer due diligence (CDD), record keeping, and submit suspicious activity reports (SARs).
This overarching structure also includes the creation of a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)
and other entities tasked with investigating malfeasance. The first FIUs were created in the
1990s, and since then 166 FIUs have collaborated and shared financial intelligence under the
coordination of the Egmont Group. These institutions and enforcement agencies provide the
toolbox that states can use to counter money laundering and terrorist financing.
AML/CFT effectiveness encompasses a state’s capacity to use their toolbox to success-
ful disrupt efforts to exploit their financial systems. The existence of regulations and law
6Terrorist financing regulations were built into extant institutions created to counter money laundering
and the trade in illicit goods.
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enforcement agencies must be complemented with government willingness and capacity to
use the tools at their disposal to insulate their financial systems. Capacity encompasses
the funding, personnel, and technical experience necessary to cull through SARs, investigate
suspects, and pursue legal actions against those that violate their legal AML/CFT frame-
work. Willingness captures the government’s underlying preferences for disrupting illicit
financing. There are many reasons governments might not prefer a financial system that is
fully robust to illicit exploitation. International investors may seek out environments with
less onerous regulations and reward these countries with increased capital inflows. Criminal
enterprises may hold significant political power and corrupt politicians can enrich themselves
by exploiting the same financial vulnerabilities that AML/CFT institutions were created to
disrupt. Thus a state’s AML/CFT capacity reflects their ability and desire to effectively use
their legal framework to rebuff efforts for criminal financing. This measure best reflects a
country’s de facto levels of protection from illicit exploitation of their financial markets.
Measuring a state’s counter illicit financing system poses a challenge. There are few ob-
servable indicators of counter-illicit financing institutions and effectiveness that are uniform
across countries. Codified structural AML/CFT may be easier to observe, but it is difficult
to compare technical components of different laws without a strong substantive understand-
ing of each country’s unique legal system and their money laundering and terrorist financing
risks. Observing the effectiveness of a AML/CFT system is even more difficult, as this cat-
egory is more subjective. In constructing a measure of effectiveness one must decide what
metrics to use. Is an effective system one that produces the biggest paper trail, freezes the
most assets, or deters exploitation attempts to begin with? I have defined effectiveness as the
state’s ability to identify, disrupt, and prevent illicit exploitation of financial systems. Once
a metric has been chosen and validated, there are still challenges in accessing the correct
observable data. Governments rarely report underlying data so it may be impossible to com-
pare the number of SARs, investigations derived from financial intelligence, assets frozen, or
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compliant industries. To overcome these challenges, I use expert assessments conducted by
FATF.
FATF experts are trained to evaluate the implementation of international AML/CFT
standards within the context of each member’s domestic legal system. These standards apply
a risk-based approach, so while the money laundering and terrorist financing challenges in
some countries might be greater, FATF ratings reflect a country’s attempts to understand
and evaluate their risks as well as the steps they’ve taken to counter them. The FATF’s
overarching definition of an effective AML/CFT system is “financial systems and the broader
economy are protected from the threats of money laundering and the financing of terrorism
and proliferation, thereby strengthening financial sector integrity and contributing to safety
and security” (FATF, 2012-2020a). The FATF’s definitions and measurement strategy align
closely with my conceptions of counter-illicit financing structures and effectiveness.
3.3 FATF Reports
The Financial Action Task Force was founded by the Group of Seven (G-7) in 1989 to
develop international standards for disrupting money laundering. In 1990 the FATF pro-
duced 40 anti-money laundering recommendations to combat the thriving illicit drug trade.
The FATF expanded their scope to include terrorist financing in 2001, resulting in eight
(and later nine) recommendations to counter the financing of terrorism. These recommen-
dations were reviewed and revised in 2012 to produce a cohesive 40 international standards
on AML/CFT. The goal of these standards is to facilitate international coordination, help
states identify their risk landscape, and develop preventative, investigative, and punitive
measures to counter threats.
FATF relies on nine FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs) to facilitate implementation
of recommendations and monitor member progress. The FATF and FSRBs encompass 200
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member countries and jurisdictions. Most countries are members of their regional bodies
but not members of FATF separately. A key exception is the European Union, which does
not have a regional FSRB and is a direct member of FATF. Figure 3.1 provides a map of













Note: APG=Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering; CFATF=Caribbean Financial Action Task Force; EAG = Eurasian
Group; ESAAMLG = Eastern & Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group; GABAC =Central Africa Anti-Money Laun-
dering Group; GAFILAT = Latin America Anti-Money Laundering Group; GIABA = West Africa Money Laundering Group;
MENAFATF = Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force; MONEYVAL = Council of Europe Anti-Money
Laundering Group
Figure 3.1: Map of FATF Regional Body Membership
FSRBs and FATF monitor member progress on recommendations through Mutual Evalu-
ation Reports and Follow-up Reports. The mutual evaluation process for a given jurisdiction
takes 18 months to complete and involves information sharing between assessment teams and
country officials, a two week on site visit, and review with input from the assessed country.
Assessment teams comprise five to six legal, financial, and law enforcement experts from
other member countries that have been confirmed by the FATF President. The process be-
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gins six months prior to on-site evaluations with members answering a questionnaire on their
technical compliance. Members must provide evidence documenting their progress on each
recommendation and demonstrating the effectiveness of their policies which reduces subjec-
tiveness in expert evaluations. These expert reports produce country ratings across 51 (40
recommendations and 11 immediate outcomes) aspects of their AML and CFT frameworks.
The final report is considered and adopted by a Plenary session of the FATF.
The teams evaluate members’ technical compliance and effectiveness. The technical com-
ponent scores each member’s compliance with the FATF 40 recommendations. These recom-
mendations are listed in Table 4.8 in the appendix and are categorized within policies and
coordination, money laundering and confiscation, terrorist financing and financing of pro-
liferation, preventive measures, transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons and
arrangements, powers and responsibilities of competent authorities and other institutional
measures, and international cooperation. Countries are evaluated on an ordinal scale with
four ratings from non-compliant, indicating major shortcomings, to complaint. The effective-
ness section contains 11 immediate outcomes that experts use to evaluate how well the coun-
try is meeting the objectives of AML/CFT and creating financial systems that are protected
from exploitation. For example, the first effectiveness measure is “Money laundering and
terrorist financing risks are understood and, where appropriate, actions coordinated domes-
tically to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation”(FATF,
2012-2020a). Countries can receive a rating of low, moderate, substantial, or high levels of
effectiveness.
The FATF ratings and accompanying reports provide incredibly detailed assessments
of each country’s countering illicit financing institutions. However they do not provide a
clear strategy for evaluating or comparing the overall strength of AML/CFT institutions or
effectiveness across countries. Which country has the best system for AML/CFT? What
aspects of AML/CFT are the most important? How do counter-illicit financing systems
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affect other important political phenomena such as mobilization of violence, international
interactions among states, and foreign investment?
To address these questions and others, I construct two measures to capture states’
counter-illicit financing systems. For the first measure, AML/CFT structure, I use informa-
tion from the technical compliance section of the Mutual Evaluation Reports and Follow-up
Reports which evaluate changes to technical compliance in subsequent years. To evaluate a
country’s AML/CFT effectiveness I use FATF’s 11 immediate outcome measures in the Mu-
tual Evaluation Reports. These are measures of the effectiveness of the overall AML/CFT
system by evaluating whether a given country has achieved a goal that is indicative of an
effective AML/CFT system. This measure is a strong reflection of latent capacity and will-
ingness to counter illicit financing that I have described. The immediate outcomes reflect a
government’s ability to use the tools available to produce improvements in financial system
robustness to illicit exploitation. To create these measures I use a dynamic ordinal item
response theory model.
3.3.1 Geographic and Temporal Scope
Mutual Evaluation Reports (MERs) are not yet available for all FATF and FSRBs mem-
ber jurisdictions. The FATF Plenary determines the schedule of evaluation reports and can
only release reports that have been approved in semi-annual Plenary sessions. As of May
2021 FAFT has released MERs on 106 countries and jurisdictions. The geographic coverage
of available reports is shown in Figure 4.3. There are reports on countries in every geographic
region and across FSRB. The available reports include developed and developing countries
and variation across economic markets, regime types, and population sizes. The FATF will
continue releasing reports as they are completed and approved. As additional reports are





Figure 3.2: Countries with Complete Mutual Evaluation Reports 2014 - May 2021
The updated FATF standards came into force in 2012. The first evaluation reports
based on the updated standards were finished in December of 2014 for Spain and Norway.
Reports on nine additional countries were released in 2015 and the rate has increased since
then except for disruptions due in the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. Figure 3.3 shows the
number of reports released from 2014 to May 2021. Given the high level of detail and
coordination that is required for MERs, they are produced relatively infrequently. Initial
MERs provide a baseline assessment that governments are expected to improve upon in
subsequent years. To monitor progress, FATF conducts more frequent Follow-up Reports.
Follow-up Reports evaluate a government’s progress on technical compliance with FATF
recommendations but do not reevaluate the immediate outcomes. These reports can results
in a raising or lowering of a country’s compliance with individual recommendations. Given
the structure of Follow-up Reports there are multiple observations for a country’s technical




















Figure 3.3: New FATF Reports Released by year from 2014 through May 2021
The average number of reports for a country in the sample from 2014-2021 is three and
the maximum is six. For every country in the dataset there is a MER. This report provides
the first evaluation of the country’s AML/CFT systems and is the sole source of information
on the system’s effectiveness. Several countries have only had this report released, but others
have multiple Follow-up Reports available as well. The expected schedule is for countries
to follow up on their progress with FATF three years after their MER is released. FATF
plans to produce a new MER covering effectiveness and technical compliance every five
years, although no additional MERs are yet available. For countries that have substantial
deficiencies, reports are more frequent, typically with three Follow-up Reports within a five-
year period.
The irregular number and frequency of reports affects the empirical strategy but does not
pose a substantial challenge for the use of these reports. First, subsequent Follow-up Reports
do not necessarily signify improvements. The underlying goal of these intermediary reports is
to encourage countries to improve their technical compliance with FATF recommendations.
However, Follow-Up Reports can revise ratings upward or downward based on the experts’
review. These are additional sources of information, but the standards and evaluation metrics
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are the same. Second, this produces an unbalanced panel. The empirical strategy in this
paper is able to handle this structure. Countries are included in the data beginning with the
first year a MER is available. A country’s counter-illicit financing systems are relatively slow
moving. Once laws are codified they remain the law of the land unless specifically overturned.
Changes to counter-illicit financing systems take time to codify and build technical expertise
and capacity to effectively uphold new protocols. Given these features, I use a dynamic item
response theory model which centers the prior distribution on the country’s previous year.
Countries with more frequent reports will have more certain estimates (smaller standard
deviations), but the estimates themselves are not affected by the amount of data available
for a given country.
3.4 Dynamic Ordinal Item Response Theory Model
I use a dynamic ordinal item response theory (IRT) to measure a country’s AML/CFT
structures and effectiveness. This modeling approach is becoming more popular in interna-
tional relations literature to measure difficult to observe concepts such as democracy (Treier
and Jackman, 2014), human rights (Fariss, 2014; Schnakenberg and Fariss, 2014), prevalence
of sexual violence (Krüger and Nord̊as, 2020), peace agreement strength (Williams et al.,
2019), nuclear proficiency (Smith and Spaniel, 2020) and state preferences over investor pro-
tection (Montal, Potz-Nielsen and Sumner, 2020). These models assume a unidimensional
latent feature which maps onto observable variables, also called manifest indicators or items.
In line with the theoretical argument and measurement strategy of the FATF, I estimate
AML/CFT structures and effectiveness as two separate unidimensional latent variables.7
These features represent distinct latent features that I expect may have different effects on
7It would be possible to estimate a multidimensional latent variable from the 40 FATF recommendations.
As shown in table 4.8 these recommendations do have some structure and correspond to different overarching
categories. While future work focused on one or more categories may explore this the latent concept of interest
in this project is a country’s comprehensive framework for countering illicit financing.
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political phenomena. Scholars that are most interested state compliance with international
AML/CFT institutions or legal strategies to protect financial systems should use the mea-
sure of AML/CFT structures. AML/CFT effectiveness is the correct measure for exploring
variation across the actual levels of protection from illicit financing across financial systems.
There are several benefits of this strategy. First, an IRT model provides substantively
interesting information about the underlying components and their contribution to the latent
concept. This modeling strategy produces difficulty and discrimination parameters which
can be interpreted to learn about individual FATF provisions. Second, this model effectively
handles cases of missing data. Some provisions do not apply to certain countries based on
their structural or legal features. For example, Recommendation 17 provides guidelines that
financial institutions must follow when relying on third parties to perform customer due
diligence. Israeli law requires financial entities conduct all customer due diligence without
the use of third parties, so Recommendation 17 does not apply to this case. Less flexible
approaches, such as factor analysis or an additive scale, would require either Israel and other
countries be removed through list-wise deletion or would not be able to incorporate the
information from Recommendation 17 at all. Finally, this is the best strategy to capture
uncertainty in these measures. The results provide estimates for each country and include
standard deviations so that users can evaluate the certainty of the estimates. Countries with
fewer Follow-up Reports or with larger differences across scores will have greater uncertainty
that users of the data can incorporate into their models.
In each model the latent feature of interest (either AML/CFT structure or AML/CFT
effectiveness) is represented by θ. Individual countries are indexed by i ∈ {1...N}, items are
indexed by j ∈ {1...J}, and years are indexed by t. The outcome yijt represents the score for
country i on assessment item j in year t. Based on the FATF rating system, this score can
take four values represented by k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. I convert the FATF ordinal scale into this
numeric ratings with 1 representing non-compliance or low effectiveness and 4 representing
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full technical compliance or high effectiveness. I estimate the probability that observation
yijt takes a given value k. The difficulty parameter for item j is represented by αjK subject
to the ordering constraint αj1 < αj2 < αj3 < ∞. This parameter maps the cut-points at
which a level of the latent trait would produce a score of k. The discrimination parameter,
βj, shows how much a given item contributes to the overall measure. This parameter is
strictly positive and follows a half-normal prior.
I follow the priors for the standard dynamic model described in Reuning, Kenwick and
Fariss (2019). Multiple observations for one country violate the assumption that observations
are independent. Dynamic models allow the assumption to be relaxed and instead model
the interdependence between multiple observations for the same unit over time. For the
first observation of a given country the prior for θ is distributed N(0, 1). For subsequent
observations, t ∈ 2...T , the prior distribution of θit is centered on the previous year, θit−1,
with a standard deviation of σ which is estimated from the data. I summarize the model
priors below:
θi1 ∼ N(0, 1)
θit ∼ N(θi(t−1), σ)
βj ∼ HN(0, 10)
αjk ∼ N(0, 10)
I estimate both models, structures and effectiveness, using Markov Chain Monte Carlo sim-
ulations with four chains. Each chain is run for 4,000 iterations, the first 2,000 are burn-in
draws followed by 2,000 for sampling.
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3.4.1 Technical Compliance
First, I consider technical compliance with FATF recommendations which make up the
AML/CFT structures in a country. This measure encompasses 40 items for 106 countries.
The recommendations are listed in Table 4.8 in the appendix. Figure 3.13 in the appendix
shows the correlation table of these recommendations. Most recommendations are positively
correlated below 0.5. Recommendations 22 and 23 are the most highly correlated.8 These
recommendations apply regulations such as customer due diligence and record keeping to
designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs), such as casinos, rest estate
agents, dealers in precious stones, and legal services. These recommendations are particularly
high cost for states and will be discussed further.
To validate the technical compliance measurement model I first consider the parameters.
Figure 3.4 shows the estimates of α, the difficulty parameter for the third cut-point. This
cut-point distinguishes between “Largely compliant” and “Compliant” scores. The α values
for the other two cut-points are available in the appendix Figure 3.15 and Figure 3.16. The
difficulty parameter represents how hard a given item is to achieve based on the strength
of a state’s underlying AML/CFT structures. Higher values represent items that require
higher levels of structural AML/CFT for the item to reach a satisfactory compliance. This
parameter provides support for the theoretical validity of this measurement model. Several
items, for example keeping records of financial transactions, creating offenses for AML and
CFT, and clarifying the responsible law enforcement authorities are relatively low cost to
codify and have few, if any, political costs. States with the lowest latent structural AML/CFT
are still able to fulfill these provisions.
8Recommendation 22 requires customer due diligence and record-keeping provisions (described in Rec-
ommendations 10,11,12,15 and 17) apply in select scenarios to casinos, real estate agents, dealers in precious
metals and stones, lawyers, notaries, and other independent legal professionals and accountants. Recom-
mendation 23 requires additional measures (described in Recommendations 18-21) apply in certain scenarios
to lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants, dealers in precious metals and
stones, and trust and company service providers
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R9: Financial institution secrecy laws (PM)
R21: Tipping−off and confidentiality (PM)
R30: Responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative authorities (PRCAOIM)
R20: Reporting of suspicious transactions (PM)
R29: Financial intelligence units (PRCAOIM)
R11: Record keeping (PM)
R27: Powers of supervisors (PRCAOIM)
R14: Money or value transfer services (PM)
R13: Correspondent banking (PM)
R31: Powers of law enforcement and investigative authorities (PRCAOIM)
R4: ML Confiscation and provisional measures (MLC)
R3: Money laundering offence (MLC)
R36: International instruments (IC)
R15: New technologies (PM)
R39: Extradition (IC)
R2: National cooperation and coordination (PC)
R12: Politically exposed persons (PM)
R5: Terrorist financing offence (TFFP)
R33: Statistics (PRCAOIM)
R17: Reliance on third parties (PM)
R32: Cash couriers (PRCAOIM)
R19: Higher−risk countries (PM)
R18: Internal controls and foreign branches and subsidiaries (PM)
R34: Guidance and feedback (PRCAOIM)
R16: Wire transfers (PM)
R37: Mutual legal assistance (IC)
R6: Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism & terrorist financing (TFFP)
R38: Mutual legal assistance: freezing and confiscation (IC)
R7: Targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation (TFFP)
R35: Sanctions (PRCAOIM)
R26: Regulation and supervision of financial institutions (PRCAOIM)
R10: Customer due diligence (PM)
R23: DNFBPs Other measures (PM)
R8: Non−profit organisations (TFFP)
R40: Other forms of international cooperation (IC)
R1: Assessing risks and applying a risk−based approach  (PC)
R28: Regulation and supervision of DNFBPs (PRCAOIM)
R25: Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal arrangements (TBOLPA)
R22: DNFBPs Customer due diligence (PM)
R24: Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons (TBOLPA)
0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5
Difficulty (Cut−point = 3)
Note: Recommendations are listed with their FATF categories. PC = Policies and Coordination. MLC= Money Laundering
and Confiscation. TFFP= Terrorist Financing and Financing of Proliferation. PM=Preventive Measures. TBOLPA= Trans-
parency and Beneficial Ownership of Legal Persons and Arrangements. PRCAOIM=Powers and Responsibilities of Competent
Authorities and Other Institutional Measures. IC= International Cooperation
Figure 3.4: Difficulty (α) of items
The recommendation with the highest α parameter is Recommendation 24 regarding
transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons. This recommendation requires com-
panies and entities to provide accurate basic identifying information about the person(s) who
own or control a company, trust, or entity. False, opaque, or missing ownership information
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is a key strategy to obscure the true ownership of shell corporations, which can be used for
legal or illicit tax evasion and money laundering. The FATF has acknowledged the difficulty
of achieving this recommendation and published additional guidance on beneficial ownership
in 2014 and a best practices manual in 2019.9
Several of the other highest difficulty parameters relate to government regulation and
requirements on third parties, such as shell companies, non-profit organization, charities,
and DNFBPs. This result points to the regulatory tension governments face. There is a
trade-off between efforts to impose reasonable oversight and making onerous regulations
that dissuade financial entities, NGOS, and DNFBPS from conducting business in a given
country. Governments must balance enforcement of AML/CFT with the economic benefits
of attracting businesses and allowing their businesses to conduct operations in less regulated
markets.
One potential side effect of legislation that requires burdensome and well enforced regu-
lations is de-risking. In these cases financial entities avoid entire markets due to concerns of
violating domestic or international AML/CFT regulations. These actions are very costly for
people living in affected areas who may lose their access to banking, informal value trans-
fer systems, and remittances. For example, banks and financial entities based in countries
with strong AML/CFT enforcement records such as the United Kingdom have pulled out
of Somalia due to the weak regulatory environment and high risk of money laundering or
financing terrorism. The Somali economy relies on remittances for 23% of its gross domestic
product and the systematic withdraw of financial services can further humanitarian crises
caused by the existence of terrorist organizations.10 The FATF has recognized de-risking as
9The additional guidance (October 2014) is available here: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-transparency-beneficial-ownership.pdf Best practices
manual (October 2019) is available here: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/Best-Practices-
Beneficial-Ownership-Legal-Persons.pdf
10World Bank Press Release, “World Bank Makes Progress to Support Remittance Flows to Somalia”,
June 10, 2016.
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a troubling side-effect of AML/CFT regulations and in February 2021 created a new group
to study these unintended consequences.11
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Figure 3.5: Discrimination (β) parameters
Figure 3.5 shows the discrimination parameter, β. The discrimination parameter shows
11More information is available on their website here: https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/financialinclusionandnpoissues/documents/unintended-consequences-project.html
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how well items distinguish between weak or strong structural AML/CFT. The least informa-
tive items involve designating a law enforcement agency with AML/CFT responsibilities and
financial institution secrecy laws. Recommendation 9 on financial institution secrecy laws
simply requires states “ensure that financial institution secrecy laws do not inhibit imple-
mentation of the FATF Recommendations” (FATF, 2012-2020a). Countries with both weak
and strong structural AML/CFT generally comply with these provisions as it is a baseline
requirement of any meaningful FATF engagement. The items that best distinguish struc-
tural AML/CFT systems relate to customer due diligence. Customer due diligence laws are
aimed at tracing all accounts or entities to legal customers. This forbids the existence of
anonymous or clearly fictitious account owners. Recommendation 10 requires financial enti-
ties conduct customer due diligence and Recommendation 22 applies the same standards to
DNFBPs. The existence of these laws can best distinguish between countries with relatively
weak AML/CFT structures and those with robust structures as they require governments
engage in the difficult and politically costly task of regulating private businesses.
The first FATF recommendation is also pivotal in distinguishing weak and strong compli-
ance with AML/CFT recommendations. This recommendation requires states understand
their unique money laundering and terrorist financing risks and mobilize resources to mit-
igate those risks. The FATF argues that “This approach [Recommendation 1] should be
an essential foundation to efficient allocation of resources across the anti-money laundering
and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime and the implementation of
risk-based measures throughout the FATF Recommendations” (FATF, 2012-2020a) and our
results offer support for the importance of this recommendation in determining strong struc-
tural AML/CFT. This recommendation also requires governments ensure financial entities
and DNFBPs monitor, investigate, and mitigate money laundering and terrorist financing
risks. Recommendation 19 requires financial institutions conduct enhanced due diligence
in business transactions with companies and individuals from FATF designated high-risk
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countries. This further demonstrates the internal or external roadblocks governments face
when forcing businesses to uphold AML/CFT regulations.
This result is indicative of the balance governments strike between international cooper-
ation on AML/CFT and not overregulating businesses that may have significant domestic
political power or the ability to relocate to less regulated environments. These regulations
also reflect the well-known challenge of anonymous shell companies which serve as conduits
for illicit financing and tax evasion (Findley, Nielson and Sharman, 2014). These compa-
nies are barriers to economic counterinsurgency and other efforts to increase transparency
in global financing. Only countries that have the highest determination to insulate their
financial systems from exploitation have full compliance with these recommendations. For
many governments, regulating businesses is a bridge too far despite the insistence of regula-
tory bodies that these are essential steps in reducing money laundering and countering the
financing of terrorism and crime.
Figure 3.6 presents the most recent estimates from the structural AMF/CFT measure-
ment model. The top of the right panel shows the highest rated countries which continues
in order to the bottom of the left panel. Points represent estimates and lines show the 95%
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Figure 3.6: AML/CFT Technical Compliance in 2021
These results show each country’s technical compliance for year 2021. Many countries
had lower estimates in prior years but have improved their compliance over time. The top
five countries with the strongest levels of structural AML/CFT includes Spain which has
been a key architect of this system and three small island nations, Bermuda, Mauritius, and
the Cayman Islands. These countries are all rated compliant for Recommendation 22 which
requires DNFBPs conduct customer due diligence. These rankings may reflect a response
to recent de-risking, particularly in the Caribbean. According to the World Bank, the loss
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of correspondent banking relationships have been pervasive for small countries (WB, 2018).
The Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago, which currently has the 7th strongest structural
AML/CFT rating, has specifically produced guidance on increasing compliance with FATF
AML/CFT regulations as a tool to avoid the economic costs of de-risking.12 Their technical


























Figure 3.7: Trinidad and Tobago Technical Compliance Estimates 2016-2021
Figure 3.7 shows Trinidad and Tobago’s estimated technical compliance from 2016-2021.
In the plot, the dots represent Trinidad and Tobago’s estimated score and the lines show the
95 % credible interval. Trinidad and Tobago received an average AML/CFT technical rating
in their 2016 Mutual Evaluation Report. With this report as a template and fears about
de-risking in the Caribbean, the government of Trinidad and Tobago sought to strengthen
their AML/CFT framework. In 2019, the FATF released the three year follow up report
for Trinidad and Tobago. This visualization also demonstrates key features of the dynamic




with reports in 2016 and 2019 are smaller, demonstrating our higher certainty of those
values given available data. The dynamic model smooths the estimates for 2017 and 2018
which aligns with Trinidad and Tobago making improvements to their compliance with
FATF recommendations across these years. The 2019 report described significantly improved
compliance with recommendations, increasing their ratings on 18 recommendations.13 The
estimates for 2020 and 2021 show the highest uncertainty as there are not yet reports available
for these or subsequent years.
3.4.2 Effectiveness
Next I consider a country’s latent capacity to counter the financing of terrorism and
money laundering. To construct this variable, I include 11 manifest variables drawn from
the FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports immediate outcomes. Collectively, these items rate
whether a government understands and can identify AML/CFT threats, uses AML/CFT
tools, engages in international cooperation in sharing financial intelligence, and has the
ability to block exploitation of financial systems for AML/CFT.
Table 4.7 in the appendix lists the items and Figure 3.17 provides the difficulty α and
discrimination β parameters for these variables which I only discuss briefly. I include the
difficulty parameters for the third cut-point, representing the cut-point between the highest
two levels of effectiveness. The immediate outcome with one of the lowest α values relates to
international cooperation. This item states: “International cooperation delivers appropriate
information, financial intelligence, and evidence, and facilitates action against criminals and
their assets”(FATF, 2012-2020a). The literature on international relations would suggest this
finding is surprising given the challenges of international cooperation, especially on issues
that arguably impinge on sovereignty. However, this is within the context of countries that
13The report is available here: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/fur/cfatf-4mer-
3fur-trinidad-and-tobago.pdf
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have already joined FATF and assented to an invasive Mutual Evaluation Report. In many
cases, this item reflects a country’s willingness to receive financial intelligence rather than
produce and disseminate that information. Of the items with highest α values, three relate
to regulating financial institutions and DNFBPs. As we learned with structural AML/CFT,
codifying regulations of financial entities and DNFBPs can be a difficult or unwelcome po-
litical task for governments. Only governments with the highest AML/CFT capacity and
willingness are able to regulate and conduct oversight over these entities.
Figure 3.8 presents estimates for each country’s latent AML/CFT capacity and willing-
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Figure 3.8: AML/CFT Effectiveness in 2021
3.5 Discussion of Dynamic IRT Measures
Together these results point to several interesting aspects of the global AML/CFT regime.
Technical compliance and effectiveness are positively correlated, with a Pearson’s Correlation
Coefficient of 0.75 based on initial Mutual Evaluation Reports. Figure 3.9 shows this cor-
relation with the regression line plotted. Countries above the regression line have relatively
higher technical compliance compared to states of similar effectiveness. Countries below the
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regression line have lower technical compliance than would be predicted based on their effec-
tiveness. These scores will not match the most recent technical compliance scores in Figure
3.6 because those scores incorporate updated information from Follow-up Reports. Since
AML/CFT effectiveness is not evaluated in Follow-up Reports, it is most straightforward to
compare the correlation between measures from the first Mutual Evaluation Reports. The
most recent technical compliance scores have a Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient of 0.49 with
effectiveness. Figure 3.19 in the appendix provides a scatterplot based on the most recent
technical compliance scores.14

































Figure 3.9: Scatterplot of effectiveness and technical compliance estimates based on initial
Mutual Evaluation Reports
Although highly correlated, strong AML/CFT structures is not a necessary condition
for effectiveness. For example, the United States has the second most effective AML/CFT
system yet ranks in the bottom 30% for current technical compliance. This result is sur-
14Figure 3.18 and Figure 3.20 in the appendix provide these same plots with all countries labeled.
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prising considering the United States’ role in championing efforts to counter the financing of
terrorism (Zarate, 2013). Although this is not out of character with the United State’s be-
havior in international agreements broadly, often demonstrating involvement and leadership
in the creation of international regimes, but then failing to ratify the legislation domesti-
cally.15 The United States’ low technical compliance is driven by their non-compliance with
measures on DNFBPs and the transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons and
arrangements. The United States does not require casinos, accountants, dealers in precious
metals and stones, lawyers, and other DNFBPs to conduct enhanced customer due diligences
nor comply with AML requirements. The United States’ lax regulatory environment toward
company ownership has been critiqued for allowing shell companies to flourish.16
Despite ranking in the top five for AML/CFT structures, Mauritius, Trinidad and Tobago
and the Cayman Islands all have below average AML/CFT effectiveness. Mauritius and the
Cayman Islands have even been placed on the FATF’s list of jurisdictions under increased
monitoring as of February 2021 for low AML/CFT effectiveness. The FATF specifically
describes a lack of law enforcement training and capacity as hindering the efficacy of Mau-
ritius’ strong AML/CFT structure. Similarly, the FATF critiques the Cayman Islands’ lack
of enforcement, particularly in overseeing the behaviors of private companies.
Bermuda also sticks out as an interesting case. Bermuda has the highest level of technical
compliance and the fifth highest level of effectiveness. Bermuda is a well-known tax haven
where shell companies are used to avoid corporate taxes. Google has been reported as
using a Dutch shell company to shelter $23 billion on Bermuda which has a 0% corporate
tax rate.17 Given the importance of Bermuda as a hub for legal tax-avoidance schemes, it
follows that they want to ensure all transactions are well documented to minimize the risk
of nefarious financing that could invite investigations. Banks and other companies that have
15This includes the International Criminal Court, human rights treaties, and climate change initiatives.
16For examples see https://www.globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/shell-companies-secrecy-and-us/
17See https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jan/03/google-tax-haven-bermuda-netherlands
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violated AML/CFT provisions have faced hefty fines and may consider reinvesting in safer
jurisdictions. Other tax havens such as Vanutu also have strong AML/CFT structures but
are unable or unwilling to use them effectively.
These results show the different incentives that drive structural AML/CFT and effective
AML/CFT systems. In some cases, structural AML/CFT reflects the efforts of small, fi-
nancially vulnerable countries that seek to avoid the costs of de-risking. Compliance with
FATF recommendations can be a strategy to regain or maintain access to financial services
and correspondent banking. AML/CFT effectiveness reflects the capacity and willingness to
secure financial systems from illicit exploitation. These countries tend to be larger in size,
economically powerful, and more central to the international financial system. Countries like
the United States and Australia are less vulnerable to de-risking given their economic po-
sition and have fewer incentives to comply with recommendations that may anger powerful
business interests.
These models present the first attempt to measure and compare cross-national AML/CFT
structures and effectiveness. There are several limitations of these measures that should be
considered. First, I have discussed the geographic and temporal limitations of this study.
While we have gleaned important knowledge from these models, they currently only cover
106 jurisdictions of the 200 FATF members. The remaining reports have either not been
conducted and released yet or the member has not allowed a review process. This creates a
non-random sample of countries. Researchers must carefully consider the implications of this
sample on their analysis when using these measures. Second, Follow-up Reports provide up-
dated information on technical compliance over time but do not evaluate effectiveness. These
reports do not allow us to evaluate the impact of improved technical compliance scores on
effectiveness. The examples of Mauritius and Cayman Islands suggest technical compliance
may not result in higher levels of effectiveness. When follow up Mutual Evaluation Reports
are published we will be able to evaluate the temporal trends of these two variables better.
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Finally, the modeling approach has allowed me to create yearly measures for each country
despite the limitations on reports. Yet, the effectiveness measure is not time-series and the
technical compliance measure is slow-moving (due to infrequency of Follow-up Reports).
These can be used to study cross-national variation, but researchers should be cautious of
these temporal limitations in their own analyses.
3.5.1 Geographic Trends
I explore these measures and their validity further by evaluating variation in technical
compliance and effectiveness across countries. Figure 3.10 presents the geographic spread of














Figure 3.10: Estimates of AML/CFT Structures and Effectiveness from Mutual Evaluation
Reports
The top map shows the level of effectiveness based on Mutual Evaluation Reports re-
leased from 2014- May 2021. Countries in light gray have no report available. Dark green
represents higher levels of capacity and willingness to disrupt illicit financing and light yel-
low represents low AML/CFT effectiveness. Some clear geographic trends emerge from this
visualization. More developed countries such as the United States, Canada, Spain, United
Kingdom, Australia, and Russia have more effective AML/CFT systems. Countries located
in North, Central, and South America all have strong scores as do most European countries
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with reports available. Many African and East Asian states have relatively weaker scores.
These results suggest regional integration and coordination may enhance AML/CFT capa-
bilities. These regional trends are also present in the distribution of technical compliance
and may be connected to regional economic integration that encourages similar financial
regulations.
The second map shows trends in technical compliance. This map reflects the technical
compliance scores that a country first received in their Mutual Evaluation Report. These
values match the time-period available for the effectiveness scores. See Figure 3.21 in the
appendix for a map with the update technical compliance scores based on Follow-up Reports.
This map shows similar patterns to the geographic distribution of effectiveness. European
countries are exceptionally strong across both dimensions of AML/CFT. The weakest areas
for technical compliance are in Africa, although there is large variation across the continent.
The updated map in Figure 3.21 shows fewer regional distinctions as countries with weak
structural AML/CFT have worked to improve their technical compliance.
Saudi Arabia stands out for its strong technical compliance score. In the 1980s the
Saudi monarchy established a financial system for connecting wealthy donors, charities,
and mosques to facilitate the flow of money to non-violent and violent Islamic movements
throughout the Middle East (Zarate, 2013). This financial system was exploited by Al-Qa’ida
to finance the 9/11 attacks on the United States (Zarate, 2013; Kean, Hamilton et al., 2004).
In 2002, the United States Treasury Security Paul O’Neill personally led a delegation to Saudi
Arabia to begin negotiations with the Saudi monarchy over shutting down their network of
terrorist financing charities and disrupting the flow of funds to Al-Qa’ida and other violent
groups (Zarate, 2013). Since 2003, the Saudis have publicly embraced international efforts
to counter the financing of terrorism and money launder (Blanchard and Prados, 2007).
However, there remains a gulf between their technical compliance and the flow of money
that continues to fund violent non-state actors from Saudi charities and donors (Zarate,
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2013; Blanchard and Prados, 2007). In 2019, the European Union temporarily added Saudi
Arabia to a list of “high-risk countries” for their failures in AML/CFT, however by 2020 the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia succeeded in leveraging political power for their removal (Turak,
2019; Guarascio, 2020).
The Saudi case highlights how some governments may use relatively cheap compliance
with legal provisions as a public relations strategy to bolster their country’s reputation or at-
tract foreign investors. I expect these larger geopolitical concerns and international relations
to undergird many states’ efforts to improve their compliance with FATF recommendations.
These political issues may elucidate states with high technical compliance but relatively
weak capacity or willingness to effectively enforce AML/CFT. This also demonstrates the
importance of measuring AML/CFT technical compliance alongside effectiveness, which can
distinguish weak signals of compliance from meaningful efforts to insulate financial systems
from exploitation.
3.5.2 Convergent Validity with Quality of Government Institutions
To demonstrate content validity of latent variable models, studies often replicate prior
work that uses a single variable or additive scales to measure the same underlying con-
cept (Treier and Jackman, 2014; Fariss, 2019; Solis and Waggoner, 2020). To the author’s
knowledge, this study represent the first attempt to cross-nationally measure counter-illicit
financing systems, so no similar body of work exists. Instead, I evaluate the convergent va-
lidity of these measures by exploring their similarity to other measures of government quality
and country features (Fariss and Lo, 2020; Trochim and Donnelly, 2008).
State counter-illicit financing systems encompass a strong legal and law enforcement
toolbox as well as demonstrated capacity to effectively use those tools to produce financial
controls on AML/CFT. These measures are likely to reflect the quality of a government’s
institutions broadly. Governments with more effective governing systems can leverage their
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resources and technical expertise to enact and enforce these provisions. Strong underly-
ing state institutions, such as law enforcement agencies and financing oversight bureaus,
are characteristics of a state with strong capacity and are necessary to fulfill FATF recom-
mendations and successful disrupt illicit financing. I consider several alternative measures of
government capability and institutional quality. Figure 3.11 explores the correlation between
these variables and country features.18
An imprecise but commonly used measure of state capacity is Gross Domestic Product
per Capita (GDP). This measure is frequently used to proxy state strength or administrative
capacity in the conflict literature (Hendrix, 2010; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). I use data on
logged GDP per capita from the World Bank. As expected, GDP is strongly correlated with
effectiveness and technical compliance. This measure has a particularly strong correlation
with effectiveness which matches the concept of interest.
18To create these plots I use data from 2016-2020. Correlation plots require no missing values and I
use list-wise deletion to create them. For this reason, the correlation between Effectiveness and Technical


































































Figure 3.11: Correlation of AML/CFT Structures and Effectiveness and Quality of Govern-
ment Institutions
Government effectiveness (Gov effective) is the World Governance Indicator of the mea-
sure of “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and
the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation
and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies”
(Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2011). Rigorous and impartial public administration
(Administrate) is included from the Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) project. This variable
measures whether “public officials are rigorous and impartial in the performance of their
duties” (Coppedge et al., 2021). A well-functioning bureaucracy is vital for AML/CFT pro-
visions which require coordination across agencies, monitoring of fine-grain financial trans-
actions, and uncorrupted implementation of regulations. These measures are both positively
109
correlated with both AML/CFT structure and effectiveness.
Regulatory quality (reg quality) is a measure of perceptions over the government’s abil-
ity to formulate and implement regulations that promote private sector development from
the World Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2011). This is an in-
teresting index, as it combines measures of government ability to regulate with a Western
capitalist expectation that regulations should not be overly burdensome on businesses. This
includes variables on tariffs, ease of starting a business, barriers to foreign investors, trade
policy, regulator burden, and discriminatory taxations. Higher scores indicate regulatory
environments that are fair, with clear and understandable provisions, uncorrupted in busi-
ness dealings, and are business-friendly. The ability to implement these provisions shows
a governments ability to effectively navigate complex financial matters, however, investors
might also find AML/CFT provisions to be onerous regulations. Both measures of state
counter-illicit financing systems are positively associated with regulatory quality. However,
this measure is the largest gap between the two measures.
In the discussion of AML/CFT capacity and willingness, I expected government corrup-
tion to be antithetical to the success of these provisions. Corrupt politicians use many of the
same legal loopholes, such as shell companies, as money launderers and terrorist groups to
transfer and store bribes and embezzle funds. To evaluate this, I use the political corruption
index Corruption from V-Dem. This index provides a broad measure of corruption across
members of the executive to public bureaucrats including both petty and grand exchange of
goods for favors or influence (Coppedge et al., 2021). As expected, corruption is negatively
correlated with both measures of counter-illicit financing systems.
Collectively, measures of government institutional quality are more highly correlated with
AML/CFT effectiveness which matches the conceptual distinction between these two dimen-
sions. I briefly evaluated whether AML/CFT structures are more closely associated with
international connectivity and the pressures that may come from reliance on the interna-
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tional system for economic or political support. For example, if countries are highly reliant
on international trade then concerns over de-risking might be particularly acute and drive
compliance as it has in the Caribbean. Figure 3.22 provides the correlation of these measures
with three measures of international connectivity: trade, resource rents as a percentage of
GDP, and autonomy. AML/CFT structures have a weak (0.16) positive correlation with
Trade, a weak (-0.16) negative correlation with the percentage of GDP as resource rents and
no correlation with the level of autonomy from the international system. The relationship
with trade fits my expectations about states reliant on international trade improving com-
pliance to safeguard against financial exclusion, however, further work should evaluate how
these state preferences interact with the preferences from firms involved in trade and foreign
investment.
3.6 Resilience to Illicit Financing and Political Violence
I briefly evaluate the underlying objective of these provisions. The goal of economic
counterinsurgency, including these specific policies, is to reduce political violence by cutting
off violent groups’ access to financing. However, recent work has evaluated specific economic
counterinsurgency tools and found mixed results. Paul, Clarke and Grill (2010) reviews
30 resolved insurgency cases from 1978-2008 and finds that reducing tangible support to
insurgents is a highly effective strategy. In the eight successful cases of counterinsurgency in
the sample, counterinsurgents disrupted at least three forms of tangible support and in the
22 cases where counterinsurgency was deemed a failure, counterinsurgent forces disrupted
no more than two sources of support (Paul, Clarke and Grill, 2010). Section 1503 of the
Dodd-Frank Act was created to break the link between natural minerals and conflict in
Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, but has been associated with increased violence
and looting in affected areas (Bloem, 2018; Stoop, Verpoorten and Van der Windt, 2018).
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Targeted sanctions and foreign terrorist lists are associated with reduced violence conditional
on group adaptability (Radtke and Jo, 2018) and location (Phillips, 2019), but can increase
violence against civilians from predatory groups (Simonelli, 2021a). Sector-specific initiatives
such as the Kimberley Process diamond certification and Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative have been successful at curtailing violence in some countries, but not others (Grant,
2012; Bone, 2012; Beevers, 2015; Rustad, Le Billon and Lujala, 2017).
Collectively, this work shows the potential benefits and risks of specific economic coun-
terinsurgency policies. However, no work has cross-nationally evaluated the role of systemic
economic counterinsurgency, such as the recommendations supported by FATF. This analysis
provides an initial look at the relationship between AML/CFT systems and the prevalence
of terrorism and insurgent violence. I expect that structural AML/CFT alone will have
little impact on levels of political violence. The existence of laws may have some deterrent
effects, forcing terrorists and criminals to expend some time and resources to reroute their
financial transactions elsewhere to avoid oversight. However, until these tools are employed
and funding streams are disrupted it is unlikely that laws alone would have a real impact on
a violent non-state actor’s ability to perpetrate violence. After all, these are actors that are
well acquainted with operating outside the scope of the law.
Figure 3.12 shows the correlation of effectiveness and technical compliance with three
different measures of political violence. Battle Deaths is the count of battle-related fatalities
in a year from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). This measure captures the in-
tensity of violence between government forces and insurgent groups. Simonelli (2021a) shows
that economic counterinsurgency provisions, such as sanctions, might impact a group’s bat-
tlefield violence differently from their violence against civilians. To evaluate this, I include
two measures of violence against civilians. Civilian Deaths is a measure of the one-sided
attacks on civilians by violent non-state actors from UCDP. Terror is the number of terrorist
attacks in a given country-year from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). This measure
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includes a range of violence from small isolated incidents resulting in no fatalities to coor-
dinated terrorist campaigns by large insurgent groups. Included attacks target a range of













































Figure 3.12: Correlation of AML/CFT Structures and Effectiveness and Political Violence
Both measures of financial AML/CFT robustness are negatively associated with battle
deaths. This may provide support for these measures as tools to disrupt the funding to
insurgent groups or could reflect that governments that are not involved in civil wars have a
higher capacity to implement structural reforms. The first measure of violence against civil-
ians, civilian deaths, is not associated counter-illicit financing systems. However, terrorist
attacks have a weak positive association with effective AML/CFT policies. There are several
possible explanations for this relationship. First, correlation tests cannot isolate the causal-
ity between two variables. It is plausible that terrorist attacks would prompt a government
to devote more resources toward blocking the financing of terrorism. Terrorism from an Al-
Qa’ida affiliate in Saudi Arabia from 2003-2007 was pivotal in the Saudi monarchy deciding
to disrupt terrorist financing networks (Blanchard and Prados, 2007). Second, the increase
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in terrorism could be associated with a decline in insurgency. If AML/CFT provisions are
effective they should block an insurgent’s ability to raise and transfer money, diminishing the
resources available to procure matériel and support troops. Terrorism is a relatively cheap
form of political violence (Crenshaw, 1981) and these correlations may indicate a shifting
from the financial intensive tactic of battling governments to cheaper bombings and shoot-
ings that can be conducted with few resources and personnel. This conclusion would be a
troubling side effect of these provisions and undermine one of the primary goals of these
international standards.
I use linear regression to evaluate these relationships further. I include data from 2016-
2019 which captures the majority of counter-illicit financing scores as well as availability of
covariate data. The measure of AML/CFT effectiveness does not vary over time and the
measure of technical compliance varies for some countries, but is relatively slow moving.
For these reasons, I evaluate political violence cross-nationally. I include fixed effects for
the year. To control for alternative explanations of political violence I include the log of
GDP per capita, the log of population and the percentage of GDP that stems from resource
rents from the World Bank. Democracy is the electoral democracy index from V-Dem. The
dependent variable is the log of UCDP Battle deaths or GTD Terrorist attacks in a given
country-year.
I use multiple imputation to estimate the missing data values. This technique uses pre-
dictive mean matching to estimate the missing values. Single imputation can underestimate
the uncertainty of the dataset. Multiple imputation builds on this technique but incorporates
greater uncertainty by creating multiple imputed values. I create five datasets with imputed
estimates and then pool over these datasets when conducting my analysis. This strategy is
preferable to other options, such as list-wise deletion. First, the scope of the data is already
somewhat limited so it is best to retain as many values as possible. Second, the conditions
when list-wise deletion are most appropriate, when values are missing at random, are not
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met in the sample. Table 3.1 presents the results from the pooled analysis. Models run on
the individual imputed datasets are available in the appendix for battle deaths in Table 3.5
and terrorism in Table 3.6.
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Table 3.1: Pooled Results of Linear Models of Political Violence
Dependent variable:
Battle Deaths Terror Attacks
AML/CFT Effectiveness −0.244* (0.139) 0.102 (0.114)
AML/CFT Technical Compliance −0.202 (0.138) −0.002 (0.113)
AML/CFT Effectiveness × Technical 0.054 (0.086) −0.069 (0.070)
GDP per Capita (log) −0.004 (0.093) 0.058 (0.076)
Population (log) −0.055 (0.056) 0.366*** (0.038)
Democracy −0.465 (0.376) 0.153 (0.314)
Terror Attacks (log) 0.740*** (0.065) -
Battle Deaths (log ) - 0.489*** (0.043)
Resource Rents −0.011 (0.014) 0.003 (0.011)
Intercept 1.081 (1.354) −5.542*** (1.041)
Observations 240 240
Year FE Yes Yes
Note: AML/CFT = Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Ter-
rorism GDP = Gross Domestic Product
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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The results show that AML/CFT effectiveness is associated with fewer battle deaths.
AML/CFT technical compliance is also negative but the probability that the result would
be observed due to chance is 14.5% which is above the traditional cutoff for statistical signif-
icance in these models. Surprisingly the interaction term is positive although the coefficient
is very small and not statistically significant. If this result were stronger it would indicate
countries with high levels of technical compliance and effectiveness experience more civil war
violence which would warrant further investigation. However, the results indicate that the
model cannot deduce the true relationship and this result is inconclusive. The results for
the model evaluating terrorist attacks is similarly inconclusive for the primary measures of
interest. AML/CFT effectiveness retains the positive relationship observed in the correlation
matrix, but neither variable is significant. Other common covariates such as democracy and
GDP per capita do not provide much explanatory power for the variation in these samples
either.
Due to the temporal limitations and empirical approach, this study cannot isolate the
causal link between the AML/CFT effectiveness and political violence. Countries with strong
financial resilience may be better at countering the threats of insurgent groups. However,
this result could also indicate that states which are not busy fighting active insurgencies
are better able to devote resources toward preventative measures. Although the casual link
cannot be isolated, these results demonstrate the importance of considering counter-illicit
financing systems when evaluating the occurrence of political violence.
3.7 Conclusion
Economic counterinsurgency is a central strategy in government efforts to counter vio-
lent non-state actors. The effective implementation of these policies has been a feature of
every successful counterinsurgent effort in recent decades (Paul, Clarke and Grill, 2010). To
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better understand and explore economic counterinsurgency, this chapter has presented the
first cross-national measures of counter-illicit financing systems. I use FATF mutual evalua-
tion reports and dynamic item response theory models to construct measures of AML/CFT
structures and government capacity and willingness to counter money laundering and ter-
rorist financing. The results show that technical compliance with FATF recommendations
does not necessarily lead to more effective AML/CFT systems.
This chapter demonstrates how AML/CFT structures and effectiveness can contribute to
our understanding of political phenomena and be useful to policymakers. First, I have uncov-
ered how business interests may be a significant roadblock to the development of AML/CFT
structures. Only countries with the most rigorous AML/CFT structures extend these laws to
regulate financial and non-financial businesses. These regulations can be costly, as foreign in-
vestors may prefer markets with less oversight and fewer reporting requirements. AML/CFT
legislation is an important and overlooked consideration of the desirability of host markets
and these estimates can help explain investor behavior.
Second, this chapter contributes to the nascent literature on economic counterinsurgency.
The results show that effective AML/CFT systems are associated with lower intensity civil
wars. This not only deepens our understanding of systematic economic counterinsurgency,
but is a necessary feature when evaluating targeted measures as well. Ceteris paribus a
targeted economic counterinsurgency measure is likely to be more effective in a country with
robust AML/CFT systems. In countries with weaker AML/CFT structures or effectiveness,
a domestic government might not cooperate with international efforts or lack the enforce-
ment capacity to confiscate assets. The targeted group may more easily evade sanctions by
storing monies under aliases or using unregulated informal value transfer systems. Without
considering country-level financial robustness this variation would be attributed to the sanc-
tion itself. This parallels other policy evaluation areas; we would not expect to understand
the efficacy of a specific anti-poverty policy without considering the extant economic and
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social systems that it operates under. The inclusion of this important source of variation
could help explain the mixed results in the broader economic counterinsurgency literature.
Finally, policymakers can use these estimates and framework to evaluate counterparts’
counter-illicit financing systems and separate false signals of compliance from strong AML/CFT
systems. The results show that several countries that have the strongest AML/CFT struc-
tures fail to effectively block the illicit exploitation of their financial systems. Information
is a key aspect of international cooperation and bargaining. The information provided by
these measures can help regulators understand compliance and reduce enforcement noise for




Money laundering and terrorist financing risks are understood and, where appropri-
ate, actions coordinated domestically to combat money laundering and the financing
of terrorism and proliferation
IO2
International co-operation delivers appropriate information, financial intelligence,
and evidence, and facilitates action against criminals and their assets.
IO3
Supervisors appropriately supervise, monitor and regulate financial institutions and
DNFBPs for compliance with AML/CFT requirements commensurate with their
risks.
IO4
Financial institutions and DNFBPs adequately apply AML/CFT preventive mea-
sures commensurate with their risks, and report suspicious transactions.
IO5
Legal persons and arrangements are prevented from misuse for money laundering
or terrorist financing, and information on their beneficial ownership is available to
competent authorities without impediments.
IO6
Financial intelligence and all other relevant information are appropriately used by
competent authorities for money laundering and terrorist financing investigations.
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IO7
Money laundering offenses and activities are investigated and offenders are prose-
cuted and subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.
IO8 Proceeds and instrumentalities of crime are confiscated.
IO9
Terrorist financing offenses and activities are investigated and persons who finance
terrorism are prosecuted and subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanc-
tions.
IO10
Terrorists, terrorist organizations and terrorist financiers are prevented from raising,
moving and using funds, and from abusing the NPO sector.
IO11
Persons and entities involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
are prevented from raising, moving and using funds, consistent with the relevant
UNSCRs.
Table 3.2: FATF Effectiveness Immediate Outcomes
Item Description
AML/CFT Policies and Coordination
R1 Assessing Risks and Applying a Risk-Based Approach
R2 National cooperation and coordination
Money Laundering and Confiscation
R3 Money laundering offence
R4 Confiscation and provisional measures
Terrorist Financing and Financing of Proliferation
R5 Terrorist financing offence
R6 Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism & terrorist financing
R7 Targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation
R8 Non-profit organisations
Preventive Measures
R9 Financial institution secrecy laws
R10 Customer due diligence
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R11 Record keeping
R12 Politically exposed persons
R13 Correspondent banking
R14 Money or value transfer services
R15 New technologies
R16 Wire transfers
R17 Reliance on third parties
R18 Internal controls and foreign branches and subsidiaries
R19 Higher-risk countries
R20 Reporting of suspicious transactions
R21 Tipping-off and confidentiality
R22 DNFBPs: Customer due diligence
R23 DNFBPs: Other measures
Transparency and Beneficial Ownership of Legal Persons and Arrangements
R24 Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons
R25 Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal arrangements
Powers and Responsibilities of Competent Authorities and Other Institutional Mea-
sures
R26 Regulation and supervision of financial institutions
R27 Powers of supervisors
R28 Regulation and supervision of DNFBPs
R29 Financial intelligence units
R30 Responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative authorities
R31 Powers of law enforcement and investigative authorities
R32 Cash couriers
R33 Statistics




R37 Mutual legal assistance
R38 Mutual legal assistance: freezing and confiscation
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R39 Extradition
R40 Other forms of international cooperation
Table 3.3: FATF 40 Recommendations

























































































































Figure 3.13: Technical Recommendations Correlation Plot
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Figure 3.14: Effectiveness Immediate Outcomes Correlation Plot
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R11: Record keeping (PM)
R5: Terrorist financing offence (TFFP)
R9: Financial institution secrecy laws (PM)
R20: Reporting of suspicious transactions (PM)
R27: Powers of supervisors (PRCAOIM)
R29: Financial intelligence units (PRCAOIM)
R3: Money laundering offence (MLC)
R30: Responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative authorities (PRCAOIM)
R4: ML Confiscation and provisional measures (MLC)
R21: Tipping−off and confidentiality (PM)
R35: Sanctions (PRCAOIM)
R34: Guidance and feedback (PRCAOIM)
R40: Other forms of international cooperation (IC)
R17: Reliance on third parties (PM)
R2: National cooperation and coordination (PC)
R10: Customer due diligence (PM)
R26: Regulation and supervision of financial institutions (PRCAOIM)
R1: Assessing risks and applying a risk−based approach  (PC)
R39: Extradition (IC)
R37: Mutual legal assistance (IC)
R31: Powers of law enforcement and investigative authorities (PRCAOIM)
R18: Internal controls and foreign branches and subsidiaries (PM)
R14: Money or value transfer services (PM)
R36: International instruments (IC)
R16: Wire transfers (PM)
R33: Statistics (PRCAOIM)
R12: Politically exposed persons (PM)
R32: Cash couriers (PRCAOIM)
R19: Higher−risk countries (PM)
R13: Correspondent banking (PM)
R38: Mutual legal assistance: freezing and confiscation (IC)
R6: Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism & terrorist financing (TFFP)
R15: New technologies (PM)
R23: DNFBPs Other measures (PM)
R22: DNFBPs Customer due diligence (PM)
R24: Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons (TBOLPA)
R25: Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal arrangements (TBOLPA)
R28: Regulation and supervision of DNFBPs (PRCAOIM)
R8: Non−profit organisations (TFFP)
R7: Targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation (TFFP)
−15 −10 −5
Difficulty (Cut−point = 1)
Note: Recommendations are listed with their FATF categories. PC = Policies and Coordination. MLC= Money Laundering
and Confiscation. TFFP= Terrorist Financing and Financing of Proliferation. PM=Preventive Measures. TBOLPA= Trans-
parency and Beneficial Ownership of Legal Persons and Arrangements. PRCAOIM=Powers and Responsibilities of Competent
Authorities and Other Institutional Measures. IC= International Cooperation
Figure 3.15: Discrimination (α) parameters of cut-point 1
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R9: Financial institution secrecy laws (PM)
R11: Record keeping (PM)
R3: Money laundering offence (MLC)
R21: Tipping−off and confidentiality (PM)
R30: Responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative authorities (PRCAOIM)
R4: ML Confiscation and provisional measures (MLC)
R5: Terrorist financing offence (TFFP)
R39: Extradition (IC)
R27: Powers of supervisors (PRCAOIM)
R29: Financial intelligence units (PRCAOIM)
R31: Powers of law enforcement and investigative authorities (PRCAOIM)
R10: Customer due diligence (PM)
R37: Mutual legal assistance (IC)
R14: Money or value transfer services (PM)
R2: National cooperation and coordination (PC)
R36: International instruments (IC)
R18: Internal controls and foreign branches and subsidiaries (PM)
R20: Reporting of suspicious transactions (PM)
R40: Other forms of international cooperation (IC)
R17: Reliance on third parties (PM)
R34: Guidance and feedback (PRCAOIM)
R38: Mutual legal assistance: freezing and confiscation (IC)
R19: Higher−risk countries (PM)
R32: Cash couriers (PRCAOIM)
R12: Politically exposed persons (PM)
R1: Assessing risks and applying a risk−based approach  (PC)
R16: Wire transfers (PM)
R13: Correspondent banking (PM)
R33: Statistics (PRCAOIM)
R26: Regulation and supervision of financial institutions (PRCAOIM)
R23: DNFBPs Other measures (PM)
R15: New technologies (PM)
R35: Sanctions (PRCAOIM)
R6: Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism & terrorist financing (TFFP)
R25: Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal arrangements (TBOLPA)
R22: DNFBPs Customer due diligence (PM)
R24: Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons (TBOLPA)
R7: Targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation (TFFP)
R8: Non−profit organisations (TFFP)
R28: Regulation and supervision of DNFBPs (PRCAOIM)
−6 −4 −2 0
Difficulty (Cut−point = 2)
Note: Recommendations are listed with their FATF categories. PC = Policies and Coordination. MLC= Money Laundering
and Confiscation. TFFP= Terrorist Financing and Financing of Proliferation. PM=Preventive Measures. TBOLPA= Trans-
parency and Beneficial Ownership of Legal Persons and Arrangements. PRCAOIM=Powers and Responsibilities of Competent
Authorities and Other Institutional Measures. IC= International Cooperation
Figure 3.16: Discrimination (α) of cut-point 2
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IO9: TF Investigation & Prosecution
IO11: Proliferation Financial Sanctions
IO1: Risk, Policy and Coordination
IO10: TF Prevention & Sanctions
IO7: ML Investigation & Prosecution
IO4: Preventative Measures
IO5: Legal Persons and Arrangements
IO3: Supervision
4 8 12 16
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Money laundering and terrorist financing risks are understood and, where appropri-
ate, actions coordinated domestically to combat money laundering and the financing
of terrorism and proliferation
IO2
International co-operation delivers appropriate information, financial intelligence,
and evidence, and facilitates action against criminals and their assets.
IO3
Supervisors appropriately supervise, monitor and regulate financial institutions and
DNFBPs for compliance with AML/CFT requirements commensurate with their
risks.
IO4
Financial institutions and DNFBPs adequately apply AML/CFT preventive mea-
sures commensurate with their risks, and report suspicious transactions.
IO5
Legal persons and arrangements are prevented from misuse for money laundering
or terrorist financing, and information on their beneficial ownership is available to
competent authorities without impediments.
IO6
Financial intelligence and all other relevant information are appropriately used by
competent authorities for money laundering and terrorist financing investigations.
126
IO7
Money laundering offenses and activities are investigated and offenders are prose-
cuted and subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.
IO8 Proceeds and instrumentalities of crime are confiscated.
IO9
Terrorist financing offenses and activities are investigated and persons who finance
terrorism are prosecuted and subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanc-
tions.
IO10
Terrorists, terrorist organizations and terrorist financiers are prevented from raising,
moving and using funds, and from abusing the NPO sector.
IO11
Persons and entities involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

























































































































Figure 3.18: Scatterplot of Effectiveness and Technical Compliance with Country Labels
(ISO 3c) based on first Mutual Evaluation Reports
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Figure 3.20: Scatterplot of Effectiveness and Technical Compliance with Country Labels













AML/CFT Technical Compliance Initial Report
Figure 3.21: Estimates of AML/CFT Effectiveness and Technical Compliance from Reports
updated through 2021
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Table 3.5: Models of Insurgent Violence Across Five Imputed Datasets
Dependent variable:
Battle Deaths
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AML/CFT Effectiveness −0.229 −0.251∗ −0.263∗ −0.243∗ −0.236∗
(0.141) (0.139) (0.139) (0.136) (0.136)
AML/CFT Technical Compliance −0.202 −0.199 −0.194 −0.208 −0.209
(0.140) (0.139) (0.138) (0.138) (0.137)
AML/CFT Effectiveness × Technical 0.056 0.054 0.059 0.046 0.052
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086)
GPD per Capita (log) −0.007 0.001 0.001 −0.003 −0.014
(0.093) (0.092) (0.093) (0.093) (0.094)
Population (log) −0.059 −0.056 −0.051 −0.053 −0.054
(0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.056)
Democracy −0.408 −0.493 −0.477 −0.490 −0.456
(0.364) (0.376) (0.374) (0.368) (0.388)
Terror Attacks (log) 0.741∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗ 0.740∗∗∗ 0.740∗∗∗ 0.741∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065)
Resource Rents −0.002 −0.012 −0.017 −0.010 −0.014
(0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011)
Intercept 1.104 1.084 0.998 1.062 1.154
(1.361) (1.353) (1.367) (1.341) (1.344)
Observations 240 240 240 240 240
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.492 0.494 0.495 0.495 0.495
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.6: Models of Terrorist Attacks Across Five Imputed Datasets
Dependent variable:
Terror Attacks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AML/CFT Effectiveness 0.118 0.090 0.097 0.108 0.098
(0.115) (0.114) (0.114) (0.112) (0.111)
AML/CFT Structure −0.013 0.007 −0.004 −0.001 0.001
(0.114) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.112)
AML/CFT Effective × Structure −0.070 −0.068 −0.071 −0.064 −0.069
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070)
GDP per Capita (log) 0.061 0.048 0.063 0.064 0.053
(0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.076)
Population (log) 0.361∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039)
Democracy 0.083 0.212 0.166 0.078 0.224
(0.296) (0.306) (0.305) (0.301) (0.316)
Battle Deaths (log) 0.487∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Resource Rents 0.006 −0.004 0.004 0.006 0.003
(0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009)
Intercept −5.457∗∗∗ −5.552∗∗∗ −5.631∗∗∗ −5.493∗∗∗ −5.578∗∗∗
(1.044) (1.037) (1.048) (1.030) (1.030)
Observations 240 240 240 240 240
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.655 0.655 0.655 0.655 0.655










































Figure 3.22: Correlation of Financial Resilience Measures and International Connections
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CHAPTER IV
Counter-Illicit Financing Measures and Foreign
Investment
4.1 Introduction
On the morning of December 6, 1989, a vehicle containing 1,100 pounds of dynamite
detonated outside the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) building in the middle
of a bustling commercial district in Bogotá, Colombia (Long, 1989). The explosion, claimed
by the notorious Medelĺın Cartel to target a government intelligence unit, ripped through
the prominent district, killing 57 people, injuring hundreds, and destroying or damaging
commercial buildings within a two-square-mile area (AP, 1989). The deadly terrorist attack
capped off a decade of violence across the globe fueled by powerful cartels enriched by drug
trafficking and money laundering. This growing violence propelled world leaders to pour re-
sources into disrupting intricate global networks for drug trafficking and money laundering.
To coordinate these efforts, the Group of Seven (G-7) created the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) in 1989 to develop international standards on combating money laundering.1
1The Group of Seven is an intergovernmental organization comprising seven leading industrial countries
and tasked with coordinating strategies to global challenges. Its members are Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. Russia was a member from 1997 until 2014 during
which time the organization was called the G-8.
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FATF’s scope and standards were expanded to include countering terrorist financing in the
2000s. The goal of these standards is to understand, monitor, and block illicit exploitation
of legitimate financial markets and international trade. Under the coordination of FATF,
individual governments and intergovernmental organizations have created a massive inter-
connected system of regulations, surveillance, and enforcement with purview over every part
of the global financial system.
This chapter evaluates how this relatively new system of financial oversight impacts the
investment choices of multinational firms, the key actors propelling global economic activity.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been a major cause of development in the 20th century
and some argue it has contributed to a decline in civil conflict (Schneider, 2017; De Soysa
and Fjelde, 2010). Multinational corporations (MNCs) have globalized their supply chains to
exploit the unique competitive advantages and input profiles of countries around the world.2
Firms generally seek out stable host markets where business operations are predictable and
political risks are low (Busse and Hefeker, 2007; Jensen, 2008; Johns and Wellhausen, 2016;
Vernon, 1971). Firms are attracted to host markets with low taxation, laws that protect
businesses from government overreach, and strong rule of law (Biglaiser and Staats, 2012;
Staats and Biglaiser, 2012; Jensen, 2008; Li and Resnick, 2003). Investment flees from host
markets where governments might intercede in business dealings or expropriate assets and
where political violence, such as the bombing of the DAS building, can destroy assets and
interrupt business (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008; Bandyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas,
2018; Braithwaite, Kucik and Maves, 2014; Witte et al., 2016; Powers and Choi, 2012).
Given these preferences, state counter-illicit financing systems present a challenge for
firms evaluating the suitability of a host market. The international standards to counter
2Multinational corporations refers to firms that own assets, produce goods, or sell services in more than
one country. I use the terms MNCs, firms, FDI, and foreign investors interchangeably in this manuscript to
describe these actors. If I reference a firm that only engages in domestic economic activity I will specify this
with the term “domestic firm”.
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money laundering and terrorist financing laid out by FATF encompass substantial govern-
ment oversight into foreign firm’s business dealings, require companies invest in or be subject
to onerous customer due diligence procedures, and erode customer privacy expectations that
are cultural tenets of financial institutions. However, these provisions also emphasize anti-
corruption in government and, if effective, should reduce funding for political violence that
can be antithetical to smooth business operations. State counter-illicit financing systems
send conflicting signals on the desirability of a host market to investors.
My theory unravels these contradictory preferences by evaluating two components of a
state’s counter-illicit financing strategy. Anti-money laundering and countering the financing
of terrorism (AML/CFT) structures are the legal frameworks and regulatory tools available
to monitor, track, disrupt, and prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. These pro-
visions include significant regulatory and monitoring requirements for financial institutions
and businesses involved in trade. AML/CFT effectiveness encompasses the government’s
capacity and willingness to use their AML/CFT toolbox to disrupt money laundering and
terrorist financing. This variable captures how well the government and AML/CFT institu-
tions functions and achieves the goal of preventing criminal and terrorist actors from raising,
transferring, and sending funds through the financial system.3
I argue that firms seek out host markets where they can minimize the costs of inva-
sive AML/CFT regulations but reap the benefits of a government with a strong capacity
to counter illicit financing and of an environment free of well-financed violent actors. This
leads to divergent preferences between a state’s counter-illicit financing systems. Firms most
prefer host markets characterized by weak AML/CFT structures but strong AML/CFT ef-
fectiveness. However, as AML/CFT regulations and restrictions on business dealings become
3I use the terms structural AML/CFT and AML/CFT technical compliance interchangeably. Both terms
refer to the first dimension of illicit financing robustness which captures the underlying laws and tools in a
country. I use the terms AML/CFT capacity and willingness interchangeably with AML/CFT effectiveness.
This second dimension captures a governments ability to identify, enforce, and disrupt money laundering
and terrorist financing.
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more onerous, firms prefer governments less adept at implementing them. Thus firms’ prefer-
ences for governments that are effective at enforcing AML/CFT diminishes as the AML/CFT
structures they are subject to increase. I test my theory using original data on state counter-
illicit financing systems and FDI inflows. The results support my central contentions about
firm preferences over state AML/CFT structures and AML/CFT effectiveness. Firms prefer
host markets characterized by low AML/CFT structures but high AML/CFT effectiveness
and investment into strong host markets decreases with increasing AML/CFT regulations.
This finding has important implications for the success of these international efforts.
This chapter offers several contributions to the study of foreign investment and political
violence. First, this work identifies an important new source of variation across host markets
that drives investment decisions. My conceptualization of counter-illicit financing as falling
along two dimensions and original data allows me to evaluate divergent firm preferences over
these relatively new concepts. Second, this work highlights the interrelated nature of these
traditionally separate areas of study in international relations. Incidents of political violence
can directly or indirectly disrupt economic market activity. Policies designed to counter
political violence are influenced by the interests of foreign investment and affect the location
decisions of foreign firms. Foreign firms may be hampering these efforts and imperiling
their own future investment by eschewing host markets where governments are attempting
to strengthen their AML/CFT laws but are still developing their capacity. This finding
has direct relevance for policymakers as foreign direct investment represents a significant
share of many countries’ economies and firms’ preferences for less regulated markets may
be an impediment to international efforts on AML/CFT. AML/CFT efforts are costly for
domestic governments, and this study identifies an additional opportunity cost of repulsing
foreign investors that seek out less regulated environments.
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section presents my definitions of AML/CFT
structures and AML/CFT effectiveness. I review FATF’s international standards and the
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responsibilities and costs associated with these standards for governments and private busi-
nesses. Next I review the literature on the desirability of host markets for foreign investment.
I highlight the tension between a firm’s preferences for low overhead costs and restrictions
and their attraction to markets with well-functioning government bureaucracies that can pro-
tect firms from societal instability and violence. The following section presents my theory of
firms’ preferences over state robustness to illicit financing. The empirical strategy describes
the data and linear regression model that I use to evaluate my hypotheses. I present my
main results and conclude with a discussion of the study’s implications and future research
avenues.
4.2 Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Ter-
rorism Provisions
Anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism provisions were con-
structed to monitor and disrupt three common channels illicit organizations use to raise,
transfer, and launder money. The most common strategy illicit organizations use involves
the legitimate international financial system using routine transfers between bank accounts
and wire transfers. Money that is raised through illicit means, such as drug trafficking, will
be transfered through a series of accounts, often with anonymous or fictitious ownership
information, and across currencies or goods to obscure the original source of income. The
money used to fund terrorism is often legally obtained and the financial system is used to
transfer money to end users who will spend it for terrorist purposes. Alternatively, to avoid
oversight and detection some criminal and terrorist organizations eschew the financial system
and physically move funds through bulk cash smuggling. Cash couriers serve as intermedi-
aries between sources of income and depositing and spending funds by physically moving
cash across borders. Once the cash has arrived at its destination it is spent or deposited into
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banks and rejoins the financial system with its origins obscured (FATF-MENAFATF, 2015).
The third most common method is trade-based money laundering (TBML) and trade di-
version.4 Trade-based techniques exploit existing supply chains, complicit or unwitting com-
panies, and the daily transaction of legitimate goods in the global economy to exploit price
differences across markets or launder money. Architects of these schemes falsify invoicing
for goods and services, duplicate invoicing, or falsely describe the goods being transferred in
order to launder illegally obtained funds. Trade diversion is a strategy to raise funds through
illegal arbitrage, taking advantage of differences in prices across markets and diverting goods
from their intended markets. Collectively, the financing of criminal and terrorist organiza-
tions has infiltrated every corner of the modern global economy, and efforts to disrupt them
have similarly broad reach, impacting all firms in the international economic system.
International efforts to counter money laundering and illicit financing began in the late
1980s to disrupt the booming narcotics trade and violence that surrounded it (Biersteker
and Eckert, 2007). The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was founded in 1989 to develop
international standards for disrupting money laundering. In 1990 the FATF produced 40
anti-money laundering recommendations to combat the thriving illicit drug trade. The FATF
expanded their scope to include terrorist financing in 2001, resulting in eight (and later nine)
recommendations to counter the financing of terrorism. These initial recommendations were
focused on disrupting the first two channels of illicit financing, exploitation of the financial
system and the smuggling of cash (FATF-Egmont, 2020). Increasing regulations and gov-
ernment surveillance of these systems pushed more organizations toward alternative funding
strategies such as TBML and trade diversion schemes (FATF, 2006). The recommendations
were revised in 2012 to reflect this illicit financing landscape and FATF produced a cohesive
4Trade based money laundering is defined by FATF as “the process of disguising the proceeds of crime and
moving value through the use of trade transactions in an attempt to legitimize their illicit origins”(FATF,
2006). Trade diversion involves diverting products from low-price to high-price markets often with the use
of shell companies and falsified order documentation.
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40 international standards on AML/CFT.
FATF recommendations are the international standard for AML/CFT and 200 countries
and jurisdictions are members of the task force and FATF-style regional bodies. Member
countries and jurisdictions are required to codify recommendations into domestic laws and
build out their AML/CFT monitoring and enforcement infrastructure in line with recommen-
dations. The recommendations are listed in Table 4.8 in the appendix. A central principle
undergirding these standards is the risk-based approach. This approach involves the coor-
dination of government authorities and private sector entities to identify the unique money
laundering and terrorist financing challenges prevalent in their markets. Regulations and
enforcement strategies are tailored to these vulnerabilities and are intended to evolve over
time as the risks change. The overarching goal of the FATF is to facilitate international co-
ordination, help states identify their risk landscapes, and develop preventative, investigative,
and punitive measures to counter threats.
The FATF recommendations require the coordination and involvement of many actors in
the international system. I briefly review the responsibilities that fall on the public sector,
private sector, and the public-private partnership. This discussion reflects the environment
should a country be completely in compliance with the FATF recommendations and have
fully effective counter-illicit financing systems. In reality, countries have different levels of
AML/CFT structures and AML/CFT effectiveness which is the key variation of interest in
this study. The goal of the present section is to highlight the broad reach of these regulations
and the various channels through which they impact firms involved in foreign investment and
trade.
4.2.1 Public Sector Expectations
The domestic government is the centerpiece of AML/CFT provisions. A fully compliant
government’s responsibilities broadly fall under identifying risks and creating a risk-based
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approach, creating policies and institutions to mitigate risks, facilitating cooperation domes-
tically across government agencies and between public and private sector entities, monitoring
and enforceing standards within the private sector, and coordinating with foreign govern-
ments and international bodies to share intelligence, implement sanctions, and strengthen
AML/CFT capabilities. These recommendations include establishing specific authorities to
monitor and enforce AML/CFT provisions, such as a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), and
pursing actionable intelligence on illegal transactions through law enforcement and judicial
agencies. Governments are further required to codify specific provisions, including criminal-
izing money laundering and terrorism financing, limiting financial secrecy laws, mandating
customer due diligence for financial entities and designated-non financial entities, restricting
value transfer systems and cash couriers.
The FATF standards arguably represent a significant encroachment on state sovereignty.
To achieve a high level of compliance member states must implement specific AML/CFT
laws, create new government authorities, and devote scare resources toward AML/CFT.
Their sovereignty is further impinged by oversight from the FATF which conducts intensive
on site evaluations of a country’s technical compliance and effectiveness in countering money
laundering and terrorist financing. These restrictions on privacy trickle down from the
government’s loss of sovereignty, through financial entities subject to increased government
monitoring and enforcement, to individual firms and customers. The government is deemed
responsible for creating, funding, and sustaining a robust AML/CFT system with purview
into every wire-transfer, bank account, and new business customer establishing a relationship
with a financial entity.
Accomplishing these responsibilities is costly for domestic governments. They must create
and staff new agencies specifically tasked with monitoring financial intelligence. In 2019, the
United Kingdom’s Financial Intelligence Unit (UKFUI) received 570,000 suspicious activity
reports from financial institutions that UKFUI officers had to cull through to identify threats
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and leads (NCA, 2020). The information technology requirements and technical expertise
required to track and evaluate suspicious transactions exceeds the capabilities of many gov-
ernments. FATF tries to make up for these deficiencies through information sharing and
technical trainings. Governments must also have the capacity to maintain statistics on their
AML/CFT actions and guide and monitor financial institutions in their implementation of
standards.
4.2.2 Private Sector Expectations
Financial institutions : Financial institutions are the frontlines in the battle against
money laundering and terrorist financing.5 Table 4.1 summarizes ten recommendations
that specifically pertain to financial institutions within FATF’s standards. Financial insti-
tutions are responsible for conducting customer due diligence (CDD), monitoring accounts
for suspicious activities, implementing internal programs on AML/CFT, and reporting any
suspicious transactions to government FIUs.6 CDD provisions require financial entities ob-
tain and verify information regarding the direct and beneficial owners of all accounts. This
process is a time and resource intensive task that can delay transactions and repel cus-
tomers with other financing options. There are additional CDD requirements for countries
on FATF’s “high-risk” list and foreign or domestic politically exposed persons (PEPs) and
their families.7 These requirements represent a significant shift from institutionalized policies
of non-interferences and customer privacy.
5FATF defines a financial institutions “as any natural or legal person who conducts as a business one or
more of the following activities or operations for or on behalf of a customer: 1. Acceptance of deposits and
other repayable funds from the public; 2. lending; 3. financial leasing; 4. money or value transfer services;
5. Issuing and managing means of payment (e.g. credit and debit cards, cheques, traveller’s cheques, money
orders and bankers’ drafts, electronic money); 6. Financial guarantees and commitments; 7. trading in (a)
money market instruments (cheques, bills, certificates of deposit, derivatives etc.); (b) foreign exchange; (c)
exchange, interest rate and index instruments; (d) transferable securities; (e) commodity futures trading; 8.
Participation in securities issues and the provision of financial services related to such issues; 9. Individual
and collective portfolio management; 10. Safekeeping and administration of cash or liquid securities on
behalf of other persons; 11. Otherwise investing, administering or managing funds or money on behalf of
other persons; 12. Underwriting and placement of life insurance and other investment related insurance; 13.
Money and currency changing” (FATF, 2012-2020b)
6Customer due diligence policies are also called know your customer (KNC) regulations.
7FATF defines PEPS as: “Foreign PEPs are individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent
public functions by a foreign country, for example Heads of State or of government, senior politicians, senior
government, judicial or military officials, senior executives of state owned corporations, important political
party officials. Domestic PEPs are individuals who are or have been entrusted domestically with prominent
public functions, for example Heads of State or of government, senior politicians, senior government, judicial
or military officials, senior executives of state owned corporations, important political party officials.” (FATF,
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Table 4.1: FATF Recommendations Overseeing Financial Entities
Item Description
R10
Prohibited from keeping anonymous or fictitious accounts and must conduct customer due
diligence (CDD) to identify and verify the customer, beneficial owner, purpose of business
relationship, and engage in ongoing due diligence monitoring to ensure transactions align
with business expectations
R11
Must maintain records on domestic and international transactions, including documenta-
tion CDD, for five years and comply with any information requests from international or
domestic authorities
R12
Additional precautions and enhanced monitoring for foreign and domestic politically ex-
posed persons, their family members, and close associates.
R13
In conducting correspondent banking, financial entities must evaluate respondent institu-
tion’s AML/CFT controls, obtain approval from higher managers, and require partners
conduct CDD
R15
The AML/CFT risks of new technologies must be evaluated and mitigated before they
are introduced.
R16
The identifying information of originators and beneficiaries of wire transfers must be doc-
umented and authenticated, including searches for the United States terrorist sanctions
list.
R18
Financial institutions, their foreign branches, and subsidiaries must create internally pro-
grams against money laundering and terrorist financing.
R19
Enhanced customer due diligence is required on persons and institutions from countries
on FATF’s high-risk list
R20
Funds that are suspected to be related to money laundering or terrorist financing must be
reported to the Financial Intelligence Unit.
R21
Employees and institutions are prohibited from informing customers about suspicious ac-
tivity reports and are protected for any confidentiality breaches in filing reports
To ensure financial institutions do not skirt their AML/CFT responsibilities, govern-
ments hold financial entities liable for criminal activities that are associated with accounts
held by a financial entity. In order to comply with these regulations, financial institutions
have invested significant money in technical experts, often directly hiring former government
regulators (Favarel-Garrigues, Godefroy and Lascoumes, 2011) and expensive technology
that uses artificial intelligence and network analytics to monitor and flag transactions in
2012-2020b)
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real time. Under FATF guidelines financial institutions must redesign their business opera-
tions and culture from one that prioritizes privacy to an emphasis on transparency, conduct
internal AML/CFT risk assessments, oversee CDD, submit suspicious activity reports to
FIUs, and develop a legal team and strategy to counter government fines or regulatory cases
against the financial institution.
Designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs): Designated non-financial
businesses and professions (DNFBPs) include casinos, real estate agents, dealers in precious
metals and stones, lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants
and trust and company service providers. These businesses are subject to some of the same
customer due diligence and accounting provisions as financial institutions.8 These provisions
can be costly and malleable for these businesses. For example, in 2020 the German finance
ministry lowered the CCD threshold for dealers in precious metals and stones from e10,000
to e2,000 causing dealers to scramble to build out their CDD capacity (Germany, 2019).
Although the scope of cases the require oversight for DNFBPs is smaller, the costs of con-
ducting CDD are just as high and these businesses may have a less developed infrastructure
compared to financial entities.
Other Multinational Corporations : These regulations require high levels of involvement from
financial institutions in particular, but all firms involved in international trade are subject to
the costs associated with AML/CFT, particularly given the rise of trade-based money laun-
dering and trade diversion (Dekieffer, 2008). Regulators have emphasized that professional
money launderers and terrorist financiers “will exploit any sector, commodity, or service
where they perceive an opportunity” (FATF-Egmont, 2020). Trade-based money laundering
8FATF recommendation 22 require due diligence for DNFBPS and 23 applies recommendations 18-21 to
DNFBPs in certain circumstances
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(TBML) has far reach across industries and these schemes have been discovered in companies
dealing in cosmetic goods, second-hand textiles, golds, precious metals and minerals, auto-
mobile companies, and agricultural products (FATF-Egmont, 2020). Although these firms
do not have additional responsibilities under the current terms of the FATF standards, they
are subject to increased regulations and surveillance by governments and financial institu-
tions. Firms are customers of financial institutions and must submit to their CDD provisions
which requires documentation and processing time. Governments seeking to crack down on
TBML are monitoring import and exports more closely, increasing oversight on all firms
involved in international trade.
4.2.3 Public-Private Partnerships
The public-private partnership is the bridge that connects government resources and law
enforcement to the avenues where criminals and money launderers profit off the financial
system. Money laundering and terrorist financing schemes run through private companies
so the partnership between these private entities and the government is crucial to the success
of the overall AML/CFT system. However, this partnership can be collaborative or antag-
onistic. The government is both the supporter of financial institutions, sharing resources
and technical expertise, and the enforcer of regulations, with a willingness to sue financial
entities that they deem negligent on AML/CFT.
The responsibilities for financial institutions include sending FIUs suspicious activity re-
ports when accounts show unusual or suspect patterns of deposits, transfers, or withdraws,
monitoring accounts for known terrorist and criminal suspects, and providing law enforce-
ment with relevant customer information to assist investigations. Government agencies are
responsible for assisting private sector entities with their internal evaluations on illicit fi-
nancing risks, sharing relevant intelligence, and providing technical expertise and guidance
for financial entities. Favarel-Garrigues, Godefroy and Lascoumes (2011) argues that the
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routinized formal and informal interactions between financial institution employees and gov-
ernment law enforcement and oversight agencies has been the most consequential impact
of these policies. These professional networks can help build mutually beneficial public-
private partnerships that are aligned in their preferences for identifying and disrupting illicit
manipulation of the financial system.
4.2.4 Counter-Illicit Financing Structures and Effectiveness
FATF measures are not implemented uniformly across states and so the unique burdens
and responsibilities of the government and private sector varies across member countries.
I define counter-illicit financing structures as the legal framework, regulatory tools, and
agencies that have been established to identify, monitor, and disrupt illicit exploitation of
financial systems. The FATF recommendations represent the international gold standard
for counter-illicit financing structures. States vary to the degree in which they have cod-
ified this legal framework into their domestically. Simonelli (2021b) uses a latent variable
model to create an overarching measure of a state’s counter-illicit financing structures and
effectiveness. In evaluating the parameters of this model, it is apparent that regulations on
private entities such as financial institutions and DNFBPs are particularly difficult for states
to fully implement and are helpful provisions in discriminating between relatively weak or
strong counter-illicit financing structures. Governments with lower counter-illicit financing
structure scores often fail to extend their laws and monitoring over private entities or shy
from mandating financial institutions implement costly customer due diligence provisions,
which experts consider vital to disrupting illicit financing. The strongest counter-illicit fi-
nancing structures encompass private entities and maintain a large degree of compliance
with the costly provisions discussed in Table 4.1.
The second source of variation across states is their counter-illicit financing effectiveness.
This reflects a state’s capacity to use the toolbox of counter-illicit financing structures to
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successful disrupt efforts to exploit their financial systems. This measure best represents a
state’s demonstrated overall ability to identify, disrupt, and prevent efforts to use financial
systems for illicit purposes such as money laundering and financing terrorism. The existence
of regulations and law enforcement agencies must be complemented with government will-
ingness and capacity to use the tools at their disposal to insulate their financial systems.
Capacity encompasses the funding, personnel, and technical experience necessary to cull
through SARs, investigate suspects, coordinate with financial institutions, and pursue legal
actions against those that violate their legal AML/CFT framework. Willingness captures
the government’s underlying preferences for disrupting illicit financing. Governments might
be hesitant to build an effective AML/CFT system due to opposition from powerful business
interests, political considerations, internal corruption, lack of concern about money launder-
ing and terrorist financing, or privatization of other political priorities. A state’s AML/CFT
effectiveness reflects the overarching security of their financial systems from illicit exploita-
tion.
The relative levels of structural AML/CFT and AML/CFT effectiveness impacts the
relative burdens places on private firms operating in the market. Given the costs and benefits
associated with AML/CFT and variation across states, how will robustness to illicit financing
influence firm decisions across host markets?
4.3 Foreign Investment Preferences Over Host Markets
Modern multinational corporations have many options to choose from across poten-
tial host markets. Foreign investors benefit host markets through job creation, technology
spillover (Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Sayek, 2009), and increased tax revenues.9 As a re-
9There is debate over whether these potential benefits are commonly realized and provide tangible benefits
to the host economy. However, these expected benefits and other political benefits have resulted in host
government competition for foreign investment.
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sult, rather than having to compete for access to markets as was more common in the era
of protectionism, firms are often pursued by host governments who compete against other
potential host markets to win investments through incentives (Pandya, 2016). Yet, firms
face an obsolescing bargain (Vernon, 1971). They hold significant leverage during the nego-
tiation phase, but once they have invested in a country their assets are sunk into the market
and reliant on the host government maintaining their ex ante guarantees. Foreign firms are
vulnerable to ex posts risks such as host violation of investment terms, changes in economic
policy, societal unrest that disrupts factors of production or transportation, and in the most
extreme cases loss of assets due to government expropriation or destructive political violence
(Braithwaite, Kucik and Maves, 2014). Firms have several strategies to minimize these risks,
such as arbitration and protections through bilateral investment treats (BITs) (Büthe and
Milner, 2009; Allee and Peinhardt, 2011; Kerner, 2009) and preferential trade agreements
(PTAs) (Büthe and Milner, 2008), but the most important is their ex ante decisions over
locations.
Multinational corporations invest in foreign markets to circumvent trade barriers to for-
eign consumers or take advantage of cheaper inputs or other local resource endowments.
These firms seek to minimize the costs of operations and other risks while maximizing their
productivity and profits. These cost-benefit analyses have produced firm preferences over
many features of home markets including regime type (Li and Resnick, 2003; Jensen, 2003,
2008), rule of law (Biglaiser and Staats, 2012; Staats and Biglaiser, 2012), regulatory envi-
ronment (List and Co, 2000), and more. Foreign investors tend to prefer democracies because
foreign leaders that are accountable to the public are expected to have more constraints on
their exploitative behavior (Jensen, 2003, 2008). Additional constraints through strong rule
of law and independent judiciaries contribute to investor confidence (Biglaiser and Staats,
2012; Staats and Biglaiser, 2012). Market characteristics associated with economic liberal-
ism, such as protections over property rights, see heightened investment (Li and Resnick,
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2003). Investors seek out capable governments with clearly-defined laws and independent
branches of government that can ensure leaders do not overstep their powers.
While firms prefer constraints on the host government, particularly the executive, they
eschew markets that overly regulate business or impinge on free market values. However,
when it comes to investor preferences over specific regulations, the results are less clear. For
examples, foreign investors do not seem to seek out host markets with fewer environmental
regulations, so-called pollution havens (Erdogan, 2014). Firms that are extensive produc-
ers or downstream beneficiaries of carbon-intensive activities are not more likely to create
subsidiaries in low regulation markets (Manderson and Kneller, 2012). Yet in the United
States, multinational firms in both pollution-intensive and non-pollution intensive industries
prefer states with less stringent environmental regulations (List and Co, 2000) and domestic
firms that are carbon emitters or connected to carbon-related costs via their supply chains
form strong lobbies to oppose regulations (Cory, Lerner and Osgood, 2021). Alternatively
multinational firms that have few adjustment costs of implementing climate regulations have
lobbied for increased regulations as a strategy to increase costs on domestic firms that lack
their capacity (Kennard, 2020). Theories of FDI have established firm preferences for loca-
tions that minimize production costs, but more work is needed to understand how individual
regulations or institutions impact these costs and firms choices of host markets.
Foreign firms are also sensitive to political and societal risks outside the control of do-
mestic governments such as protests and strikes (Schneider and Frey, 1985), terrorism,10 and
civil war (Braithwaite, Kucik and Maves, 2014; Collier, 1999; Lee, 2016). Political violence
raises costs for foreign firms by disrupting transportation and supply chains (Gaibulloev
and Sandler, 2009; Johns and Wellhausen, 2016; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2011; Meierrieks
and Gries, 2013), stifling domestic market activity (Benmelech, Berrebi and Klor, 2010;
10See Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008); Bandyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas (2018); Braithwaite, Kucik
and Maves (2014); Brandt and Sandler (2010); Witte et al. (2016); Powers and Choi (2012); Osgood and
Simonelli (2020)
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Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides, 2004), and directly targeted firms, their physical assets,
and personnel (Brandt and Sandler, 2010; Enders, Sachsida and Sandler, 2006). As high-
lighted by the DAS bombing in Bogotá, violence aimed at the government or unrelated
targets can massively disrupt business operations. To counter these risks firms pay for
heightened security protocols (Busse and Hefeker, 2007) and insurers raise the premiums for
firms (Jensen, 2008). Political violence also affects the strategic environment of the host gov-
ernment, raising incentives on governments to divert resources from the economy to military
spending (Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2009). These constraints and uncertainty over leadership
tenure can cause the government to violate contracts and expropriate assets to supplement
resource supplies or counter domestic unrest.
As a result of heightened costs and uncertainty associated with political violence, scholars
largely conclude that terrorism repels foreign investors. Foreign investors avoid markets char-
acterized by violence and those that are already invested may abandon their sunk assets and
exit the market. However, the negative impact of political violence on foreign firm location
choices may be ameliorated by the host government’s counter-terrorism capabilities (Bandy-
opadhyay, Sandler and Younas, 2014; Lee, 2017). Countries that receive counterterrorism
aid from the United States do not see reduced FDI inflows in the wake of domestic terrorist
attacks (Lee, 2017). Effective counter-terrorism provisions may bolster investor confidence
that the host government is capable of containing the political risk while maintaining their
contract obligations to foreign investors.
This literature on firm location preferences does not provide a straightforward frame-
work for evaluating investor preferences over state robustness to illicit financing. Extant
literature suggests that investors may on one hand be repelled by the regulatory costs and
oversight associated with structural AML/CFT. However, firms are attracted to capable,
well-resourced governments that can create internal stability and defend against political
violence. State robustness to illicit financing represents a tension between a firm’s desire for
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low regulations and overhead costs and their attraction to stable investment environments.
In the next section I build a theory that interweaves these dueling preferences to develop a
cohesive understanding of firm preferences over state robustness to illicit financing.
4.4 Foreign Investors and State Robustness to Illicit Financing
My theory centers on two primary channels through which counter-illicit financing mea-
sures should affect multinational firms’ investment choices. First, AML/CFT regulations
and enforcement impacts MNCs directly through additional regulations, encroachment on
privacy, and availability and cost of financial services. These regulations are especially acute
for financial institutions and DNFBPs, but affect every firm involved in international trade.
The second mechanism is through the domestic government. Domestic governments manage
relationships with foreign investors and are also the biggest risk MNCs face when investing
in a host market. Foreign firms are highly sensitive to the political structures and legal
constraints on host governments (Jensen, 2003, 2008; Li, 2009). Counter-illicit financing
measures that impact a government’s availability of resources, oversight capacity, and legal
purview into private business will inevitably influence firm decisions.
The counter-illicit financing measures in a state comprise legal framework and institutions
that create AML/CFT structures and the government’s capacity and willingness to use their
toolbox to produce an effective AML/CFT system which can disrupt money laundering and
the financing of violence. Varying levels of these two features create unique investment
challenges and opportunities for foreign firms choosing investment locations. I first consider
the impact of AML/CFT structures, then AML/CFT effectiveness, before evaluating my
expectations for their interaction and where foreign direct investment should flow.
The AML/CFT regulatory environment laid out in the FATF recommendations raises
the costs and uncertainty for firms operating in a host market. Financial institutions and
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DNFBPS must hire and maintain a skilled staff for the labor intensive work of customer due
diligence. These efforts often require advanced technology and the processing power to ex-
pediently evaluate new potential customers and monitor transactions for suspicious patterns
in real time. This includes requesting, verifying, and maintaining records on the ownership
of every account, business owner, and beneficiary with whom they transact. Financial insti-
tutions either build out their internal information technology capabilities or hire third-party
vendors to provide regulatory services.11 These policies are contrary to the culture of fi-
nancial entities where customer confidentiality is an esteemed principle (Favarel-Garrigues,
Godefroy and Lascoumes, 2011). There is an additional opportunity cost of diverting re-
sources from other technology and business advancements that allow institutions to remain
competitive.
The overhead costs to create and maintain this infrastructure are ample. In a survey of
772 financial institutions, Thomson Reuters found that customer due diligence requirements
are a significant burden for financial entities and their customers (Reuters, 2016). Banks
in the survey self-reported spending an average of $60 million annually just on customer
due diligence. In 2015 the United States’ financial intelligence unit, FinCen, conducted
a regulatory impact assessment on CDD requirements and predicted that the regulations
would cost banks and their customers $700 million and $1.5 billion over a ten year period.12
These regulations can cause significant processing delays and result in the loss of customers
due to lengthy on-boarding processes.
Firms that do not fall under the scope of financial institutions or DNFBPS are the cus-
tomers of these entities and absorb many of the costs associated with AML/CFT structures.
In order to acquire or build a new business in the host market the foreign firm must sign
11Some countries, for example Israel, prohibit financial entities from contracting out any customer due
diligence processing to third-parties.
12FinCEN stands for the Financial Crimes and Enforcement Network and is housed within the United
States Department of the Treasury.
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ownership contracts and establish relationships with the domestic government, financial in-
stitutions, and intermediary businesses that will transport and facilitate the supply chain. In
doing so, these firms will be subject to these due diligence requirements. Firms must disclose
and provide documentation for the owners of accounts and the beneficial ownership for the
subsidiary. This information is then processed and validated before the acquisition or green-
field investment can be finalized. These procedures have increased on-boarding delays, which
averaged more than two months according to a Thomson Reuters survey of 822 corporate of-
ficers in 2016 (Reuters, 2016). Of these corporate customers, 89% reported an unsatisfactory
experience with their customer due diligence processing at financial institutions (Reuters,
2016). Foreign investors may struggle to navigate strict AML/CFT environments or spend
extra resources to hire local experts for these provisions.
The risk-based approach ingrained in the FATF standards mandates a cycle of risk anal-
ysis and policy revisions that can create uncertainty for business operations. For example,
the German Federal Ministry of Finance conducted their first national review assessment
in 2019 and concluded that trade in precious metals and stones posed a high risk of ex-
ploitation by money launderers (Germany, 2019). To combat a pattern of trades falling
just below the CDD threshold of e10,000 the government lowered the threshold to e2,000
(Germany, 2019; FATF-Egmont, 2020). This drastic change in standard resulted in panic
buying amongst German citizens who hold ample wealth in gold bars and jewelry. Dealers
in precious metals were overrun with buyers exchanging gold prior to the law going into
force. After the lower threshold was enacted these firms had to expend substantial resources
and time to meet the more stringent requirements (Manly, 2020). This cyclical process is
ingrained in the laws and structures of AML/CFT; compliant states must continually eval-
uate their illicit financing risks and then revise regulations and allocate resources to target
vulnerabilities. This creates an environment where firms cannot be ex ante certain of the
regulations they will operate under ex post.
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State robustness to illicit financing also redefines aspects of the relationship between gov-
ernments and firms. Government regulatory authorities monitor suspicious financial trans-
actions and evaluate the compliance of financial institutions. When compliance is lacking,
the government can fine financial institutions for their negligence and hold them account-
able for the behaviors of their customers. The rise in trade-based money laundering and
trade diversion has led to increased government oversight into exports and imports and cus-
toms processing. High technical compliance requires additional government oversight into
the firm’s transactions and could exacerbate investor fears about government meddling in
private business or using AML/CFT as grounds for expropriation. Together, these create
a costly and risky investment environment for multinational firms. Most firms have many
host markets to choose from that provide a good match to their inputs. Given these choices,
I expect firms to avoid markets where AML/CFT structures are strong.
Hypothesis 1: Firms will prefer host markets with lower levels of AML/CFT
structures.
The second aspect of a state’s robustness to illicit financing is the government’s capacity
and willingness to use their toolbox to disrupt criminal and terrorist financing networks
within their country. The FAFT describes the high-level objective of an effective AML/CFT
system as “financial systems and the broader economy are protected from the threats of
money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation, thereby strengthening
financial sector integrity and contributing to safety and security” (FATF, 2012-2020b). This
measure centers less on compliance from financial entities and more on the government’s
ability to effectively allocate resources to combat money laundering and terrorist financing
risks.
Governments are tasked with overseeing the compliance of financial institutions and DNF-
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PBs. In order to effectively accomplish this monitoring and enforcement task government
must allocate resources away from other priorities and toward AML/CFT. For example, the
United States’ FIU, FinCEN, maintains a workforce of 300 and an annual budget of $125
million. This FIU is the forefront of monitoring suspicious transaction reports and tracing
money laundering, but its just one of many agencies that devote resources and personnel
to disrupt illicit financing. Law enforcement and judicial branches of the government are
involved in arresting, processing, and prosecuting criminal and terrorist persons. In order
to effectively carry out these tasks, the government must have a well-functioning bureau-
cracy, law enforcement apparatus and a judiciary that can process criminal and civil money
laundering and terrorist financing cases. These institutions reflect government capabilities
and rule of law that usually allays firm concerns over expropriation (Jensen, 2003, 2008; Li,
2009).
Countries with effective AML/CFT systems face less internal and external political pres-
sure to change their regulations. For example, the Cayman Islands has the fifth strongest
AML/CFT structures as of 2021 yet was placed on the FATF’s list of jurisdictions under
increased monitoring due to strategic deficiencies in the effective implementation of these
procedures. The FATF and other regional economic bodies such as the European Union
maintain black lists that spotlight countries that fail to effectively block money laundering
and terrorist financing. These listings come with ramifications for firms operating within
these countries. Financial institutions must conduct additional enhanced due diligence pro-
cedures when transacting with persons and business entities from countries on FATF’s watch
list.13 However, once a country has demonstrated a record of effective AML/CFT their struc-
tural deficiencies are often overlooked. For example, the United States falls in the bottom
30% for their AML/CFT technical compliance yet has devoted tremendous resources and
toward effectively monitoring, investigating, prosecuting, and disrupting money launder-
13FATF recommendation 19 describes the requirements for higher risk countries
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ing and terrorist financing. Effectiveness decreases the uncertainty associated with FATF’s
risk-based approach, as there is less external and international political pressure to enact
additional regulations on the private sector.
Finally, an effective AML/CFT system should create a secure environment with a finan-
cial system that can rebuff illicit financing streams and provide important financial intelli-
gence to government counterinsurgent agencies. This reduces the risk that well-organized and
funded violent non-state actors can perpetrate violence and disrupt the economy. The attack
on the DAS building in Bogotá in 1989 exemplifies a state with an ineffective AML/CFT sys-
tem that was unable to block a multi-billion dollar illicit financing operation by the Medelĺın
Cartel. While firms are sensitive to the costs they might encounter under these structures,
they should prefer host markets with the government capacity and willingness to effectively
protect financial markets from illicit infiltration.
Hypothesis 2: Firms prefer host markets with stronger AML/CFT effective-
ness.
Firms prefer less regulated host markets where the government has the capacity to shoul-
der the burden of creating secure financial systems. However, firms do not observe these two
dimensions in isolation as both covary across potential host markets. Firms must consider
how the AML/CFT structures in a country interact with the government’s willingness and
capacity to use them to block illicit financing. Table 4.3 summarizes my expectations about
how these features should interact across four types of counter-illicit financing regimes.
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Benefits: Low likelihood of political
violence, highly certain and stable en-
vironment
Benefits: Government lacks capacity
to monitor and enforce provisions
Risks: High costs of compliance;
strong oversight and enforcement of pri-
vate sector
Risks: Uncertainty over enforcement;
lack of strong public partner in imple-
menting regulations; political violence
risks








Expectation: Low risk, high
AML/CFT costs
Expectation: High risk, moderate
AML/CFT costs. Least preferable in-
vestment environment
Low
Benefits: High functioning public sec-
tor counterpart; low risk of political vi-
olence; few regulations; stable environ-
ment
Benefits: Few regulations, Compliance
is low cost and unlikely to be enforced
Risks: Government enforcement in-
creases oversight and costs of non-
compliance
Risks: High uncertainty; state could
be subject to black-listing; political vi-
olence risks
Example: Australia, United States Example: Madagascar, Haiti
Expectation: Low risk and low
AML/CFT cost. Most preferable in-
vestment environment
Expectation: High risk, predictable
low AML/CFT costs
The public-private partnership demonstrate the interdependence of responsibilities that
governments and the private sectors face under these regulations. Higher government capac-
ity can enhance a private entity’s ability to comply with regulations by providing clear guide-
lines, offering expert support, and creating the infrastructure for reporting requirements.
Alternatively, higher AML/CFT effectiveness might signal the government’s willingness to
strictly regulate private entities, monitoring their adherence to AML/CFT structures, care-
fully reviewing paperwork, fining firms for deficiencies, and pursuing lawsuits against their
private sector counterparts. Government sector zeal for AML/CFT enforcement could also
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heighten the resources firms must devote to responding to investigative requests and increase
inspections and processing time through customs.
Effective AML/CFT systems present a trade-off for foreign firms. On one hand an effec-
tive government counterpart and secure investment environment are beneficial, and on the
other these governments might make compliance with AML/CFT structures more costly.
I expect firm preferences for strong AML/CFT effectiveness to diminish as a country’s
AML/CFT technical compliance creates additional regulatory requirements for private sec-
tor entities. The non-exclusionary benefits of a secure financial system become less appealing
as firms are forced to absorb additional costs of compliance.
Hypothesis 3: Firm preferences for effective government AML/CFT diminishes
as the strength of AML/CFT structures increases.
4.4.1 Alternative mechanisms
It is worth briefly discussing three alternative mechanisms that could connect state
counter-illicit financing measures and foreign direct investment. I have argued that multi-
national corporations have strong incentives to avoid markets with robust counterterrorism
and anti-money laundering institutions. However, a different and possibly simultaneous
mechanism may be through the government’s decision to enact AML/CFT legislation given
the importance of foreign investors in an economy. Foreign investment provides substan-
tial benefits to host markets through job creation, technology spillover, providing services.
Governments actively seek out firms and these potential benefits. The current study cannot
distinguish causality given the temporal constraints of the data and research design. How-
ever, this alternative mechanism still supports the underlying logic of my theory and we
would observe the same empirical pattern. The results here might not show foreign investors
actively choosing host markets but instead represent governments that are dependent on
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foreign investment anticipating FDI’s adverse reaction to additional AML/CFT regulations
and choosing lax regulations as a result. It is plausible that the empirical results reflect the
interwoven nature of these two mechanism and both occur.
Second, money launderers and terrorist organizations exploit legitimate transactions
through trade-based techniques and falsify their financial documentation to hide illegal funds.
These schemes will appear as routine transactions in export and import filings and resul-
tantly in the data governments and intergovernmental organizations use to measure trade
flows and foreign direct investment (Perez, Brada and Drabek, 2012; De Boyrie, Pak and
Zdanowicz, 2005). According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2-5% of
global GDP is laundered each year (UNODC, 2021). Some portion of the companies that
exist in the financial system and FDI data explicitly exist as front companies to launder
money. If the decisions of these firms are driving my results, I would expect to see foreign
investment which flees from countries with high robustness to illicit financing. These crimi-
nal and terrorist organizations should prefer host markets characterized by low AML/CFT
technical compliance and low effectiveness.
Finally, large firms that produce an outsized proportion of global trade may have different
preferences from medium or small firms involved in foreign investment. These firms have su-
perior resources compared to smaller firms and can invest in the human capital, technology,
and legal experts necessary to comply with AML/CFT structures. These firms also have
the highest risk of violating these provisions as regulators tend to investigate and prosecute
cases that will have the largest impact on markets and fetch the highest penalties. These
competitive advantages may compel firms to advocate for greater regulations as a form to
crowd out smaller firms that lack compliance capabilities (Gulotty, 2020; Kennard, 2020).
This mechanism would be particularly likely if the costs of compliance with AML/CFT reg-
ulations were fixed. There are many startup costs that a firm has to absorb in order to build
internal knowledge, processes, and capacity to comply with strict AML/CFT Structures.
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However, the daily operating of these institutions is also costly and we might expect even
large firms to prefer markets with fewer regulations so they can focus these resources on do-
mestic compliance with AML/CFT regulations. If large firms have a competitive advantage
in implementing AML/CFT regulations which they use to push out smaller firms, I would
expect to observe a positive relationship between AML/CFT structures and FDI.
4.5 Empirical Strategy
My theory centers on multinational firms decisions to allocate long term capital-intensive
investments across potential host markets. I measure this concept with country-year data
on net FDI inflow data from the World Bank.14 FDI inflow data captures investments and
disinvestment across countries and time. This is a good measure of long term investments
in a host market, such as greenfield investment or the acquisition of foreign firms. These
investments are vulnerable to the political risks I have described.
The temporal and geographic scope and modeling strategy is defined by the key ex-
planatory variables, robustness to illicit financing. I use a new measure of robustness to
illicit financing from Simonelli (2021b). I create two dynamic latent variable models using
FATF expert Mutual Evaluation Reports on member country’s effectiveness and technical
compliance to AML/CFT. These measures estimate a country’s latent levels of structural
AML/CFT and AML/CFT effectiveness based on compliance with 40 FATF recommenda-
tions and 11 measures of effectiveness. The validity of these measures are demonstrated
through substantively informative exploration of their parameters and correlation with sim-
ilar measures. However, Mutual Evaluation Reports are currently only available for 106
countries and their time-series is limited. Each country in the sample has one report avail-
able assessing their effectiveness, but most countries have multiple measures of technical
14The data is available here: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD
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compliances over time. I use a dynamic item response theory model to produce country-year
estimates for AML/CFT structures and effectiveness from 2016-2021. Effectiveness does not
vary over time, and, the AML/CFT structures variable does vary for most countries but
is a slow moving indicator.15 The countries in the sample are shown in Figure 4.3 in the
appendix and contain variation across every continent, market size, and regime type.
I create a country-level dataset matched to the countries with FATF scores available.
I include several additional covariates to account for variation across countries and other
common explanations of foreign investment. To account for differences across economic
development and size of the available labor markets I include GDP per Capita (log) and
population (log) from the World Bank. To account for the role of natural resources in
fueling investor decisions, I include the percentage of GDP resource rents from World Bank.
The varieties of democracy (VDEM) project provides indexes based on expert surveys of
several variables of interest. From VDEM I include measures of property rights, democracy,
rule of law, and corruption. VDEM provides several measures of democracy and I include
their electoral democracy index, polyarchy.
I include two measures of political violence to evaluate the impact of AML/CFT Robust-
ness outside of this direct mechanisms. I include data on the number of terrorist attacks
from the Global Terrorism Database. I measure violence between challengers and govern-
ments with data on battle deaths from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Both violence
count data are zero inflated with a long right tail. I included the logged values of both these
variables.
The sample includes 106 countries from 2016-2019. I only include data up to 2019
because most covariates are not yet available for 2020 and values in this year would reflect
a significantly altered patterns of investment due to the global pandemic. However, there
remains some missingness across covariates. I use multiple imputation to estimate the missing
15See Simonelli (2021b) for further discussion of these measures and their limitations
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data values which I expect to be missing at random conditional on the observable covariates
in my dataset. This technique uses predictive mean matching to estimate the missing values.
Single imputation can underestimate the uncertainty of the dataset. Multiple imputation
builds on this technique but incorporates greater uncertainty by creating multiple imputed
values. I create five datasets with imputed estimates and then pool over these datasets when
conducting my analysis. The variables from VDEM have the greatest missingness, missing
values in 13 countries, so their values show greater uncertainty in the results. This strategy
is preferable to other options, such as listwise deletion, because it allows us to retain the full
sample of countries for which robustness to illicit financing scores are available and accounts
for the uncertainty that accompanies the missing data.
I use a cross-national analysis to explore variation across countries and evaluate my
hypotheses. I use linear regression on each of the five imputed datasets and pool over the
results. I estimate the following model:
FDIit = β0 + β1 · AML/CFT Structureit + β2 · AML/CFT Effectivenessi+
β3 · AML/CFT Structureit · AML/CFT Effectivenessi + β4−13Zit + µt + εit
The model term FDIit represents the inflows of foreign direct investment in country i in
year t. The coefficients for AML/CFT structure is β1 and β2 is the coefficient for AML/CFT
capacity. The relationship between these two variables and foreign investment is captured
in the interaction term with coefficient β3. Zit represents a matrix of covariates that vary at
the country-year unit of analysis. A limitation of this data is the lack of temporal variance
in country AML/CFT capacity. There are no updated reports yet available on changes in
AML/CFT capacity. AML/CFT structure does vary across time for some countries but given
the data generating process described above, these are slow moving indicators. Including
country fixed effects is a common strategy in panel data to reduce bias in the error term
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associated with multiple non-independent observations from a single country. This allows
researchers to study changes within a given country over time. Given the theoretical question
of interest, firm choices between different potential host markets, and data limitations, this
study focuses on cross-national variation, and country-fixed effects would mask the key
variation of interest. I include a fixed effect for the multiple years of data that is available
in term µt. The remaining error of the model is represented in term εit.
Results
The main results from the pooled linear regression models are presented in Table 4.4.
Individual model results on each of the five imputed datasets are available in Table 4.9 in the
appendix. The results offer support for the central theory of firm preferences across country
robustness to illicit financing.
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Table 4.4: Summary of Model Results
Dependent variable:
Model 1: FDI Model 2: FD1
AML/CFT Structure −0.352*** (0.119) −0.436*** (0.111)
AML/CFT Effectiveness 0.456*** (0.142) 0.414*** (0.122)
Structure × Effectiveness - −0.140** (0.067)
GDP per capita (log) 0.114 (0.097) 0.125 (0.087)
Population (log) 0.156*** (0.051) 0.156*** (0.044)
Property Rights −1.815 (1.085) −1.174* (0.669)
Democracy −0.068 (0.608) −0.283 (0.524)
Corruption 0.160 (0.811) 0.244 (0.568)
Rule of Law 0.663 (0.978) 1.189 (0.792)
Terror Attacks (log) −0.083 (0.084) −0.05 (0.066)
Battle Deaths (log) 0.107* (0.058) 0.1* (0.052)
Resource Rents 0.003 (0.013) 0.003 (0.011)
Intercept −2.043 (1.676) −3.013** (1.322)
Observations 240 240
Year FE Yes Yes
Note: GDP = Gross Domestic Product












































Predicted Levels of FDI Inflow
Figure 4.1: Marginal Effects of AML/CFT Effectiveness and Structures on FDI Inflows
Figure 4.1 shows the marginal effects of AML/CFT structure and AML/CFT effective-
ness on FDI inflows. AML/CFT structure is negatively associated with FDI inflows. This
supports hypothesis 1 that high levels of AML/CFT regulations will repel foreign investors.
The coefficient for AML/CFT effectiveness is positive, offering support for hypothesis 2.
Countries characterized by economic systems that are protected from money laundering and
terrorist financing are rewarded with higher levels of foreign investment. GDP per capita is
included in the models as a broad measure of government capabilities, so the observed effect
is specific to government effectiveness over AML/CFT. Figure 4.2 shows the interaction effect
between the two dimensions of state robustness to illicit financing. The blue line represents
investment into countries with the most effective AML/CFT systems. The red flatter line
shows the marginal effects of increases in technical compliance for countries with the least
effective systems. Firms have a strong preference for low technical compliance regardless of
a country’s overall effectiveness, as shown by the negative β1 coefficient in Table 4.4 and
trend present in the plot. However, these preferences are strongest when governments have
demonstrated capacity and willingness to enforce AML/CFT provisions. Operating in the
undesirable environment of high technical compliance, firms have a slight preference for the
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benefits associated with effective AML/CFT systems but these benefits are drastically offset


























Predicted Levels of FDI Inflow
Figure 4.2: Interaction of AML/CFT Effectiveness and Structures on FDI Inflows
Foreign firms have a clear preference for host markets where the government has the
resources and capacity to protect financial systems from infiltration but where onerous regu-
lations do not raise the costs of doing business. This highlights two interesting characteristics
of state robustness to illicit financing. Despite the central role the FATF has played in con-
structing standards, building state AML/CFT expertise and capacity, and monitoring state
robustness to illicit financing, the highest adherence with FATF standards is not neces-
sary for an effective AML/CFT system. These two dimensions are highly correlated, but
governments can choose to neglect some recommendations, particularly those that regulate
businesses, if they have enough capacity to take on more of the monitoring workload. Sec-
ond, these dynamics may be an impediment to developing robust AML/CFT structures.
We see no evidence that relatively under-resourced and low AML/CFT capacity states are
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rewarded for their signaling of structural compliance. The opposite is true, investors choose
their less regulated counterparts.
The current study cannot distinguish causality given the temporal constraints of the data
and research design. I have argued that multinational corporations have strong incentives to
avoid markets with robust counterterrorism and anti-money laundering institutions. How-
ever, a different and possibly simultaneous mechanism may be through the a government’s
decision to enact AML/CFT legislation given the importance of foreign investors in an econ-
omy. However, this alternative mechanism still supports the underlying logic of my theory
and we would observe the same empirical pattern. The results here might not show foreign
investors actively choosing host markets but instead represent governments that are de-
pendent on foreign investment anticipating FDI’s adverse reaction to additional AML/CFT
regulations and choosing lower levels of structural AML/CFT.
4.5.1 Alternative Measures of Business Environment
To further evaluate my theory and the robustness of my results, I consider alternative
outcomes that represent market-friendly policies within a country. I include three measures
of the ease of doing business within a country from the World Bank Doing Business indi-
cators and one measure of regulatory quality from the World Bank Governance Indicators
(provided in the VDEM data). Doing Business is the World Bank’s aggregate ease of doing
business score that measures regulatory best practices across 41 indicators that evaluate the
costs of starting and conducting a business in a country. Starting Business is a measure of
how easy it is to start a new business in a country based on the number of regulatory pro-
cedures a company must go through, average number of days, costs, and minimum capital
necessary. Credit Ease measures the strength of legal rights for borrowers and the availabil-
ity of relevant credit information for lenders. This information is particularly relevant as
the ability of financial entities to quickly assess intentional customers is vital to conducting
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customer due diligence. All these Doing Business indicators range from zero representing
the worst regulatory environment to 100, representing the best regulatory environment.16
The variables are scaled and with a mean of zero for the analysis. Finally, I include Reg.
Quality which is a measure of perceptions over the government’s regulatory environment
and private sector development from the World Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay
and Mastruzzi, 2011). This measures how well the government can provide regulations that
help business development such as access to capital and banking supervision while avoiding
excessive regulations that deter foreign trade and investment.
I evaluate these dependent variables using the same modeling strategy and imputed
datasets as my primary model on FDI. Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 provides the results of anal-
ysis with these alternative dependent variables. These results provide consistent support
for my argument that systemic economic counterinsurgency impacts the broader business
environment. Across all four models AML/CFT Effectiveness is positively associated with a
more desirable business environment. This association is significant in the first three models,
but there is greater uncertainty in the final model on regulatory quality. AMF/CFT struc-
tures is negatively associated with all four business environment indicators, even though this
result is only statistically significant in the models evaluating regulatory quality and starting
a business. The interaction between structures and effectiveness is less consistent across the
models and with the main model. In the first two models the interaction is not significantly
distinguishable from zero. However, the interaction for ease of credit access is negative with
p < 0.1 and the interaction for regulatory quality is positive and significant. Reported levels
of ease of access to credit follows similar patterns as the main models on foreign invest-
ment. Businesses generally find it easier to access credit in countries with more effective
AML/CFT systems, perhaps representing the benefits of the public-private partnership, but
16Further information about the Doing Business methodology is available at
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/32436/9781464814402 Ch06.pdf
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as AML/CFT structures increase this preference diminishes. If customer due diligence and
other regulations on financial entities are onerous than even efficient public counterparts
cannot reduce the hoops business have to jump through to access lines of credit. Ratings of
regulatory quality are negatively correlated with the regulations that comprise AML/CFT
structures, providing further evidence that businesses are repelled by these host markets. As
these AML/CFT regulations increase, the benefits of high AML/CFT effectiveness balance
out the costs of regulations and regulatory quality remains fairly static. However, ratings
of regulatory quality countries with low AML/CFT effectiveness are particularly sensitive
to changes in AML/CFT structures and as these regulations increase, ratings of quality
plummet.
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Table 4.5: Summary of Model 3 and Model 4
Dependent variable:
Model 3: Model 4:
Doing Business Starting Business
AML/CFT Structures −0.099 (0.065) −0.235** (0.101)
AML/CFT Effectiveness 0.378*** (0.077) 0.394*** (0.104)
Structures × Effectiveness 0.012 (0.040) −0.046 (0.057)
GDP per Capita (log) 0.372*** (0.056) 0.021 (0.079)
Population (log) 0.056 (0.034) −0.081 (0.060)
Property Rights 0.820** (0.364) 3.126*** (0.499)
Democracy −1.716*** (0.324) −1.215** (0.469)
Corruption −2.022*** (0.441) −0.980 (0.581)
Rule of Law 3.612*** (0.525) 2.242*** (0.720)
Terror Attacks (log) −0.118*** (0.039) 0.044 (0.059)
Battle Deaths (log) 0.048 (0.031) 0.023 (0.043)
Resource Rents 0.015* (0.008) 0.017** (0.008)
Intercept −7.127*** (1.322) −2.841** (1.369)
Observations 240 240
Year FE Yes Yes
Note: GDP = Gross Domestic Product
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.6: Summary of Model 5 and Model 6
Dependent variable:
Model 5: Model 6:
Credit Ease Reg. Quality
AML/CFT Structures −0.159 (0.111) −0.117** (0.056)
AML/CFT Effectiveness 0.479*** (0.126) 0.091 (0.058)
Structures × Effectiveness −0.126* (0.068) 0.058* (0.032)
GDP per Capita (log) 0.147 0.094 0.495*** (0.043)
Population (log) 0.107* (0.055) 0.087*** (0.026)
Property Rights −0.339 (0.738) 1.064*** (0.273)
Democracy −0.385 (0.555) −0.541** (0.238)
Corruption −3.685*** (0.739) −0.827** (0.339)
Rule of Law 3.811*** (0.909) 1.849*** (0.399)
Terror Attacks (log) −0.209*** (0.072) −0.059* (0.030)
Battle Deaths (log) 0.062 (0.052) 0.040 (0.024)
Resource Rents 0.015 (0.011) 0.004 (0.006)
Intercept −6.289*** (1.510) −8.023*** (0.677)
Observations 240 240
Year FE Yes Yes
Note: GDP = Gross Domestic Product
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Although my theory centers on the trade-offs for foreign investors, these results support
my expectations that AML/CFT structures and effectiveness impact the desirability of a
market. Governments that prioritize and allocate resources toward blocking illicit exploita-
tion of their financing systems also provide clear guidelines for business that want to access
the market legitimately. Governments that diligently implement every international standard
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on AML/CFT are punished for creating additional costs and red tape for businesses.
4.5.2 Discussion of Results
The results have uncovered a clear trend of multinational firms and businesses broadly
favoring markets with high levels AML/CFT effectiveness but weaker AML/CFT structures.
One might have a prior expectation that AML/CFT structures and AML/CFT effectiveness
would behave similarly considering they are both measures of state counter-illict financing
systems. Why then do they have such different effects on investment environments? Three
features of these variables are important to evaluating this question. First, AML/CFT struc-
tures are not a necessary condition for AML/CFT effectiveness. States that are able to create
relatively secure financial markets do not always do so by codifying international standards
into domestic law and requiring businesses engage in costly investigation and monitoring of
customers. Further research should explore this discrepancy more and determine why states
are able to achieve financial resilience without onerous regulations on private entities and
other characteristics of strong AML/CFT structures.
Second, the features that distinguish high and low levels of AML/CFT structures center
on the regulation of private entities. This finding motivated the investigation in this paper
and may explain why business preferences are so closely tied to lower levels of AML/CFT
structures. Countries with high scores for AML/CFT structures achieve this by employing
costly regulations on private entities. Finally, this study is compelling because it specifically
investigates an area where I expected preferences to diverge across these two features of a
country’s AML/CFT regime. There are other cases where my a prior expectation would
be for these two counter-illicit financing measures to have similar or compounding effects.
Both may be connected to a governments level of connectivity to international institutions,
histories with high-profile exploitation of financial systems by terrorist groups, or levels of
political violence.
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It is also worth considering features of the sample that could influence these results.
There is evidence that fears of de-risking and loss of correspondent banking can push small
countries to adopt greater compliance with international AML/CFT standards to publicly
demonstrate the security of their financial systems. Implementing FATF recommendations
may be a relatively low cost way for these countries to signal their reliability even if they have
little capacity or interest in enforcing provisions. However, large countries that are major
players in the international economic system are not vulnerable to these risks, lowering their
incentives to comply with onerous recommendations especially if they have already achieved a
relatively high level of financial resilience. Countries with larger economies may have political
systems prone to influence from business interests that can pressure governments to improve
their capacity of public sector AML/CFT tools, but resist compliance with recommendations
that shift responsibilities to the private sector. As more FATF reports are available future
work can expand the sample of countries included in the analysis and further work can also
seek to disentangle these casual pathways.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper highlights a significant barrier to international efforts to countering the financ-
ing of terrorism and disrupt money laundering. The incentive structure for foreign investors
compels firms to seek out markets with fewer regulations. This creates two interrelated chal-
lenges for policymakers. First, this limits the transactions that fall under the scope of these
regulations. In a highly globalized world, a few unregulated, outlier countries can shield
lots of illicit financing from oversight. Second, fear of losing current or potential investment
may discourage governments from enacting more stronger provisions. However, these results
also point to a solution; firms prefer countries with more secure financial systems. By in-
vestigating why some systems are more effective than others, international regulators may
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be able to find common ground with powerful business lobbies and focus on regulations or
capacity-building that is more likely to create security from illicit financing.
This work suggests several avenues for further research. First, a firm’s preferences may
also be shaped by the regulations in their home market. The firm is subject to oversight in
both their home and host market. If the home country is a strong adherer to AML/CFT then
it may actually be less costly for firms to seek out host markets with similar regulations. This
is the logic underlying de-risking. Financial entities operating under strong customer due
diligence and documentation requirements from their home market may avoid unregulated
host markets due to concerns of violating their home market’s provisions and facing fines.
The results presented in this paper provide support for an alternative “race to the bottom”
mechanism. This logic which has been shown for labor standards would suggest that firms
from highly regulated host markets may be the most likely to seek out weakly regulated host
markets. The relative cost of host market regulations should be a function of the firm’s home
market. Firms that are already compliant with high standards face fewer costs than a firm
that must create new capacity for customer documentation, verification, and investigation.
For these reasons we might expect FDI to travel between country dyads with the most similar
institutions on AML/CFT.
Second, I have argued that these provisions reach and create costs for multinational
firms across sectors. However, the costs and risks associated with AML/CFT provisions
vary across industries and there may be interesting heterogeneity across these dimensions.
It is plausible that financial entities prefer host markets with stronger technical compliance to
avoid fines and reputation costs associated with violating international AML/CFT standards.
However, for firms with less risk of being targeted by domestic regulators a low technical
compliance environment may be an appealing low cost choice. There also may be other
host market features that interact with counter-illicit financing systems to shape investment
preferences. For example, firms may generally prefer lower structural AML/CFT but prefer
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strong AML/CFT structures in countries with a history of funding violent non-state actors
or being targeted by unilateral or international black-lists. Similarly, firm preferences for





Money laundering and terrorist financing risks are understood and, where appropri-
ate, actions coordinated domestically to combat money laundering and the financing
of terrorism and proliferation
IO2
International co-operation delivers appropriate information, financial intelligence,
and evidence, and facilitates action against criminals and their assets.
IO3
Supervisors appropriately supervise, monitor and regulate financial institutions and
DNFBPs for compliance with AML/CFT requirements commensurate with their
risks.
IO4
Financial institutions and DNFBPs adequately apply AML/CFT preventive mea-
sures commensurate with their risks, and report suspicious transactions.
IO5
Legal persons and arrangements are prevented from misuse for money laundering
or terrorist financing, and information on their beneficial ownership is available to
competent authorities without impediments.
IO6
Financial intelligence and all other relevant information are appropriately used by
competent authorities for money laundering and terrorist financing investigations.
IO7
Money laundering offenses and activities are investigated and offenders are prose-
cuted and subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.
IO8 Proceeds and instrumentalities of crime are confiscated.
IO9
Terrorist financing offenses and activities are investigated and persons who finance




Terrorists, terrorist organizations and terrorist financiers are prevented from raising,
moving and using funds, and from abusing the NPO sector.
IO11
Persons and entities involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
are prevented from raising, moving and using funds, consistent with the relevant
UNSCRs.
Table 4.7: FATF Effectiveness Immediate Outcomes
Item Description
AML/CFT Policies and Coordination
R1 Assessing Risks and Applying a Risk-Based Approach
R2 National cooperation and coordination
Money Laundering and Confiscation
R3 Money laundering offence
R4 Confiscation and provisional measures
Terrorist Financing and Financing of Proliferation
R5 Terrorist financing offence
R6 Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism & terrorist financing
R7 Targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation
R8 Non-profit organisations
Preventive Measures
R9 Financial institution secrecy laws
R10 Customer due diligence
R11 Record keeping
R12 Politically exposed persons
R13 Correspondent banking
R14 Money or value transfer services
R15 New technologies
R16 Wire transfers
R17 Reliance on third parties
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R18 Internal controls and foreign branches and subsidiaries
R19 Higher-risk countries
R20 Reporting of suspicious transactions
R21 Tipping-off and confidentiality
R22 DNFBPs: Customer due diligence
R23 DNFBPs: Other measures
Transparency and Beneficial Ownership of Legal Persons and Arrangements
R24 Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons
R25 Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal arrangements
Powers and Responsibilities of Competent Authorities and Other Institutional Mea-
sures
R26 Regulation and supervision of financial institutions
R27 Powers of supervisors
R28 Regulation and supervision of DNFBPs
R29 Financial intelligence units
R30 Responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative authorities
R31 Powers of law enforcement and investigative authorities
R32 Cash couriers
R33 Statistics




R37 Mutual legal assistance
R38 Mutual legal assistance: freezing and confiscation
R39 Extradition
R40 Other forms of international cooperation





Figure 4.3: Countries included in the sample
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Table 4.9: Models on Five Imputed Datasets
Dependent variable:
Foreign Direct Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AML/CFT Structure −0.434∗∗∗ −0.450∗∗∗ −0.423∗∗∗ −0.440∗∗∗ −0.435∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.109) (0.110) (0.109) (0.111)
AML/CFT Effectiveness 0.424∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.115) (0.121) (0.118) (0.118)
Structure × Effectiveness −0.138∗∗ −0.148∗∗ −0.137∗∗ −0.143∗∗ −0.135∗∗
(0.068) (0.067) (0.066) (0.067) (0.068)
GDP per Capita (log) 0.129 0.111 0.134 0.124 0.125
(0.088) (0.083) (0.088) (0.088) (0.087)
Population (log) 0.160∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044)
Property Rights −1.305∗∗ −0.888 −1.289∗∗ −0.844 −1.546∗∗∗
(0.585) (0.575) (0.584) (0.573) (0.594)
Democracy −0.219 −0.368 −0.297 −0.384 −0.148
(0.527) (0.514) (0.512) (0.485) (0.524)
Corruption 0.108 0.486 0.165 0.347 0.112
(0.544) (0.527) (0.539) (0.533) (0.546)
Rule of Law 0.996 1.530∗∗ 1.086 1.303∗ 1.028
(0.768) (0.737) (0.759) (0.738) (0.761)
Terror Attacks (log) −0.062 −0.035 −0.055 −0.035 −0.066
(0.064) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064)
Battle Deaths (log) 0.103∗∗ 0.096∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.096∗ 0.110∗∗
(0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052)
Resource Rents 0.005 0.006 −0.002 −0.001 0.007
(0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010)
Intercept −2.887∗∗ −3.481∗∗∗ −2.925∗∗ −3.335∗∗∗ −2.437∗
(1.212) (1.257) (1.238) (1.235) (1.272)
Observations 240 240 240 240 240
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.270 0.271 0.279 0.272 0.271





This dissertation describes the relatively new global economic counterinsurgency regime
which has grown into an expansive interconnected system of regulations, surveillance, and
enforcement with purview over every part of the global financial system. This project demon-
strates that targeted and systemic economic counterinsurgency have consequences for peace
and security, civilian victimization, and foreign investment. Specifically, I have evaluated the
the following questions: How does targeted economic counterinsurgency impact rebel groups
use of violence against opponents and civilians? How do we measure country-level systemic
economic counterinsurgency? How does systemic economic counterinsurgency impact the
levels of political violence within a country and the desirability of a country’s economic
market?
I began my exploration of the global economic counterinsurgency regime at the most
narrow level, evaluating targeted sanctions against violent non-state actors. In Chapter
2, Economic Sanctions and Insurgent Violence, I ask how economic sanctions affect rebel
groups use of violence against combatants and civilians. In this chapter I move beyond
prior studies of economic sanctions that only evaluate rebels battlefield violence (Radtke
180
and Jo, 2018; Escribà-Folch, 2010; Hultman and Peksen, 2017) and consider how economic
coercion might affect violence against civilians. This chapter draws on theories of rebel
mobilization, origins, and civilian victimization to develop a theory of rebel behavior under
economic sanctions. I argue that the mechanisms of sanctions will work differently against
non-state actors compared to state targets and should not be expected to have homogeneous
impacts across rebel groups. Instead I theorize that the effects of economic sanctions will
be based on the diversity and vulnerability of their economic portfolios and foundational
origins. Economic portfolios comprise all the distinct methods rebel groups employ to raise
and maintain the resources necessary to continue their violent campaigns. Sanctions work
by isolating the target from their wider economic networks and severing supply chains.
Given these characteristics, I expect sanctions to have larger impacts on rebel groups whose
economic portfolios are more reliant on long transnational supply chains than those that
acquire funding from difficult to interdict methods.
Next, I evaluate how economic sanctions will impact rebel groups reliance on and tactics
toward civilian populations. I consider two primary tactics groups use to elicit civilian
support, persuasion and coercion. I explore heterogeneity across rebel groups based on their
origins. The pre-existing institutions from which rebels drew their initial membership have
enduring implications on rebel groups organizational structures and subsequent treatment of
civilian populations. I show that groups founded in pre-existing institutions with connections
to local communities will maintain their ties to civilians and use persuasion to acquire more
resources from civilians. The implementation of economic sanctions are accompanied by
international condemnation meant to name and shame the deleterious behaviors of the target.
These reputation attacks can be particularly harmful to groups with social origins as they
rely on civilians favorable perceptions to maintain their support. These groups will need
to counter the UN’s narrative in order to extract additional resources from civilians. This
incentivizes groups that occasionally were coercive to civilians to improve their behavior and
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cease any violence that could provide evidence in support of a harmful narrative.
Groups that were founded around the exploitation of an external source of income such
as state sponsorship or natural resources, generally lack these productive ties with civilians.
These groups overcame their mobilization challenges through economic endowments, lack
foundational connections to pre-existing civic institutions, and never had to expend resources
to build connections with civilians where no prior ones existed because of their alternative
sources of resources. When these groups do require resources from civilians they tend to rely
on coercion, using violence or the threat of violence to evoke fear so civilians withhold pro-
viding intelligence to government forces and provide food, money, or other goods. Sanctions
will also raises costs for these groups, but lacking a positive relationship with civilians the
tactic of persuasion is unavailable and these groups will redouble their coercive tactics. The
results support this theory and explain variation in patterns of violence against civilians in
the wake of economic sanctions.
This work does not find a clear connection between supply chain features of insurgent
groups’ resource-generating tactics and sanction effectiveness. After this anlaysis at the
micro-level, I consider whether macro-level features at the country-level could impact the
enforcement of sanctions. In Chapter 3, Measuring State Counter-Illicit Financing Systems,
I use a dyanmic oridinal item respose theory model and FATF reports to create two new
measures that capture this variation cross-nationally and over time. AML/CFT structures
measures a government’s creation of laws and regulatory tools to counter illicit finacing.
AML/CFT effectiveness encompasses a state’s latent capacity and willingness to create a
financial system that is secure from illicit exploitation. Exploring the model parameters
highlights the challenges governments face in regulating private entities which serve as the
day-to-day monitors and enforcers over transactions. The results show that AML/CFT
structures and effectiveness are highly correlated, but high quality AML/CFT institutions
are not a necessary condition for an effective AML/CFT system.
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Using these measures I explore the impact of counter-illicit financing systems on po-
litical violence within a country. The results show that neither AML/CFT structures nor
AML/CFT effectiveness are associated with terrorism. AML/CFT structures have no sig-
nificant impact on any of the violent outcomes I explore. Although these systems are rela-
tively new, this finding should cause policymakers to examine the international standards on
AML/CFT and consider why these laws fail to produce observable shifts in the prevalence of
terrorism. AML/CFT effectiveness is associated with a lower intensity of internal conflict.
AML/CFT effectiveness measures the actual level of security from financial exploitation in
a country so this result is encouraging for the utility of these efforts. While terrorism is
relatively cheap, financing an insurgency is exorbitant. This chapter demonstrates the im-
portance of severing large insurgencies exploitation of the legitimate economy to financing
their operations.
An important observation from Chapter 3 is difficulty or hesitant governments face in
enacting AML/CFT provisions that require financial entities and other private businesses
engage in enhanced customer due diligence and monitoring of accounts for nefarious trans-
actions. These provisions are costly for businesses who need to build the capabilities and
technical expertise to comply with standards and allocate resources toward monitoring and
enforcement. This chapter prompts the question: How do country counter-illicit financing
systems effect foreign firms decisions to invest in a host market? Multinational firms tend
to be repelled from markets where regulations are onerous and costs of day-to-day opera-
tions are high. However, foreign firms prefer stable host markets where the risks of political
violence are low and governments have the capacity to maintain and enforce rule of law.
In Chapter 5, Foreign Investment and State Robustness to Illicit Financing, I evaluate the
puzzle of firm preferences over counter-illicit financing systems.
My theory unravels these contradictory preferences by evaluating two components of a
state’s counter-illicit financing strategy. Anti-money laundering and countering the financing
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of terrorism (AML/CFT) structures are the legal frameworks and regulatory tools available
to monitor, track, disrupt, and prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. These pro-
visions include significant regulatory and monitoring requirements for financial institutions
and businesses involved in trade. AML/CFT effectiveness encompasses the government’s
capacity and willingness to use its AML/CFT toolbox to disrupt money laundering and
terrorist financing. This variable captures how well the government and AML/CFT institu-
tions function and achieve the goal of preventing criminal and terrorist actors from raising,
transferring, and sending funds through the financial system.1
I argue that firms seek out host markets where they can minimize the costs of inva-
sive AML/CFT regulations but reap the benefits of a government with a strong capacity to
counter illicit financing and environment free of well-financed violent actors. This leads to di-
vergent preferences between a state’s counter-illicit financing systems. Firms most prefer host
markets characterized by weak AML/CFT structures but strong AML/CFT effectiveness.
However, as AML/CFT regulations and restrictions on business dealings become more oner-
ous, firms prefer governments less adept at implementing them. Thus firms’ preferences for
governments that are effective at enforcing AML/CFT diminishes as the AML/CFT struc-
tures they are subject to increase. I test my theory using original data on state counter-illicit
financing systems and FDI inflows. The results support my central contentions about firm
preferences over state AML/CFT structures and AML/CFT effectiveness. Firms prefer host
markets characterized by low AML/CFT structures but high AML/CFT effectiveness and
investment into strong host markets decreases with increasing AML/CFT regulations. This
finding has important implications for the success of these international efforts.
1I use the terms structural AML/CFT and AML/CFT technical compliance interchangeably. Both terms
refer to the first dimension of illicit financing robustness which captures the underlying laws and tools in a
country. I use the terms AML/CFT capacity and willingness interchangeably with AML/CFT effectiveness.




This dissertation offers several contributions to the study of economic counterinsurgency,
political violence, and foreign investment. I begin by contributing new knowledge on the
scope and occurrence of economic counterinsurgency and proposing that economic counterin-
surgency tactics are best understood under the framework of the broader global economic
counterinsurgency regime. I argue that this diverse set of economic counterinsurgency tactics
affect a range of actors through unique mechanisms. In Chapter 2, I show how the same eco-
nomic counterinsurgency tool, economic sanctions, has different effects on insurgent groups
based on the vulnerability and diversity of their economic portfolios and organizational ori-
gins. Groups with social origins, economic origins, and rebel origins all respond differently to
this same policy intervention. This approach proves that not only do the tools of economic
counterinsurgency vary, but within a single tool the impact varies based on attributes of the
target.
Second, I move beyond prior studies of economic sanctions that only evaluate rebel
groups’ battlefield violence (Radtke and Jo, 2018; Escribà-Folch, 2010; Hultman and Peksen,
2017) and consider how economic coercion affects violence against civilians. Building on my
approach of evaluating rebel heterogeneity, I show that groups with social origins have en-
during connections to civilian populations that they use to persuade civilians to provide
resources for their efforts. Economic sanctions increase these groups reliance on civilian
populations and incentivize rebel groups to reduce any coercive behaviors toward noncom-
batants. Alternatively, rebel groups that originated around external resource endowments
or from splintering off prior violent non-state actors do not have the shared social connec-
tions and tools to persuade civilians to supplement their losses under economic sanctions.
My results show that these groups will increase violence against civilian populations to
shore up resource deficiencies caused by economic sanctions. These findings should caution
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policymakers to evaluate rebel group characteristics when applying targeted economic coun-
terinsurgency. These features can help predict where economic counterinsurgency should be
complimented with policies to safeguard civilians from negative side effects.
Third, this dissertation is the first research to cross-nationally measure and evaluate
systemic economic counterinsurgency. I create two new concepts to evaluate counter-illicit
financing systems. AML/CFT structures measures a country’s AML/CFT laws and reg-
ulatory tools and AML/CFT effectiveness encompasses the governments capabilities and
willingness to use these tools to produce improved security of financial markets. This disser-
tation has demonstrated how these concepts can elucidate variation in political violence and
foreign investment. These measures will enable other researchers to study these phenomenon
further, incorporate systemic variation into analyses of categorical and targeted measures.
Finally, I look beyond political violence and evaluate how economic counterinsurgency
policies affect the broader political economy of a country. Policymakers and scholars must
consider these downstream effects when evaluating the costs and benefits of economic coun-
terinsurgency. My results show that foreign firms avoid markets with broad AML/CFT
structures but are attracted to countries that effectively insulate their financial markets from
illicit exploitation. These findings point to a source of tension between governments seeking
to attract foreign investment and improve their compliance with international counter-illicit
financing policies. This dissertation demonstrates the interconnected nature of the actors
involved in the international financial system, both licit and illicit.
5.3 Future Research
This dissertation paves the way for several areas of future research and there are direct
extensions of this work that I plan to pursue to further our understandings of the efficacy
and drawbacks of economic counterinsurgency. This dissertation has only explored one form
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of targeted economic counterinsurgency, economic sanctions. However, governments have
a toolbox of targeted measures including arresting financiers, raids, confiscating goods and
armaments from safe houses, enhancing security to disrupt intelligence networks, and con-
ducting surveillance over supply chains. I have collected preliminary data on these targeted
measures against insurgent groups from 1990-2018. Data collection is ongoing and there is
not currently sufficient coverage to produce a random sample of groups for analysis. How-
ever, the patterns in the preliminary data in Figure 5.1 suggests economic sanctions are a
far less common form of economic counterinsurgency than the law enforcement actions do-
mestic governments routinely take to disrupt resource-generating tactics. Figure 5.2 shows
the increase of targeted economic counterinsurgency in recent years and highlights the need

















Targeted Economic Counterinsurgency Tactics
Figure 5.1: Frequency of Targeted Economic Counterinsurgency Tactics (Preliminary Data)
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Figure 5.2: Occurence of Targeted Economic Counterinsurgency 1990-2018 (Preliminary
Data)
is that these actions are often interconnected with military or law enforcement officers who
can serve as front-line enforcers of strategies to disrupt insurgent supply chains. Military
or police operations against physical strongholds or insurgents can also result in the confis-
cation of large quantities of resources and disrupt supply chains. I hope future work using
this original data will help integrate the study of economic counterinsurgency with studies
focusing on the military or law enforcement prongs of counterinsurgency.
Beyond this original data collection, this project suggests several additional avenues for
future work. An immediate extension of this dissertation will be to include state counter-
illicit financing measures in evaluations of targeted and categorical economic counterinsur-
gency. Due to the focus of rebel organizational attributes in Chapter 2, I was restricted in
the time period by the data available with yearly information on insurgent groups. As such,
I was unable to incorporate the measures of counter-illicit financing from 2016-2019 into my
evaluation of economic sanctions which covered 1998-2012. However, I plan to explore this
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further with new data in future papers. These measures may also be well-suited to regional
analyses that exploits inter-regional differences across government AML/CFT structures
and AML/CFT effectiveness. My results show that there could be useful variation across
AML/CFT effectiveness in South Africa, West Africa, East Asia, and South East Asia. Gov-
ernments in South and West Africa also vary substantially in their AML/CFT structures.
For example, it may be fruitful to explore variation in the enforcement of targeted sanc-
tions against Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb across countries with varying counter-illicit
financing systems in the African Sahel region in particular as several countries including
Mauritania have worked to bolster their AML/CFT structures in recent years.
Rebel production of violence is one observable implication of targeted sanctions, but these
policies are likely to have broader impacts on the internal cohesion and strategic calculus of
violent non-state actors and the governments opposing them. Future work could consider
the impact of sanctions on insurgent splintering, willingness to negotiate, and longevity.
Economic sanctions targeting rebels best reflect the growing toolbox of financial counterin-
surgency, but in the context of intrastate conflicts it is worth analyzing symmetric sanctions
that impact the capabilities of all belligerents and sanctions that only target the government.
This theory has focused on rebel groups, civilian populations, and domestic governments,
but further analyses into the broader networks of violent non-state actors could identify if
these policies cascade across rebel alliances or are disrupted by sanctions-busting foreign
sponsors.
This work also suggests several avenues for future research in international political econ-
omy. A firm’s preferences may also be shaped by the regulations in their home market. The
firm is subject to oversight in both their home and host market. If the home country is a
strong adherer to AML/CFT then it may actually be less costly for firms to seek out host
markets with similar regulations. This is the logic underlying de-risking. Financial entities
operating under strong customer due diligence and documentation requirements from their
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home market may avoid unregulated host markets due to concerns of violating their home
market’s provisions and facing fines. The results presented in this paper provide support
for an alternative “race to the bottom” mechanism. This logic which has been shown for
labor standards would suggest that firms from highly regulated host markets may be the
most likely to seek out weakly regulated host markets. The relative cost of host market reg-
ulations should be a function of the firm’s home market. Firms that are already compliant
with high standards face fewer costs than a firm that must create new capacity for customer
documentation, verification, and investigation. For these reasons we might expect FDI to
travel between country dyads with the most similar institutions on AML/CFT.
Finally, I have argued that these provisions reach and create costs for multinational firms
across sectors. However, the costs and risks associated with AML/CFT provisions vary across
industries and there may be interesting heterogeneity across these dimensions. It is plausible
that financial entities prefer host markets with stronger technical compliance to avoid fines
and reputation costs associated with violating international AML/CFT standards. However,
for firms with less risk of being targeted by domestic regulators a low technical compliance
environment may be an appealing low cost choice.
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Rustad, Siri Aas, Philippe Le Billon and Päivi Lujala. 2017. “Has the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative been a success? Identifying and evaluating EITI goals.” Resources
Policy 51:151–162.
Salehyan, Idean, David Siroky and Reed M Wood. 2014. “External Rebel Sponsorship
and Civilian Abuse: A Principal-Agent Analysis of Wartime Atrocities.” International
Organization 68(68):633–661.
201
Salehyan, Idean, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and David E. Cunningham. 2011. “Explaining
External Support for Insurgent Groups.” International Organization 65(4):709–744.
Sawyer, Katherine, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham and William Reed. 2017. “The Role of
External Support in Civil War Termination.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 61(6):1174–
1202.
Schnakenberg, Keith E. and Christopher J. Fariss. 2014. “Dynamic Patterns of Human
Rights Practices.” Political Science Research and Methods 2(1):1–31.
Schneider, Friedrich and Bruno S Frey. 1985. “Economic and political determinants of foreign
direct investment.” World development 13(2):161–175.
Schneider, Gerald. 2017. “Capitalist Peace theory: A critical appraisal.”.
Simonelli, Corina. 2021a. “Economic Sanctions and Insurgent Violence.” Working Paper .
Simonelli, Corina. 2021b. “Measuring State Robustness to Illicit Financing: A Latent Vari-
able Approach and Implications for Political Violence.” Working Paper .
Smith, Bradley C. and William Spaniel. 2020. “ Introducing ν -CLEAR: a latent variable
approach to measuring nuclear proficiency .” Conflict Management and Peace Science
37(2):232–256.
Solis, Jonathan A. and Philip D. Waggoner. 2020. “Measuring Media Freedom: An Item
Response Theory Analysis of Existing Indicators.” British Journal of Political Science .
Staats, Joseph L and Glen Biglaiser. 2012. “Foreign direct investment in Latin America:
The importance of judicial strength and rule of law.” International Studies Quarterly
56(1):193–202.
Staniland, Paul. 2012. “Organizing insurgency: Networks, resources, and rebellion in South
Asia.” International Security 37(1):142–177.
Staniland, Paul. 2014. Networks of rebellion: Explaining insurgent cohesion and collapse.
Cornell University Press.
Stoop, Nik, Marijke Verpoorten and Peter Van der Windt. 2018. “More legislation, more
violence? The impact of Dodd-Frank in the DRC.” PloS one 13(8):e0201783.
The Institute for Economics & Peace. 2017. Global Terrorism Index 2017. Technical report.
Toft, Peter, Arash Duero and Arunas Bieliauskas. 2010. “Terrorist targeting and energy
security.” Energy Policy 38(8):4411–4421.
Treier, Shawn and Simon Jackman. 2014. “Democracy as a Latent Variable Democracy as
a Latent Variable.” 52(1):201–217.
202
Trinkunas, Harold. 2019. “Financing Terrorism.” (October):1–18.
Trochim, William MK and James P Donnelly. 2008. Research methods knowledge base. Vol. 3
Atomic Dog Pub.
Turak, Natasha. 2019. “Saudi Arabia’s inclusion on European terror finance risk list could
threaten Vision 2030 investment.” CNBC .
UN. 1945. Charter of the United Nations.
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 2009. From conflict to peacebuilding.
URL: http://www.unep.org/pdf/pcdmb policy 01.pdf
UNOCD. 2010. World Drug Report 2010. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.




UNODC. 2021. “Money Laundering.” United Natinons Office on Drugs and Crime .
URL: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/overview.html
UNSC. 2003. Resolution 1493. United Nations Security Council.
UNSC. 2008. Resolution 1807. United Nations Security Council.
UNSC. 2012. Resolution 2036. United Nations Security Council.
UNSC. 2017. Resolution 2368. United Nations Security Council.
Vernon, Raymond. 1971. Sovereignty at Bay. New York: Basic Books.
Walsh, James Igoe, Justin M Conrad, Beth Elise Whitaker and Katelin M Hudak.
2018. “Funding rebellion: The Rebel Contraband Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research
55(5):699–707.
WB. 2018. The Decline in Access to Correspondent Banking Services in Emerging Markets:
Trends, Impacts, and Solutions. World Bank Group.
Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2006. Inside rebellion: The politics of insurgent violence. Cambridge
University Press.
Weiss, Thomas G. 1999. “Sanctions as a foreign policy tool: Weighing humanitarian im-
pulses.” Journal of Peace Research 36(5):499–509.
203
Williams, Rob, Daniel J. Gustafson, Stephen E. Gent and Mark J.C. Crescenzi. 2019. “A
latent variable approach to measuring and explaining peace agreement strength.” Political
Science Research and Methods 9(1):89–105.
Witte, Caroline T, Martijin J Burger, Elena I Ianchovichina and Enrico Pennings. 2016.
“Dodging bullets: The heterogeneous effect of political violence on greenfield FDI.” World
Bank Group: Policy Research Working Paper 7914 (December).
Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2008a. “The social processes of civil war: The wartime transformation
of social networks.” Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 11:539–561.
Wood, Reed M. 2008b. “‘A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation’: Economic Sanctions and
State Repression 1976-2001.” International Studies Quarterly 52(3):1976–2001.
Wood, Reed M. 2010. “Rebel capability and strategic violence against civilians.” Journal of
Peace Research 47(5):601–614.
Wood, Reed M. 2014. “From Loss to Looting? Battlefield Costs and Rebel Incentives for
Violence.” International Organization 68(04):979–999.
Wood, Reed M., Jacob D. Kathman and Stephen E. Gent. 2012. “Armed intervention and
civilian victimization in intrastate conflicts.” Journal of Peace Research 49(5):647–660.
Zarate, Juan. 2013. Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare.
Hachette UK.
204
